Mary Whitelaw Murphy as Trustee for The Wilson Trust -v- Laura-Kay Shields
- Document Type
- Decision
- Matter Number
- FBA 13/2026
- Matter Description
- Appeal against a decision of the Commission in matter number U 69 of 2023 given on 14 April 2026
- Industry
- Hospitality
- Jurisdiction
- Full Bench
- Member/Magistrate name
- Senior Commissioner R Cosentino, Commissioner C Tsang, Commissioner T Kucera
- Delivery Date
- 13 Aug 2026
- Result
- Appeal dismissed
- Citation
- 2026 WAIRC 00793
- WAIG Reference
APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION IN MATTER NUMBER U 69 OF 2023 GIVEN ON 14 APRIL 2026
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
FULL BENCH
CITATION : 2026 WAIRC 00793
CORAM
: SENIOR COMMISSIONER R COSENTINO
COMMISSIONER C TSANG
COMMISSIONER T KUCERA
HEARD
:
THURSDAY, 30 JULY 2026
DELIVERED : THURSDAY, 13 AUGUST 2026
FILE NO. : FBA 13 OF 2026
BETWEEN
:
MARY WHITELAW MURPHY AS TRUSTEE FOR THE WILSON TRUST
Appellant
AND
LAURA-KAY SHIELDS
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
JURISDICTION : WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
CORAM : COMMISSIONER TB WALKINGTON
CITATION : 2026 WAIRC 00218
FILE NO : U 69 OF 2023
CatchWords : Industrial Law (WA) – Appeal against a decision of the Commission – Remedy for unfair dismissal – Approach to assessing quantum of loss – Approach to assessing compensation for injury – Whether award of compensation for injury involved error or excessiveness – Appeal dismissed
Legislation : Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA)
Result : Appeal dismissed
REPRESENTATION:
APPELLANT : MS S LAW AND WITH HER MR G DIRK
RESPONDENT : MS L SHIELDS ON HER OWN BEHALF
Case(s) referred to in reasons:
Capewell v Cadbury Schweppes Australia Ltd (1997) 78 WAIG 299
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499
Shields v Mary Whitelaw Murphy as Trustee for the Wilson Trust [2026] WAIRC 00069; (2026) 106 WAIG 842
Shields v Mary Whitelaw Murphy as Trustee for the Wilson Trust [2026] WAIRC 00212; (2026) 106 WAIG 838
Shields v Mary Whitelaw Murphy as Trustee for the Wilson Trust [2026] WAIRC 00218; (2026) 106 WAIG 845
Richards v Nicoletti [2016] WAIRC 00941; (2016) 97 WAIG 177
Reasons for Decision
THE FULL BENCH:
1 The appellant, Mary Whitelaw Murphy as trustee for the Wilson Trust (Trustee), employed the respondent, Ms Laura-Kay Shields, as a casual cook. The employment started in March 2022 and ended on 28 September 2023. At the start of the employment, Ms Shields worked at the Trustee’s Wisteria Café business. In mid-2023, the Trustee commenced trading at a second location, Sessions at Craigie.
2 Ms Shields referred a claim of unfair dismissal to the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission. Following a hearing before the Commission, she succeeded in establishing that the end of the employment was both at the Trustee’s initiative, and that it was unfair: Shields v Mary Whitelaw Murphy as Trustee for the Wilson Trust [2026] WAIRC 00069; (2026) 106 WAIG 842 (Liability Decision) [27] and [34].
3 After the Commission published its reasons for upholding Ms Shields’ claim, it listed the claim for a further hearing to decide what orders should be made to remedy the unfair dismissal, in exercise of the powers conferred on the Commission under s 23A of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) (IR Act).
4 On 14 April 2026, the Commission made orders under s 23A requiring the Trustee to pay to Ms Shields within seven days:
(a) $21,971.19 gross as compensation for loss; and
(b) $3,000 gross for injury.
Shields v Mary Whitelaw Murphy as Trustee for the Wilson Trust [2026] WAIRC 00218; (2026) 106 WAIG 845.
5 As outlined in [30] of Shields v Mary Whitelaw Murphy as Trustee for the Wilson Trust [2026] WAIRC 00212; (2026) 106 WAIG 838 (Remedy Decision), the $21,971.19 as compensation for loss comprised $19,554.36 for loss of wages and $2,416.83 for loss of superannuation contributions.
6 The Trustee appeals against those orders. The two grounds of appeal concern the quantum of compensation for loss, and the fact that an award was made for compensation for injury.
Nature of the appeal
7 Having found that Ms Shields has been harshly, oppressively or unfairly dismissed, the Commissioner has a discretion under s 23A of the IR Act to make an award of compensation for loss or injury caused by the dismissal.
8 The relevant principles that apply in an appeal from a discretionary decision are well known. It is only in limited circumstances that the Full Bench should interfere with the exercise of a discretion by a Commissioner. The appellant must satisfy the Full Bench that the Commissioner has made an error in the exercise of their discretion, before the Full Bench can intervene. This might be a matter of principle, it may involve mistaking the facts, it may involve an error of law, it may also involve failing to take into account relevant considerations or taking into account irrelevant considerations. Additionally, if the decision reached is manifestly unreasonable or plainly unjust, appellate intervention may be permissible: House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 [504]–[505].
Ground 1: Compensation for loss of wages
9 In determining the quantum of compensable loss resulting from the dismissal, the Commissioner said in the Remedy Decision at [11], [15]–[19]:
11 The applicant contends that had it not been for the sudden and abrupt dismissal, she would have been employed for some years to come. The applicant says it was very unlikely she would have sought out other employment because she had enjoyed her job, the role was well suited to her skills, and she had a good rapport with other staff. The roster allocated suited her and she was paid above the award rate.
…
15 I find that the applicant’s expectation of continued employment for some years, was neither unfounded nor unreasonable. In my view, it is likely the applicant would have continued to be employed for some years to come. The respondent’s evidence does not persuade me that there was a real likelihood the applicant would be terminated within a short period of time of being dismissed.
16 As set out in [Bogunovich v Bayside Western Australia Pty Ltd [No 2] (1998) 79 WAIG 8] (8) and (9), the loss may be both up until the date of hearing as well as anticipated future lost wages.
17 The applicant sought to mitigate the loss she suffered from the dismissal and quickly secured alternative employment after her dismissal. The applicant’s evidence is that the income received during the same period as her calculations for loss from the respondent is $130,532.57.
18 The difference between the [applicant’s] earnings from the respondent had she continued in employment, and the earnings she received from her subsequent employment, is $21,971.19. I find that this is the loss the applicant has suffered because of the dismissal.
19 Given the applicant’s evidence that her earnings for six months with the respondent is $32,325.13 and the loss suffered because of the dismissal is less than the cap prescribed under s 23A(8) of the Act, I will order the respondent pay the applicant $19,554.36 gross for loss of wages and $2,416.83 gross for loss of superannuation contributions.
10 The Commissioner’s reasons assume Ms Shields would have remained in the Trustee’s employment up to the date that the Liability Decision was published on 5 February 2026, that is, a period of about 2 years and 19 weeks from the date that the employment actually ended.
11 The Trustee submits that the finding that Ms Shields would have continued to be employed for years to come was against the evidence. The Trustee relies on the following matters:
(a) Ms Shields was employed casually;
(b) She had only worked with the Trustee for around 18 months;
(c) She continued to be employed at all relevant times by another employer;
(d) She was under pressure due to the challenges of the role and was dissatisfied with management;
(e) There was mutual dissatisfaction in the workplace, or in other words, the relationship between the parties was breaking down; and
(f) Ms Shields’ communications on 28 September 2023 that preceded the dismissal were damaging to the employment relationship.
