Quai-De Azam Edoo -v- South Metropolitan Health Service

Document Type
Decision
Matter Number
FBA 15/2026
Matter Description
Appeal against a decision of the Commission in matter number P 18 of 2025 given on 23 April 2026
Industry
Health Services
Jurisdiction
Full Bench
Member/Magistrate name
Chief Commissioner S J Kenner, Commissioner T B Walkington, Commissioner C Tsang
Delivery Date
26 Aug 2026
Result
Appeal dismissed
Citation
2026 WAIRC 00825
WAIG Reference
DOCX | 42kB
2026 WAIRC 00825
APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION IN MATTER NUMBER P 18 OF 2025 GIVEN ON 23 APRIL 2026
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

FULL BENCH

CITATION : 2026 WAIRC 00825

CORAM
: CHIEF COMMISSIONER S J KENNER
COMMISSIONER T B WALKINGTON
COMMISSIONER C TSANG

HEARD
:
FRIDAY, 21 AUGUST 2026

DELIVERED : WEDNESDAY, 26 AUGUST 2026

FILE NO. : FBA 15 OF 2026

BETWEEN
:
QUAI-DE AZAM EDOO
Appellant

AND

SOUTH METROPOLITAN HEALTH SERVICE
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
JURISDICTION : WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
CORAM : COMMISSIONER T KUCERA
CITATION : [2026] WAIRC 00249
FILE NO : P 18 OF 2025

Catchwords : Industrial Law (WA) – Appeal against decision of the Commission – Dismissal of application under s 27(1)(a) for want of jurisdiction – Application by individual employee – Suspension on full pay – No jurisdiction – Appeal dismissed
Legislation : Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) s 27(1), s 27(1)(a), s 29(1), s 29(1)(a)(ii), s 29(1)(i), s 29(1)(j), s 36AA(2)(c)
Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA) s 78
Health Services Act 2016 (WA) s 171
Result : Appeal dismissed
REPRESENTATION:
APPELLANT : IN PERSON
RESPONDENT : MR M AULFREY OF COUNSEL