12 That Ms Shields was employed as a casual employee, and her period of service with the Trustee was uncontentious. However, there was no evidence before the Commissioner that Ms Shields was employed by, or working for, another employer at the time of her dismissal.
13 The evidence was that, at the start of her employment with the Trustee and while she was performing shifts only at one location, Wisteria Café, she was also working for another employer, a deli, on Sundays. However, she said that she resigned from the deli when she accepted the Trustee’s offer to work at a second location, Sessions at Craigie: ts 37. Her evidence in this regard was unchallenged. She returned to work for the other employer after the dismissal. This is verified by an Income Statement for the Financial Year 2023/2024 from that other employer which was tendered into evidence, showing the period of her employment commenced on 3 October 2023: exhibit A42(a).
14 Incidentally, it was also Ms Shields’ unchallenged evidence that she had worked for that other employer, as a casual employee, for six years: ts 8. This is relevant to whether the fact that Ms Shields was a casual employee of the Trustee is indicative of the likely longevity of the employment relationship.
15 The evidence is that Ms Shields worked at Wisteria Café for some time before accepting Ms Susan Law’s offer to work at Sessions at Craigie, which she accepted because the hours and pay suited her: ts 7–8, 37.
16 In her closing submissions, Ms Shields expressed the view that she believed her tenure at Sessions at Craigie would have extended into years because she probably would not have been able to negotiate for or get a better deal anywhere else: ts 55.
17 Ms Shields’ unchallenged evidence was that she got on well with all of the staff, although she had genuine concerns about the conduct of one of her coworkers towards a junior staff member: ts 16.
18 On 26 January 2023 Ms Shields raised an enquiry, by text message, about her pay. Her text message says ‘I don’t think you’ve done it on purpose…’ and ‘I take pride in my work an [sic] go above and beyond for the cafe to do my best…Hopefully we can rectify this as I do love working at the cafe.’: exhibit A1.
19 By 27 July 2023, the pay issue appeared to be resolved, or close to being resolved, as Ms Law had messaged Ms Shields to say she was finalising the payment regarding wages owed over the weekend. It was in that same message that Ms Law asked Ms Shields to come and work ‘for me’ at Sessions at Craigie: exhibit A3.
20 Messages between Ms Shields and Ms Law during August and September 2023 show mutual appreciation and cooperation: exhibit A30.
21 That the employment relationship was on a good footing is supported by the fact that when the Trustee commenced operating the Sessions at Craigie café in July 2023, Ms Shields was invited to work there and do more hours than she had previously been doing.
22 The Trustee’s only witness to give evidence was Mr Gareth Dirk. He did not work with Ms Shields. He spoke to her by telephone on 28 September 2023, during which the Commissioner found Ms Shields was told she was dismissed. When giving evidence, Mr Dirk asserted that there had been ‘behavioural and safety and health issues’ but this assertion was not substantiated by any cohesive factual evidence: ts 24.
23 The only evidence the Trustee could point to of a deterioration of the relationship was the communications that were exchanged on 28 September 2023, which the Trustee characterised as being undermining of management. The Trustee submitted the messages were inflammatory, showed that Ms Shields was unhappy in her employment, and that they inevitably would have caused a deterioration in the employment relationship. The Trustee submitted that those communications put ‘the wheels in motion’ for an end to the employment sooner rather than later.
24 The communications the Trustee is referring to, and the circumstances leading to them, are reproduced at [9]–[10] of the Liability Decision:
9 Ms Shields’ evidence is that on Wednesday, 27 September 2023, there was an extraordinarily high number of customers at the café because there was an event at the aquatic centre. The event involved more than 500 children attending the aquatic centre for the commencement of the swim vacation program. The staff working on the day were informed by the aquatic centre’s front of house staff when they arrived for their shift. In addition, at some point during the day, the iPad ordering system broke down, compounding further issues. Consequently, staff received complaints and abuse from customers.
10 The following day, the café owner, Ms Susan Law, messaged the staff through WhatsApp. Ms Shields provided copies of screenshots of the text exchange in the WhatsApp group chat:
Susan Law (at 6:46 am and 6:52 am Thursday, 28 September 2023) to the group WhatsApp:
ALL STAFF PLEASE READ
When Anna, the café manager, or I assigns you to a position in preparation for a busy day you are required to stay in that role unless told otherwise.
Failure to do so creates unnecessary stress on the rest of the team and will result in disciplinary action (6:46 am)
Today’s requirements
Dry side coffee machine: Anna
Dry side Register: Lewis
Wet side: Lilly A
Runners wet & dry: Alamaya, Hugo (6:52 am)
Laura Shields (at 7:32 am Thursday, 28 September 2023) to the group WhatsApp:
In all due respect Susan yesterday shouldn’t have happened. We were set up as a team to fail all along. To be notified start of shift on the same day that there was 500 kids booked in for a program was ridiculous and poor management. Extra staff should have been rostered to cater for events as yesterday. My position is head cook yet I’m constantly dragged from the kitchen to consult with angry aggressive customers and correcting incorrect orders from a failed ipad system and then when I’ve gone to get Anna or yourself to deal with the numerous angry customers (so I could get back to my position) neither of you were anywhere to be seen. It’s easy to blame each other for yesterday but in all honesty we had no hope giving the circumstances. Hopefully we’ve all learnt something from this an can provide a better service for next time
Anna (Café Manager) (at 7:43 AM and 7:52 am Thursday, 28 September 2023) to the group WhatsApp:
Hey Laura where do you like me tu put your bread in the coldroom or Freezer? (7:43 am)
And with all the due respect you are part of the management, so if you don’t mind we can keep management problems for the management meetings since we have one every week!
Thanks (7:52 am)
Laura Shields (at 8:24 am and 8:28 am Thursday, 28 September 2023) to the group WhatsApp in response:
In all due respect Anna I was responding to Susan’s ALL STAFF PLEASE READ post .... assuming I’m a staff member I’m responding to positions not been held an why I’m leaving mine. My kitchen management position is not to attend front of the house management issues. If I was part of the management team I would of known 500 kids plus and there parents were attending yesterday and every week day to come....as would of you. I’m kitchen manager not cafe manager. I manage food stock orders, kitchen staff, catering for events anything associated with food an kitchen and customer’s with food complaints....not lost failed orders or incorrect coffee orders !! Thanks (8:24 am)
I’ve spoken to my kitchen staff rostered on today so she knows the duties for today an where the bread is to go as it needs to be split up some frozen an some fresh for next couple days (8:28 am)
25 At its highest, it might be said that Ms Shields was defensive in responding to an all staff message critical of staff leaving their assigned post on the previous day by referring to being notified at the start of the shift that there were 500 children commencing the swim vacation program as ‘ridiculous and poor management’. She does not make this comment as a personal attack on anyone. She does not denigrate any individual. The tone of her message is one of frustration and disappointment. But Ms Shields’ frustrations were understandable and a reasonable response to the day’s events. Employees should not be expected to be passive and muted when faced with genuine and legitimate concerns, provided their concerns are expressed in an appropriate way and in an appropriate forum.
26 Ms Shields states ‘Hopefully we’ve all learnt something from this [and] can provide a better service for next time’: exhibit A12. In other words, her intention in sending the message was to learn from the events of the previous day and she was affirming her commitment to the Trustee’s business. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that her messages were damaging to the employment relationship or anything beyond the ordinary feedback that occurs in workplaces when issues arise, as they inevitably do, especially in a hospitality context.
27 Accordingly, on the evidence, it was open to the Commissioner to reject the Trustee’s suggestion that the relationship between Ms Shields and the Trustee was deteriorating before or as of 28 September 2023. There was ample evidence for the Commissioner to conclude, as she did, that Ms Shields was enjoying her job, and would have remained there for years to come.
28 The Trustee has failed to demonstrate any error of principle, any mistake in the facts, or any error of law. It is not enough that the Full Bench might have taken a different approach to the exercise of the discretion to award compensation on the facts of this case. The Commissioner exercised her discretion in accordance with established principles and consistent with the facts.
29 Second, the Trustee challenges the calculation that the Commissioner used in calculating Ms Shields’ loss, submitting that:
(a) they were excessive;
(b) they were rounded up; and
(c) they were made without regard to the Trustee’s payroll advice evidence submitted on the day of the hearing, so that the average earnings were overstated.
30 At the hearing of the appeal, the Trustee’s overarching submission was that the award of compensation amounted to a windfall to Ms Shields. It is unclear how the Trustee arrives at the conclusion that the compensation involves a windfall. Reference was made to the Trustee having an expectation that the compensation would be around three or four weeks’ pay. But the Trustee provided no calculations or other basis to say that the compensation awarded put Ms Shields in a better position than she would have been in if her employment had not been terminated.
31 The Trustee also submitted that Ms Shields’ calculations, which were accepted by the Commissioner, were based on the most favourable sixweek period of employment, when over the course of the employment, Ms Shields was not working as many hours as she worked in that sixweek period.
32 Under s 23A(8) of the IR Act, the amount of compensation that can be awarded by the Commission is not to exceed 6 months’ remuneration of the employee. Section 23A(9) states that for the purpose of s 23A(8), the Commission may calculate the amount on the basis of an average rate received by the employee during any relevant period of employment.
33 The meaning of ‘remuneration’ in s 23A(8) is not restricted to salary or wages but also includes superannuation contributions: Capewell v Cadbury Schweppes Australia Ltd (1997) 78 WAIG 299 at 301.
34 The Commissioner based her calculations of compensation on Ms Shields’ earnings in the sixweek period comprising of the pay periods commencing 14 August 2023 to 24 September 2023 (exhibits A34–A39): Remedy Decision [12]. There was a sound and logical basis for the selection of this sixweek period. It was the only period of time involving full weeks of work at Sessions at Craigie. It was therefore open to the Commissioner to accept these earnings as best approximating what Ms Shields would have earned in the future, which was anticipated to involve regular hours at Sessions at Craigie. Over this sixweek period, Ms Shields’ earnings, inclusive of superannuation contributions, totalled $7,439.21, equal to an average of $1,239.87 gross weekly remuneration.
35 Accordingly, the maximum amount that the Trustee could be ordered to pay to Ms Shields under s 23A was $32,236.58. Further, it was clearly open to the Commissioner to base calculations of loss using average weekly remuneration of $1,239.87.
36 There was evidence before the Commission of Ms Shields’ remuneration with the Trustee in the financial years ending 30 June 2022 and 30 June 2023. While her average weekly remuneration in those years was lower than $1,239.87, it is unsurprising, in the circumstances of this case where Ms Shields’ evidence included that she ceased working for a former employer when her hours with the Trustee increased, that her hours and earnings increased over the period of her employment. Therefore, it is reasonable to look to a later portion of the employment, as opposed to the entire duration of the employment, in calculating compensation.
37 The Commissioner was alive to the ability to compensate for loss both up to the date of the hearing, as well as anticipated future lost wages: Remedy Decision [16], reproduced at [9] above. However, the award of compensation reflected what the Commissioner found to be actual loss suffered to the date of the Liability Decision: Remedy Decision [18].
38 Ms Shields had three employers in the period from the date of the dismissal to the date of the Liability Decision, being the deli, the Department of Education and Mullaloo Heights Primary School Parents and Citizens Association. She produced Income Statements for all three employers for the financial years in which she worked for each of them ending 30 June 2024 and 30 June 2025: exhibits A42(a), A44(a), A46, A48, A51.
39 Ms Shields’ unchallenged evidence was that in relation to the period from 1 July 2025 to 5 February 2026, she was only employed by the Department of Education. Her evidence of her earnings from the Department of Education in that period was in the form of a payslip showing actual year to date earnings for wages as at 25 September 2025 of $13,924.91 gross: Exhibit A41. From this she added an estimate of superannuation paid, and a further pro-rata amount for earnings from the date of the issue of the payslip to 5 February 2026, to total $37,052.54.
40 Exhibit A41 shows that as at 25 September 2025, Ms Shields was earning average remuneration of $1,994.59 per fortnight, which is $997.30 per week, excluding superannuation (or $1,116.98 per week inclusive of superannuation). That is, she was not earning the same amount she had been earning prior to the dismissal and was still continuing to suffer loss.
41 Accordingly, the evidence before the Commission demonstrated that, at all times after the date of the dismissal until the date of the Liability Decision, Ms Shields’ average weekly remuneration remained less than her average weekly remuneration for the sixweek period prior to the dismissal where she performed a full week of work. There was therefore a sound basis to calculate the loss by reference to that entire period. The calculations were supported by the evidence referred to and the award was therefore one that was open to the Commissioner.
42 This part of the appeal ground is without merit. No mistake of fact, nor any error of law or misapplication of principles is demonstrated. The Commissioner’s assessment adopted the period and remuneration most favourable to Ms Shields that were reasonably open on the evidence. That does not establish appealable error.
43 The Trustee challenges the calculation of Ms Shields’ loss as derived from figures that were ‘rounded up’. The figure of $130,532.57 for post-dismissal earnings accepted at Remedy Decision [17] reconciles exactly with the exhibits:
(a) $24,078.47 from the deli and $6,838.28 from the Department of Education in the 2023/2024 financial year (exhibits A42(a), A46);
(b) $3,243.52 from the deli, $57,386.62 from the Department of Education and $1,933.14 from the Mullaloo Heights Primary School Parents and Citizens’ Association in the 2024/2025 financial year (exhibits A44(a), A48, A51); and
(c) Ms Shields’ estimate of $37,052.54 for the period 1 July 2025 to 5 February 2026 (exhibit A41).
44 Each figure, inclusive of superannuation, derives from source documents, most issued by the Australian Taxation Office or by the employers themselves. Therefore, the suggestion that the figures were ‘rounded up’ is not made out.
45 The complaint that the Commissioner disregarded the Trustee’s payroll evidence tendered on the day of the remedy hearing (exhibits R12–R14) does not advance the appeal. Those documents are payroll activity summaries for the 2023/2024 financial year. They record what the Trustee paid Ms Shields across that year, including the period when she worked fewer hours at Wisteria Café and the truncated period after the dismissal. They say little about what Ms Shields would have likely earned had the employment continued on the footing that existed once she was working full weeks at Sessions at Craigie. The weekly payslips on which the Commissioner relied on were the Trustee’s own documents. The summaries could not, and did not, contradict them.
46 In her grounds of appeal, the Trustee also says:
The transcript shows that there was confusion about the relevance of important, verifiable information as submitted by the Respondent (Notice of Assessments).