Case(s) referred to in reasons:
Edoo v South Metropolitan Health Service [2026] WAIRC 00231; (2026) 106 WAIG 927
Edoo v South Metropolitan Health Service [2026] WAIRC 00461; (2026) 106 WAIG 1449
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499
Springdale Comfort Pty Ltd trading as Dalfield Homes v Building Trades Association of Unions of Western Australia (1987) 67 WAIG 325
Reasons for Decision
THE FULL BENCH:
Introduction
1 This is an appeal to the Full Bench from a decision of the Commission at first instance dismissing an application made by the appellant in relation to his suspension on full pay from 23 May 2025, arising from events said to have occurred inconsistent with the WA Health Code of Conduct. In a stay application determined on 3 July 2026, the Chief Commissioner set out the background to the proceedings and the appeal filed: Edoo v South Metropolitan Health Service [2026] WAIRC 00461; (2026) 106 WAIG 1449. The Chief Commissioner observed at [1]-[5]:
Background
[1] The applicant, Mr Edoo, is employed by the respondent, the South Metropolitan Health Service. He is employed in the position of Program Manager. In or about May 2025, the applicant was directed by the respondent to not attend for work on the basis that an investigation had been commenced concerning a potential disciplinary matter in relation to his employment in the Mental Health Services of Fiona Stanley Fremantle Hospitals Group. The direction to the applicant to not attend work was on the basis that he would be paid his full entitlements in accordance with his contract of employment.
[2] In or about June 2025, the applicant commenced proceedings before the Commission, purportedly under s 78 of the Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA). Such a matter may be referred to the Commission as an industrial matter under s 29(1)(i) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA). By s 36A(2)(c) of the Act, the Commission is given jurisdiction to inquire into and deal with such a matter, under s 23 of the Act.
[3] The respondent disputed the applicant’s claim and contended that the Commission at first instance had no jurisdiction to inquire into and determine the matter, on the basis that the respondent is not an employer for the purposes of the PSM Act, rather, the employer is one subject to the Health Services Act 2016 (WA). Furthermore, and in any event, the respondent contended that even if the application was made under the HS Act, specifically s 171 of that legislation, the Commission still had no jurisdiction to inquire into and deal with the applicant’s claim. This was on the basis that s 171 of the HS Act does not enable an employee suspended on full pay, to refer an industrial matter to the Commission, and the Commission has no jurisdiction to inquire into and deal with such an industrial matter. The HS Act does not apply in circumstances where an employee is suspended on full pay.
An appeal is filed
[4] The learned Commissioner in first instance upheld the respondent’s application to dismiss the proceedings under s 27(1)(a) of the Act.The applicant has appealed against the decision of the Commission at first instance to dismiss his application. The grounds of appeal are in the following terms:
• This is an appeal from the order delivered on 23 April 2026 in P 18 of 2025 (2026 WAIRC 00231) dismissing the Applicant’s application under the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA).
• The appeal concerns legality only. The Applicant does not seek merits review of the allegations or investigation.
• The central issue is whether the Commissioner lawfully exercised the discretionary power to dismiss. The Applicant’s case is that the dismissal resulted from a failure to perform the discretionary task required by s 27(1)(a).
Ground 1 — Failure to consider the Applicant’s discretionary submissions (paras 24–25)
• The Applicant filed written submissions dated 19 March 2026. At paragraphs 24–25, the Applicant addressed the nature and exercise of the s 27(1)(a) discretion, including that the discretion is broad, “swings both ways”, and should not default to dismissal, but should be applied case-by-case.
• Those submissions went directly to the statutory task of whether dismissal should be ordered.
• A discretionary decision is affected by appealable error where the decision-maker fails to take into account a material consideration or otherwise fails properly to exercise the discretion (House v The King).
Ground 2 — Paragraph 97: identified statutory pathway not considered in the discretionary outcome
• At paragraph 97, of the Commissioner’s order of the 23 April 2026, the Commissioner stated in substance that the suspension/investigation may give rise to an “industrial matter” that could be referred to the Commission, but only by way of a fresh application by an organisation under s 29(1)(a)(ii).
• That observation identifies a relevant alternative pathway by which the matter could potentially proceed.
Ground 3 — Form 1A interlocutory application not considered/determined before dismissal
• On 19 December 2025, the Applicant filed a Form 1A Multipurpose Form seeking procedural and interlocutory relief including discovery/production/inspection of documents, examination of a witness, and an urgent interlocutory injunction under s 96.
• The decision does not address or determine that interlocutory application. The proceeding was dismissed without dealing with those procedural requests.
[5] It is of some note that none of the grounds of appeal advanced by the applicant seek to challenge the findings and conclusions of the Commission at first instance, that no jurisdiction existed to entertain the applicant’s claim.
Decision at first instance
2 The respondent made application under s 27(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) to dismiss the appellant’s substantive claim on the grounds that the Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain it. On 20 April 2026 the Commission delivered its decision on that application: Edoo v South Metropolitan Health Service [2026] WAIRC 00231; (2026) 106 WAIG 927. In that decision, the learned Commissioner upheld the respondent’s objection to the Commission’s jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim on a number of bases. The learned Commissioner:
(a) set out the appellant’s claim in his Form 5 purportedly referring the matter to the Commission under s 78 of the Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA);
(b) referred to the appellant’s grievances contained in his claim including the seeking of a variation to the employer’s direction allowing him to return to work or work from home;
(c) noted the employer’s objection and that the appellant’s claim could not be brought under s 78 of the PSM Act as the employer is covered by the Health Services Act 2016 (WA);
(d) noted that in the alternative, even if the appellant had brought his claim under the HS Act it would be beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction, as a dispute regarding the appellant’s suspension on full pay was not a matter that may be referred to the Commission by an individual employee;
(e) noted that the employer contended that s 171 of the HS Act did not provide a basis for the appellant’s claim;
(f) determined that the scope of an individual to refer an industrial matter to the Commission under s 29(1) is limited, whereas general disputes in relation to industrial matters, including disputes where an employee has been suspended on full pay, and the circumstances of that suspension, may be referred under s 29(1)(a)(ii) of the Act but only by an organisation (and not an individual employee);
(g) held that the appellant was not an employee whose employment is covered by the PSM Act and that Act confers no jurisdiction on the Commission;
(h) held that given that the appellant was suspended on full pay, the Commission had no jurisdiction to deal with the appellant’s claim under s 171 of the HS Act when read with s 36AA(2)(c) of the Act;
(i) held that as the appellant had not then been, at the time of the proceedings below, the subject of any disciplinary action taken by the respondent, there was also no ground for the appellant to make a claim under s 171 of the HS Act on that basis;
(j) held that for the foregoing reasons, the appellant’s application must be dismissed on the ground of want of jurisdiction.
The appeal contentions
Appellant
3 It is unnecessary to repeat the appeal grounds as set out at [1] above, and they are adopted and applied for present purposes.
4 As to ground 1, the appellant contended that the learned Commissioner failed to engage with his submissions in relation to the nature of the discretionary power of the Commission under s 27(1)(a) of the Act. The appellant therefore contended that the Commission failed to take into account a relevant consideration for the purposes of appeal principles as set out in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499.
5 As to ground 2, the appellant contended that in concluding that the appellant could only address the issues that he was aggrieved about through an application by an organisation under s 29(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, the effect of such a finding was to leave the appellant without a remedy and the Commission failed to consider this.
6 As to ground 3, the appellant contended that the application made by him for production of documents by way of an interlocutory application, was not addressed or determined, prior to the dismissal of the substantive application. On this basis, the appellant contended that the Commission failed to exercise the discretionary powers imposed upon it in a fulsome way.
7 As an overarching submission made on the hearing of the appeal, the appellant contended that the learned Commissioner failed to appreciate that the circumstances of his application went further than a dispute about his suspension on full pay. It included other matters concerning the circumstances of his suspension, the fact that the restrictions imposed upon him by the suspension were deleterious to him, and that the respondent failed to consider alternative options as to how the suspension on full pay may have been implemented.
8 At once, it is necessary to deal with and reject this contention. As we have indicated above, the learned Commissioner set out the terms of the appellant’s claim at [9] to [13] of his reasons for decision (at AB135-136). At [2(b)] above, we have referred to this issue as identified by the learned Commissioner. Also, the learned Commissioner’s reference to the capacity for an organisation to bring a dispute about the fuller circumstances of a suspension, including the arrangements in place giving effect to it, at [64] to [66], and [97] to [100] of his reasons for decision (at AB142-143 and AB146), discloses that he was well aware of the breadth of the application brought by the appellant.
Respondent
9 On behalf of the respondent, in short, it was submitted that the grounds of appeal disclose that the appellant has not appreciated the distinction between jurisdiction and the exercise of a discretion. It was submitted that a necessary first step in dealing with a matter, is that the Commission must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction to do so. It is only if the Commission has jurisdiction to enquire into and deal with an industrial matter, that it may exercise any powers, including a discretionary power, in relation to that matter.
10 In summary, the respondent contended that none of the grounds of appeal challenge the basis on which the Commission concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim at first instance. Rather, the grounds of appeal cavil with the issue of how the discretion may be exercised under s 27(1)(a) of the Act. On this basis, as the appeal grounds do not challenge the basis on which the learned Commissioner dismissed the appellant’s application, then the appeal must be dismissed.
Consideration
11 It is trite that before enquiring into and dealing with an industrial matter, the Commission must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction to do so. If a challenge as to jurisdiction is made by a party to a proceeding, then the Commission is duty bound to deal with that issue first, before proceeding further to enquire into and deal with the industrial matter: Springdale Comfort Pty Ltd trading as Dalfield Homes v Building Trades Association of Unions of Western Australia (1987) 67 WAIG 325.