47 It is unclear what the Trustee intends the Full Bench to make of this submission. It is indeed apparent from the transcript that the Trustee’s representative conducted a confused crossexamination of Ms Shields about whether she had ‘Notices of Assessment’. The Commissioner intervened to try to ascertain what documents the representative was referring to, and who created them. A Notice of Assessment is a document issued by the Australian Taxation Office following the processing of an income tax return to explain how a tax assessment is calculated. But the Trustee’s representative suggested he was referring to a document that was created by Ms Shields’ employers showing the total payments made to her during a financial year. He was probably intending to refer to an Income Statement which is the equivalent of a payment summary. Ms Shields had already produced Income Statements from her employers. These were in evidence. The cross-examination did not elicit anything capable of affecting the calculations, which rested on the Income Statements already in evidence. No appealable error arises.
48 Ground 1 of the appeal should be dismissed.
Ground 2: Compensation for injury
49 In relation to ground 2, loss for injury, the Commissioner found at Remedy Decision [29] that Ms Shields suffered anxiety and emotional distress which required medical treatment, and that the anxiety and distress were heightened by the dismissal. The Commissioner awarded $3,000 for injury.
50 In so finding, the Commissioner noted in the Remedy Decision:
21 Claims for injury must be supported by evidence: AWI Administration Services Pty Ltd v Birnie [2001] WAIRC 04015; (2001) 81 WAIG 2849 [200]. In addition, the injury must be beyond the distress experienced in most dismissal cases: Lynam v Lataga Pty Ltd [2001] WAIRC 02420; (2001) 81 WAIG 986 [56].
22 The applicant says during the phone call when she was verbally dismissed, Mr Dirk was aggressive and attacking. The applicant submits that following the phone call, she suffered panic attacks and a resurgence of her Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The applicant says the respondent locked her out of the workplace and denied her a separation certificate.
23 The applicant supported her claims with evidence from a medical practitioner. The letter provided states that the applicant attended her medical practitioner in September 2023 and that the dismissal had an understandably negative impact on the applicant’s mental health. The letter says that she has since engaged in psychological therapy and medication to treat anxiety and continues to experience anxiety related to the dismissal.
24 In her written submissions, the applicant asserts that she was locked out of the workplace. However, the applicant has not provided any evidence that this was the case. The applicant’s submissions are that she requested a former co-worker collect her personal items because she did not want to go behind the counter. The applicant’s evidence is that the representatives of the respondent removed the applicant from the WhatsApp group chat used to communicate between staff, prior to the dismissal.
25 The applicant’s evidence on these issues, were not contested by the respondent.
51 By this ground of appeal, the Trustee submits that the Commissioner erred in finding that Ms Shields’ evidence of distress was not challenged:
The Trustee submits that the evidence does not support a finding that the respondents [sic] conduct in dismissing the applicant caused psychological and/or emotional injury.
The Commission made findings that the Respondent [Trustee] did not challenge the evidence of the distress the dismissal caused to the Applicant. This is inconsistent with the verbal submissions made at the hearing as recorded by the transcript.
The evidence does not support that the Applicant had a heightened level of anxiety and distress as a result of the dismissal.
52 To the extent that the Trustee alleges error in finding, or more accurately observing, there was no challenge to the evidence, the Trustee points out that Mr Dirk crossexamined Ms Shields about the medical certificate relied on by her. His crossexamination, at ts 48–49, involved asking Ms Shields whether the medical certificate was in relation to the psychiatric condition of PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Ms Shields answered that it referred to her having a panic attack and seeking medical attention on the day of the dismissal and subsequently having treatment under a mental health care plan. She did not rely on the medical letter as establishing a resurgence of PTSD. The cross-examination therefore challenged one characterisation of the condition but did not materially contradict her evidence that the dismissal caused anxiety for which she obtained treatment.
53 In Richards v Nicoletti [2016] WAIRC 00941; (2016) 97 WAIG 117, Acting President Smith summarised the principles that apply in determining an award of compensation for injury at [37]–[38]:
37 The leading statement of principles to be applied by the Commission when considering whether to make an award of compensation for injury is set out in the following passage of the joint judgment of Coleman CC and Smith C in Birnie wherein it was said [200]:
It is accepted that there is an element of distress associated with almost all employer initiated terminations of employment. For injury to be recognised by way of compensation and thereby fall outside the limits which can be taken to have normally been associated with a harsh, oppressive or unfair dismissal there needs to be evidence that loss of dignity, anxiety, humiliation, stress or nervous shock has been sustained. Injury embraces the actual harm done to an employee by the unfair dismissal. It comprehends ‘all manner of wrongs’ including being treated with callousness ([Capewell]). The injury may be manifested by the detrimental impact on the physical or emotional wellbeing of the person whose services were terminated. However dismissals will impact to varying degrees on individuals and while the need for professional care may be evidence of that impact, this will not necessarily always be the case in order to establish the causal link between the termination of employment and the injury. While it is necessary to exercise a degree of caution to ensure that compensation is confined to reasonable limits (Timms v Phillips Engineering Pty Ltd (1997) 70 WAIG 1318 and Burazin v Blacktown City Guardian Pty Ltd 142 ALR 144) that is not to say that every claim for injury necessarily involves expert evidence of emotional trauma.
1 The circumstances in which the dismissal from employment has been effected may be sufficient to demonstrate the injury which is experienced. Situations where an employee is locked out of the workplace or is escorted from the premises, or the termination has been conducted in full view of other staff are examples of callous treatment justifying recognition for compensation for injury (Lynam v Lataga Pty Ltd (2001) 81 WAIG 986).
2 However, the Commission is not able to adjust the measure of compensation according to the opinion of the employer or employee or of the conduct of the respective parties ([Capewell]).
38 From these principles emerges a requirement to assess the gravity or scale of the injury. In particular, when considering whether to make an award of compensation for injury, the following matters should be considered:
(a) Whether the behaviour by or on behalf of an employer by the termination of employment has caused injury to the employee.
(b) If the behaviour in question has caused an injury, the gravity of the behaviour of the employer.
(c) The level of effect or impact of the behaviour on the employee and whether the effect or impact goes beyond a level of distress that is caused by almost all employer initiated terminations of employment.
54 The Commissioner undertook the analysis which the principles set out in Richards require.
55 While the Commissioner noted Ms Shields’ submission that Mr Dirk was aggressive and attacking during the phone call when she was dismissed, the Commissioner did not make a finding to this effect. Similarly, while the Commissioner noted the submission that Ms Shields suffered a resurgence of PTSD, she made no finding to this effect.
56 Rather, the Commissioner found that Ms Shields’ evidence on these issues was uncontested: Remedy Decision [25]. The issues the Commissioner is referring to is Ms Shields’ claim for an unspecified amount, as compensation for injury, for psychological and emotional injury because of the Trustee’s conduct in dismissing her: Remedy Decision [20]. The evidence that the Commissioner is referring to is stated at Remedy Decision [23], namely the letter from her medical practitioner (exhibit A39(a)) who had treated her since November 2017. The letter recorded that Ms Shields reported her dismissal in September 2023, that the dismissal had negatively affected her mental health, that she had received psychological therapy and medication for anxiety, and that she continued to experience anxiety related to the dismissal. Accordingly, the Commissioner was properly satisfied that the Trustee’s behaviour by the termination of employment had caused injury to Ms Shields.
57 The Commissioner assessed the gravity of the Trustee’s behaviour by considering Ms Shields’ submission that the dismissal involved her being locked out from the premises. The Commissioner ultimately rejected Ms Shields’ argument in this regard: Remedy Decision [28].
58 The effect of the Commissioner’s reasons, read in their full context, is that she found nothing in the Trustee’s conduct was callous, abusive or at the high end of the scale of gravity. The award of $3,000 as compensation for injury reflects this.
59 Finally, the Commissioner implicitly accepted that the level of effect or impact of the behaviour on Ms Shields went beyond a level of distress typically caused by employer-initiated terminations of employment because it involved anxiety and emotional distress which required medical treatment: Remedy Decision [29].
60 The Trustee has not demonstrated any error in relation to the award of compensation for injury.
61 Ground 2 of the appeal should be dismissed.
62 For the preceding reasons, the appeal should be dismissed.
APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION IN MATTER NUMBER U 69 OF 2023 GIVEN ON 14 APRIL 2026
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
FULL BENCH
CITATION : 2026 WAIRC 00793
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CORAM |
: Senior Commissioner R Cosentino Commissioner C Tsang Commissioner T Kucera |
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HEARD |
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THURSDAY, 30 JULY 2026 |
DELIVERED : THURsday, 13 August 2026
FILE NO. : FBA 13 OF 2026
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BETWEEN |
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Mary Whitelaw Murphy as Trustee for The Wilson Trust |
Appellant
AND
Laura-Kay Shields
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission
Coram : Commissioner TB Walkington
Citation : 2026 WAIRC 00218
File No : U 69 of 2023
CatchWords : Industrial Law (WA) – Appeal against a decision of the Commission – Remedy for unfair dismissal – Approach to assessing quantum of loss – Approach to assessing compensation for injury – Whether award of compensation for injury involved error or excessiveness – Appeal dismissed
Legislation : Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA)
Result : Appeal dismissed
Representation:
Appellant : Ms S Law and with her Mr G Dirk
Respondent : Ms L Shields on her own behalf
Case(s) referred to in reasons:
Capewell v Cadbury Schweppes Australia Ltd (1997) 78 WAIG 299
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499
Shields v Mary Whitelaw Murphy as Trustee for the Wilson Trust [2026] WAIRC 00069; (2026) 106 WAIG 842
Shields v Mary Whitelaw Murphy as Trustee for the Wilson Trust [2026] WAIRC 00212; (2026) 106 WAIG 838
Shields v Mary Whitelaw Murphy as Trustee for the Wilson Trust [2026] WAIRC 00218; (2026) 106 WAIG 845
Richards v Nicoletti [2016] WAIRC 00941; (2016) 97 WAIG 177
Reasons for Decision
THE FULL BENCH:
1 The appellant, Mary Whitelaw Murphy as trustee for the Wilson Trust (Trustee), employed the respondent, Ms Laura-Kay Shields, as a casual cook. The employment started in March 2022 and ended on 28 September 2023. At the start of the employment, Ms Shields worked at the Trustee’s Wisteria Café business. In mid-2023, the Trustee commenced trading at a second location, Sessions at Craigie.
2 Ms Shields referred a claim of unfair dismissal to the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission. Following a hearing before the Commission, she succeeded in establishing that the end of the employment was both at the Trustee’s initiative, and that it was unfair: Shields v Mary Whitelaw Murphy as Trustee for the Wilson Trust [2026] WAIRC 00069; (2026) 106 WAIG 842 (Liability Decision) [27] and [34].
3 After the Commission published its reasons for upholding Ms Shields’ claim, it listed the claim for a further hearing to decide what orders should be made to remedy the unfair dismissal, in exercise of the powers conferred on the Commission under s 23A of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) (IR Act).
4 On 14 April 2026, the Commission made orders under s 23A requiring the Trustee to pay to Ms Shields within seven days:
(a) $21,971.19 gross as compensation for loss; and
(b) $3,000 gross for injury.
Shields v Mary Whitelaw Murphy as Trustee for the Wilson Trust [2026] WAIRC 00218; (2026) 106 WAIG 845.
5 As outlined in [30] of Shields v Mary Whitelaw Murphy as Trustee for the Wilson Trust [2026] WAIRC 00212; (2026) 106 WAIG 838 (Remedy Decision), the $21,971.19 as compensation for loss comprised $19,554.36 for loss of wages and $2,416.83 for loss of superannuation contributions.
6 The Trustee appeals against those orders. The two grounds of appeal concern the quantum of compensation for loss, and the fact that an award was made for compensation for injury.
Nature of the appeal
7 Having found that Ms Shields has been harshly, oppressively or unfairly dismissed, the Commissioner has a discretion under s 23A of the IR Act to make an award of compensation for loss or injury caused by the dismissal.
8 The relevant principles that apply in an appeal from a discretionary decision are well known. It is only in limited circumstances that the Full Bench should interfere with the exercise of a discretion by a Commissioner. The appellant must satisfy the Full Bench that the Commissioner has made an error in the exercise of their discretion, before the Full Bench can intervene. This might be a matter of principle, it may involve mistaking the facts, it may involve an error of law, it may also involve failing to take into account relevant considerations or taking into account irrelevant considerations. Additionally, if the decision reached is manifestly unreasonable or plainly unjust, appellate intervention may be permissible: House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 [504]–[505].
Ground 1: Compensation for loss of wages
9 In determining the quantum of compensable loss resulting from the dismissal, the Commissioner said in the Remedy Decision at [11], [15]–[19]:
11 The applicant contends that had it not been for the sudden and abrupt dismissal, she would have been employed for some years to come. The applicant says it was very unlikely she would have sought out other employment because she had enjoyed her job, the role was well suited to her skills, and she had a good rapport with other staff. The roster allocated suited her and she was paid above the award rate.
…
15 I find that the applicant’s expectation of continued employment for some years, was neither unfounded nor unreasonable. In my view, it is likely the applicant would have continued to be employed for some years to come. The respondent’s evidence does not persuade me that there was a real likelihood the applicant would be terminated within a short period of time of being dismissed.
16 As set out in [Bogunovich v Bayside Western Australia Pty Ltd [No 2] (1998) 79 WAIG 8] (8) and (9), the loss may be both up until the date of hearing as well as anticipated future lost wages.
17 The applicant sought to mitigate the loss she suffered from the dismissal and quickly secured alternative employment after her dismissal. The applicant’s evidence is that the income received during the same period as her calculations for loss from the respondent is $130,532.57.
18 The difference between the [applicant’s] earnings from the respondent had she continued in employment, and the earnings she received from her subsequent employment, is $21,971.19. I find that this is the loss the applicant has suffered because of the dismissal.
19 Given the applicant’s evidence that her earnings for six months with the respondent is $32,325.13 and the loss suffered because of the dismissal is less than the cap prescribed under s 23A(8) of the Act, I will order the respondent pay the applicant $19,554.36 gross for loss of wages and $2,416.83 gross for loss of superannuation contributions.
10 The Commissioner’s reasons assume Ms Shields would have remained in the Trustee’s employment up to the date that the Liability Decision was published on 5 February 2026, that is, a period of about 2 years and 19 weeks from the date that the employment actually ended.
11 The Trustee submits that the finding that Ms Shields would have continued to be employed for years to come was against the evidence. The Trustee relies on the following matters:
(a) Ms Shields was employed casually;
(b) She had only worked with the Trustee for around 18 months;
(c) She continued to be employed at all relevant times by another employer;
(d) She was under pressure due to the challenges of the role and was dissatisfied with management;
(e) There was mutual dissatisfaction in the workplace, or in other words, the relationship between the parties was breaking down; and
(f) Ms Shields’ communications on 28 September 2023 that preceded the dismissal were damaging to the employment relationship.
12 That Ms Shields was employed as a casual employee, and her period of service with the Trustee was uncontentious. However, there was no evidence before the Commissioner that Ms Shields was employed by, or working for, another employer at the time of her dismissal.
13 The evidence was that, at the start of her employment with the Trustee and while she was performing shifts only at one location, Wisteria Café, she was also working for another employer, a deli, on Sundays. However, she said that she resigned from the deli when she accepted the Trustee’s offer to work at a second location, Sessions at Craigie: ts 37. Her evidence in this regard was unchallenged. She returned to work for the other employer after the dismissal. This is verified by an Income Statement for the Financial Year 2023/2024 from that other employer which was tendered into evidence, showing the period of her employment commenced on 3 October 2023: exhibit A42(a).
14 Incidentally, it was also Ms Shields’ unchallenged evidence that she had worked for that other employer, as a casual employee, for six years: ts 8. This is relevant to whether the fact that Ms Shields was a casual employee of the Trustee is indicative of the likely longevity of the employment relationship.
15 The evidence is that Ms Shields worked at Wisteria Café for some time before accepting Ms Susan Law’s offer to work at Sessions at Craigie, which she accepted because the hours and pay suited her: ts 7–8, 37.
16 In her closing submissions, Ms Shields expressed the view that she believed her tenure at Sessions at Craigie would have extended into years because she probably would not have been able to negotiate for or get a better deal anywhere else: ts 55.
17 Ms Shields’ unchallenged evidence was that she got on well with all of the staff, although she had genuine concerns about the conduct of one of her co‑workers towards a junior staff member: ts 16.
18 On 26 January 2023 Ms Shields raised an enquiry, by text message, about her pay. Her text message says ‘I don’t think you’ve done it on purpose…’ and ‘I take pride in my work an [sic] go above and beyond for the cafe to do my best…Hopefully we can rectify this as I do love working at the cafe.’: exhibit A1.
19 By 27 July 2023, the pay issue appeared to be resolved, or close to being resolved, as Ms Law had messaged Ms Shields to say she was finalising the payment regarding wages owed over the weekend. It was in that same message that Ms Law asked Ms Shields to come and work ‘for me’ at Sessions at Craigie: exhibit A3.
20 Messages between Ms Shields and Ms Law during August and September 2023 show mutual appreciation and cooperation: exhibit A30.
21 That the employment relationship was on a good footing is supported by the fact that when the Trustee commenced operating the Sessions at Craigie café in July 2023, Ms Shields was invited to work there and do more hours than she had previously been doing.
22 The Trustee’s only witness to give evidence was Mr Gareth Dirk. He did not work with Ms Shields. He spoke to her by telephone on 28 September 2023, during which the Commissioner found Ms Shields was told she was dismissed. When giving evidence, Mr Dirk asserted that there had been ‘behavioural and safety and health issues’ but this assertion was not substantiated by any cohesive factual evidence: ts 24.
23 The only evidence the Trustee could point to of a deterioration of the relationship was the communications that were exchanged on 28 September 2023, which the Trustee characterised as being undermining of management. The Trustee submitted the messages were inflammatory, showed that Ms Shields was unhappy in her employment, and that they inevitably would have caused a deterioration in the employment relationship. The Trustee submitted that those communications put ‘the wheels in motion’ for an end to the employment sooner rather than later.
24 The communications the Trustee is referring to, and the circumstances leading to them, are reproduced at [9]–[10] of the Liability Decision:
9 Ms Shields’ evidence is that on Wednesday, 27 September 2023, there was an extraordinarily high number of customers at the café because there was an event at the aquatic centre. The event involved more than 500 children attending the aquatic centre for the commencement of the swim vacation program. The staff working on the day were informed by the aquatic centre’s front of house staff when they arrived for their shift. In addition, at some point during the day, the iPad ordering system broke down, compounding further issues. Consequently, staff received complaints and abuse from customers.
10 The following day, the café owner, Ms Susan Law, messaged the staff through WhatsApp. Ms Shields provided copies of screenshots of the text exchange in the WhatsApp group chat:
Susan Law (at 6:46 am and 6:52 am Thursday, 28 September 2023) to the group WhatsApp:
ALL STAFF PLEASE READ
When Anna, the café manager, or I assigns you to a position in preparation for a busy day you are required to stay in that role unless told otherwise.
Failure to do so creates unnecessary stress on the rest of the team and will result in disciplinary action (6:46 am)
Today’s requirements
Dry side coffee machine: Anna
Dry side Register: Lewis
Wet side: Lilly A
Runners wet & dry: Alamaya, Hugo (6:52 am)
Laura Shields (at 7:32 am Thursday, 28 September 2023) to the group WhatsApp:
In all due respect Susan yesterday shouldn’t have happened. We were set up as a team to fail all along. To be notified start of shift on the same day that there was 500 kids booked in for a program was ridiculous and poor management. Extra staff should have been rostered to cater for events as yesterday. My position is head cook yet I’m constantly dragged from the kitchen to consult with angry aggressive customers and correcting incorrect orders from a failed ipad system and then when I’ve gone to get Anna or yourself to deal with the numerous angry customers (so I could get back to my position) neither of you were anywhere to be seen. It’s easy to blame each other for yesterday but in all honesty we had no hope giving the circumstances. Hopefully we’ve all learnt something from this an can provide a better service for next time
Anna (Café Manager) (at 7:43 AM and 7:52 am Thursday, 28 September 2023) to the group WhatsApp:
Hey Laura where do you like me tu put your bread in the coldroom or Freezer? (7:43 am)
And with all the due respect you are part of the management, so if you don’t mind we can keep management problems for the management meetings since we have one every week!
Thanks (7:52 am)
Laura Shields (at 8:24 am and 8:28 am Thursday, 28 September 2023) to the group WhatsApp in response:
In all due respect Anna I was responding to Susan’s ALL STAFF PLEASE READ post .... assuming I’m a staff member I’m responding to positions not been held an why I’m leaving mine. My kitchen management position is not to attend front of the house management issues. If I was part of the management team I would of known 500 kids plus and there parents were attending yesterday and every week day to come....as would of you. I’m kitchen manager not cafe manager. I manage food stock orders, kitchen staff, catering for events anything associated with food an kitchen and customer’s with food complaints....not lost failed orders or incorrect coffee orders !! Thanks (8:24 am)
I’ve spoken to my kitchen staff rostered on today so she knows the duties for today an where the bread is to go as it needs to be split up some frozen an some fresh for next couple days (8:28 am)
25 At its highest, it might be said that Ms Shields was defensive in responding to an all staff message critical of staff leaving their assigned post on the previous day by referring to being notified at the start of the shift that there were 500 children commencing the swim vacation program as ‘ridiculous and poor management’. She does not make this comment as a personal attack on anyone. She does not denigrate any individual. The tone of her message is one of frustration and disappointment. But Ms Shields’ frustrations were understandable and a reasonable response to the day’s events. Employees should not be expected to be passive and muted when faced with genuine and legitimate concerns, provided their concerns are expressed in an appropriate way and in an appropriate forum.
26 Ms Shields states ‘Hopefully we’ve all learnt something from this [and] can provide a better service for next time’: exhibit A12. In other words, her intention in sending the message was to learn from the events of the previous day and she was affirming her commitment to the Trustee’s business. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that her messages were damaging to the employment relationship or anything beyond the ordinary feedback that occurs in workplaces when issues arise, as they inevitably do, especially in a hospitality context.
27 Accordingly, on the evidence, it was open to the Commissioner to reject the Trustee’s suggestion that the relationship between Ms Shields and the Trustee was deteriorating before or as of 28 September 2023. There was ample evidence for the Commissioner to conclude, as she did, that Ms Shields was enjoying her job, and would have remained there for years to come.
28 The Trustee has failed to demonstrate any error of principle, any mistake in the facts, or any error of law. It is not enough that the Full Bench might have taken a different approach to the exercise of the discretion to award compensation on the facts of this case. The Commissioner exercised her discretion in accordance with established principles and consistent with the facts.
29 Second, the Trustee challenges the calculation that the Commissioner used in calculating Ms Shields’ loss, submitting that:
(a) they were excessive;
(b) they were rounded up; and
(c) they were made without regard to the Trustee’s payroll advice evidence submitted on the day of the hearing, so that the average earnings were overstated.
30 At the hearing of the appeal, the Trustee’s overarching submission was that the award of compensation amounted to a windfall to Ms Shields. It is unclear how the Trustee arrives at the conclusion that the compensation involves a windfall. Reference was made to the Trustee having an expectation that the compensation would be around three or four weeks’ pay. But the Trustee provided no calculations or other basis to say that the compensation awarded put Ms Shields in a better position than she would have been in if her employment had not been terminated.
31 The Trustee also submitted that Ms Shields’ calculations, which were accepted by the Commissioner, were based on the most favourable six‑week period of employment, when over the course of the employment, Ms Shields was not working as many hours as she worked in that six‑week period.
32 Under s 23A(8) of the IR Act, the amount of compensation that can be awarded by the Commission is not to exceed 6 months’ remuneration of the employee. Section 23A(9) states that for the purpose of s 23A(8), the Commission may calculate the amount on the basis of an average rate received by the employee during any relevant period of employment.
33 The meaning of ‘remuneration’ in s 23A(8) is not restricted to salary or wages but also includes superannuation contributions: Capewell v Cadbury Schweppes Australia Ltd (1997) 78 WAIG 299 at 301.
34 The Commissioner based her calculations of compensation on Ms Shields’ earnings in the six‑week period comprising of the pay periods commencing 14 August 2023 to 24 September 2023 (exhibits A34–A39): Remedy Decision [12]. There was a sound and logical basis for the selection of this six‑week period. It was the only period of time involving full weeks of work at Sessions at Craigie. It was therefore open to the Commissioner to accept these earnings as best approximating what Ms Shields would have earned in the future, which was anticipated to involve regular hours at Sessions at Craigie. Over this six‑week period, Ms Shields’ earnings, inclusive of superannuation contributions, totalled $7,439.21, equal to an average of $1,239.87 gross weekly remuneration.
35 Accordingly, the maximum amount that the Trustee could be ordered to pay to Ms Shields under s 23A was $32,236.58. Further, it was clearly open to the Commissioner to base calculations of loss using average weekly remuneration of $1,239.87.
36 There was evidence before the Commission of Ms Shields’ remuneration with the Trustee in the financial years ending 30 June 2022 and 30 June 2023. While her average weekly remuneration in those years was lower than $1,239.87, it is unsurprising, in the circumstances of this case where Ms Shields’ evidence included that she ceased working for a former employer when her hours with the Trustee increased, that her hours and earnings increased over the period of her employment. Therefore, it is reasonable to look to a later portion of the employment, as opposed to the entire duration of the employment, in calculating compensation.
37 The Commissioner was alive to the ability to compensate for loss both up to the date of the hearing, as well as anticipated future lost wages: Remedy Decision [16], reproduced at [9] above. However, the award of compensation reflected what the Commissioner found to be actual loss suffered to the date of the Liability Decision: Remedy Decision [18].
38 Ms Shields had three employers in the period from the date of the dismissal to the date of the Liability Decision, being the deli, the Department of Education and Mullaloo Heights Primary School Parents and Citizens Association. She produced Income Statements for all three employers for the financial years in which she worked for each of them ending 30 June 2024 and 30 June 2025: exhibits A42(a), A44(a), A46, A48, A51.
39 Ms Shields’ unchallenged evidence was that in relation to the period from 1 July 2025 to 5 February 2026, she was only employed by the Department of Education. Her evidence of her earnings from the Department of Education in that period was in the form of a payslip showing actual year to date earnings for wages as at 25 September 2025 of $13,924.91 gross: Exhibit A41. From this she added an estimate of superannuation paid, and a further pro-rata amount for earnings from the date of the issue of the payslip to 5 February 2026, to total $37,052.54.
40 Exhibit A41 shows that as at 25 September 2025, Ms Shields was earning average remuneration of $1,994.59 per fortnight, which is $997.30 per week, excluding superannuation (or $1,116.98 per week inclusive of superannuation). That is, she was not earning the same amount she had been earning prior to the dismissal and was still continuing to suffer loss.
41 Accordingly, the evidence before the Commission demonstrated that, at all times after the date of the dismissal until the date of the Liability Decision, Ms Shields’ average weekly remuneration remained less than her average weekly remuneration for the six‑week period prior to the dismissal where she performed a full week of work. There was therefore a sound basis to calculate the loss by reference to that entire period. The calculations were supported by the evidence referred to and the award was therefore one that was open to the Commissioner.
42 This part of the appeal ground is without merit. No mistake of fact, nor any error of law or misapplication of principles is demonstrated. The Commissioner’s assessment adopted the period and remuneration most favourable to Ms Shields that were reasonably open on the evidence. That does not establish appealable error.
43 The Trustee challenges the calculation of Ms Shields’ loss as derived from figures that were ‘rounded up’. The figure of $130,532.57 for post-dismissal earnings accepted at Remedy Decision [17] reconciles exactly with the exhibits:
(a) $24,078.47 from the deli and $6,838.28 from the Department of Education in the 2023/2024 financial year (exhibits A42(a), A46);
(b) $3,243.52 from the deli, $57,386.62 from the Department of Education and $1,933.14 from the Mullaloo Heights Primary School Parents and Citizens’ Association in the 2024/2025 financial year (exhibits A44(a), A48, A51); and
(c) Ms Shields’ estimate of $37,052.54 for the period 1 July 2025 to 5 February 2026 (exhibit A41).
44 Each figure, inclusive of superannuation, derives from source documents, most issued by the Australian Taxation Office or by the employers themselves. Therefore, the suggestion that the figures were ‘rounded up’ is not made out.
45 The complaint that the Commissioner disregarded the Trustee’s payroll evidence tendered on the day of the remedy hearing (exhibits R12–R14) does not advance the appeal. Those documents are payroll activity summaries for the 2023/2024 financial year. They record what the Trustee paid Ms Shields across that year, including the period when she worked fewer hours at Wisteria Café and the truncated period after the dismissal. They say little about what Ms Shields would have likely earned had the employment continued on the footing that existed once she was working full weeks at Sessions at Craigie. The weekly payslips on which the Commissioner relied on were the Trustee’s own documents. The summaries could not, and did not, contradict them.
46 In her grounds of appeal, the Trustee also says:
The transcript shows that there was confusion about the relevance of important, verifiable information as submitted by the Respondent (Notice of Assessments).
47 It is unclear what the Trustee intends the Full Bench to make of this submission. It is indeed apparent from the transcript that the Trustee’s representative conducted a confused cross‑examination of Ms Shields about whether she had ‘Notices of Assessment’. The Commissioner intervened to try to ascertain what documents the representative was referring to, and who created them. A Notice of Assessment is a document issued by the Australian Taxation Office following the processing of an income tax return to explain how a tax assessment is calculated. But the Trustee’s representative suggested he was referring to a document that was created by Ms Shields’ employers showing the total payments made to her during a financial year. He was probably intending to refer to an Income Statement which is the equivalent of a payment summary. Ms Shields had already produced Income Statements from her employers. These were in evidence. The cross-examination did not elicit anything capable of affecting the calculations, which rested on the Income Statements already in evidence. No appealable error arises.
48 Ground 1 of the appeal should be dismissed.
Ground 2: Compensation for injury
49 In relation to ground 2, loss for injury, the Commissioner found at Remedy Decision [29] that Ms Shields suffered anxiety and emotional distress which required medical treatment, and that the anxiety and distress were heightened by the dismissal. The Commissioner awarded $3,000 for injury.
50 In so finding, the Commissioner noted in the Remedy Decision:
21 Claims for injury must be supported by evidence: AWI Administration Services Pty Ltd v Birnie [2001] WAIRC 04015; (2001) 81 WAIG 2849 [200]. In addition, the injury must be beyond the distress experienced in most dismissal cases: Lynam v Lataga Pty Ltd [2001] WAIRC 02420; (2001) 81 WAIG 986 [56].
22 The applicant says during the phone call when she was verbally dismissed, Mr Dirk was aggressive and attacking. The applicant submits that following the phone call, she suffered panic attacks and a resurgence of her Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The applicant says the respondent locked her out of the workplace and denied her a separation certificate.
23 The applicant supported her claims with evidence from a medical practitioner. The letter provided states that the applicant attended her medical practitioner in September 2023 and that the dismissal had an understandably negative impact on the applicant’s mental health. The letter says that she has since engaged in psychological therapy and medication to treat anxiety and continues to experience anxiety related to the dismissal.
24 In her written submissions, the applicant asserts that she was locked out of the workplace. However, the applicant has not provided any evidence that this was the case. The applicant’s submissions are that she requested a former co-worker collect her personal items because she did not want to go behind the counter. The applicant’s evidence is that the representatives of the respondent removed the applicant from the WhatsApp group chat used to communicate between staff, prior to the dismissal.
25 The applicant’s evidence on these issues, were not contested by the respondent.
51 By this ground of appeal, the Trustee submits that the Commissioner erred in finding that Ms Shields’ evidence of distress was not challenged:
The Trustee submits that the evidence does not support a finding that the respondents [sic] conduct in dismissing the applicant caused psychological and/or emotional injury.
The Commission made findings that the Respondent [Trustee] did not challenge the evidence of the distress the dismissal caused to the Applicant. This is inconsistent with the verbal submissions made at the hearing as recorded by the transcript.
The evidence does not support that the Applicant had a heightened level of anxiety and distress as a result of the dismissal.
52 To the extent that the Trustee alleges error in finding, or more accurately observing, there was no challenge to the evidence, the Trustee points out that Mr Dirk cross‑examined Ms Shields about the medical certificate relied on by her. His cross‑examination, at ts 48–49, involved asking Ms Shields whether the medical certificate was in relation to the psychiatric condition of Post‑Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Ms Shields answered that it referred to her having a panic attack and seeking medical attention on the day of the dismissal and subsequently having treatment under a mental health care plan. She did not rely on the medical letter as establishing a resurgence of PTSD. The cross-examination therefore challenged one characterisation of the condition but did not materially contradict her evidence that the dismissal caused anxiety for which she obtained treatment.
53 In Richards v Nicoletti [2016] WAIRC 00941; (2016) 97 WAIG 117, Acting President Smith summarised the principles that apply in determining an award of compensation for injury at [37]–[38]:
37 The leading statement of principles to be applied by the Commission when considering whether to make an award of compensation for injury is set out in the following passage of the joint judgment of Coleman CC and Smith C in Birnie wherein it was said [200]:
It is accepted that there is an element of distress associated with almost all employer initiated terminations of employment. For injury to be recognised by way of compensation and thereby fall outside the limits which can be taken to have normally been associated with a harsh, oppressive or unfair dismissal there needs to be evidence that loss of dignity, anxiety, humiliation, stress or nervous shock has been sustained. Injury embraces the actual harm done to an employee by the unfair dismissal. It comprehends ‘all manner of wrongs’ including being treated with callousness ([Capewell]). The injury may be manifested by the detrimental impact on the physical or emotional wellbeing of the person whose services were terminated. However dismissals will impact to varying degrees on individuals and while the need for professional care may be evidence of that impact, this will not necessarily always be the case in order to establish the causal link between the termination of employment and the injury. While it is necessary to exercise a degree of caution to ensure that compensation is confined to reasonable limits (Timms v Phillips Engineering Pty Ltd (1997) 70 WAIG 1318 and Burazin v Blacktown City Guardian Pty Ltd 142 ALR 144) that is not to say that every claim for injury necessarily involves expert evidence of emotional trauma.
1 The circumstances in which the dismissal from employment has been effected may be sufficient to demonstrate the injury which is experienced. Situations where an employee is locked out of the workplace or is escorted from the premises, or the termination has been conducted in full view of other staff are examples of callous treatment justifying recognition for compensation for injury (Lynam v Lataga Pty Ltd (2001) 81 WAIG 986).
2 However, the Commission is not able to adjust the measure of compensation according to the opinion of the employer or employee or of the conduct of the respective parties ([Capewell]).
38 From these principles emerges a requirement to assess the gravity or scale of the injury. In particular, when considering whether to make an award of compensation for injury, the following matters should be considered:
(a) Whether the behaviour by or on behalf of an employer by the termination of employment has caused injury to the employee.
(b) If the behaviour in question has caused an injury, the gravity of the behaviour of the employer.
(c) The level of effect or impact of the behaviour on the employee and whether the effect or impact goes beyond a level of distress that is caused by almost all employer initiated terminations of employment.
54 The Commissioner undertook the analysis which the principles set out in Richards require.
55 While the Commissioner noted Ms Shields’ submission that Mr Dirk was aggressive and attacking during the phone call when she was dismissed, the Commissioner did not make a finding to this effect. Similarly, while the Commissioner noted the submission that Ms Shields suffered a resurgence of PTSD, she made no finding to this effect.
56 Rather, the Commissioner found that Ms Shields’ evidence on these issues was uncontested: Remedy Decision [25]. The issues the Commissioner is referring to is Ms Shields’ claim for an unspecified amount, as compensation for injury, for psychological and emotional injury because of the Trustee’s conduct in dismissing her: Remedy Decision [20]. The evidence that the Commissioner is referring to is stated at Remedy Decision [23], namely the letter from her medical practitioner (exhibit A39(a)) who had treated her since November 2017. The letter recorded that Ms Shields reported her dismissal in September 2023, that the dismissal had negatively affected her mental health, that she had received psychological therapy and medication for anxiety, and that she continued to experience anxiety related to the dismissal. Accordingly, the Commissioner was properly satisfied that the Trustee’s behaviour by the termination of employment had caused injury to Ms Shields.
57 The Commissioner assessed the gravity of the Trustee’s behaviour by considering Ms Shields’ submission that the dismissal involved her being locked out from the premises. The Commissioner ultimately rejected Ms Shields’ argument in this regard: Remedy Decision [28].
58 The effect of the Commissioner’s reasons, read in their full context, is that she found nothing in the Trustee’s conduct was callous, abusive or at the high end of the scale of gravity. The award of $3,000 as compensation for injury reflects this.
59 Finally, the Commissioner implicitly accepted that the level of effect or impact of the behaviour on Ms Shields went beyond a level of distress typically caused by employer-initiated terminations of employment because it involved anxiety and emotional distress which required medical treatment: Remedy Decision [29].
60 The Trustee has not demonstrated any error in relation to the award of compensation for injury.
61 Ground 2 of the appeal should be dismissed.
62 For the preceding reasons, the appeal should be dismissed.