12 In this case, the employer challenged the Commission’s jurisdiction to deal with the appellant’s claim at first instance, and made application under s 27(1)(a) of the Act that the application be dismissed. Given that the appellant brought his application as an individual, there are significant limitations as to the types of claims that may be the subject of a referral to the Commission under s 27(1) of the Act. Whilst an organisation may refer an industrial matter to the Commission on behalf of an employee who is a member or is eligible to be a member of that organisation, and the Commission has, by such a referral, jurisdiction to enquire into and deal with such an industrial matter under s 29(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, the referral of an industrial matter by an individual employee is far more restricted. Relevantly, s 29(1) of the Act provides as follows:
(1) An industrial matter may be referred to the Commission —
(a) in any case, by —
(i) an employer with a sufficient interest in the industrial matter; or
(ii) an organisation in which persons to whom the industrial matter relates are eligible to be enrolled as members or an association that represents such an organisation; or
(iii) the Minister;
and
...
(c) in the case of a claim by an employee that the employee has been harshly, oppressively or unfairly dismissed from the employee’s employment — by the employee; and
(d) in the case of a claim by an employee that the employer has not allowed the employee a benefit, other than a benefit under an award or order, to which the employee is entitled under the contract of employment — by the employee; and
(e) in the case of a matter relating to the bullying of a worker at work — by the worker; and
(f) in the case of a matter relating to the sexual harassment of a person in connection with work — by the person; and
(g) in the case of a decision mentioned in section 36AA(2)(b) — by a public service officer; and
(h) in the case of a claim relating to the reclassification of an office held by a government officer — by the government officer; and
(i) in the case of an industrial matter under the Public Sector Management Act 1994 section 78 that is a decision or finding made in relation to an employee or former employee to which Part 5 of that Act applies — by the employee or former employee; and
(j) in the case of an industrial matter under the Health Services Act 2016 section 171 that is a decision or finding made in relation to an employee or former employee to which Part 11 of that Act applies — by the employee or former employee; and
(k) in the case of an industrial matter relating to a flexible working arrangement dispute between an employer and an employee — by the employee; and
(l) in the case of a breach of public sector standards claim — by the person who made the claim to a public sector body.
13 The appellant purported to bring his claim at first instance under s 29(1)(i) of the Act as an industrial matter under the PSM Act. As the appellant’s employment was not covered by the PSM Act, as found by the learned Commissioner, it was not open for the appellant to bring such a claim, and the Commission had no jurisdiction to enquire into or deal with it.
14 In the alternative, the learned Commissioner considered whether, had the appellant brought a claim as an individual under s 29(1)(j) of the Act, under s 171 of the HS Act, the Commission could entertain the appellant’s claim. The learned Commissioner concluded that no such claim could be brought, because the appellant was neither suspended on partial pay or without pay, and nor was he the subject of disciplinary action taken by the employer.
15 In other words, the learned Commissioner concluded that the appellant, as an individual, had no capacity to refer an industrial matter to the Commission under s 29(1)(i) or (j) of the Act, and accordingly, the Commission had no jurisdiction to enquire into and deal with the matter that he had referred.
16 In the further alternative, the learned Commissioner pointed out, with a full understanding that the scope of the appellant’s claim at first instance went beyond just his suspension on full pay, that an organisation may refer such a dispute to the Commission under s 29(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, acting on behalf of the appellant. However, no such application was before the Commission and, in the absence of such an application, the Commission had no jurisdiction to enquire into and deal with the matter before it.
17 Given these are the fundamental and threshold issues that the learned Commissioner had to determine, and the appeal grounds filed by the appellant do not seek to challenge the basis upon which the Commission determined that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim, then this appeal cannot succeed. It is therefore not strictly necessary for us to deal with the individual grounds of appeal, because none of them engage with the reasons for the Commission’s rejection of the appellant’s application on jurisdictional grounds.
18 Irrespective of this we will comment on the grounds of appeal in any event.
19 Ground 1 of the grounds appears to assert that the appellant’s submissions at first instance, referring to the broad discretionary power of the Commission to dismiss an application under s 27(1)(a) of the Act, and that the discretion should be determined ‘on a case by case basis’, were not considered by the learned Commissioner. This is not correct. First, at [29] to [32] of the reasons for decision (see AB138-139) the learned Commissioner set out the relevant principles as to the application of s 27(1)(a) of the Act and the exercise of the discretionary power to dismiss an application. Second, at [34] to [37] (see AB139), and [45] to [51] (see AB140) of his reasons for decision, the learned Commissioner set out the appellant’s contentions as to the circumstances of his claim and his grievances. Third, the learned Commissioner set out alternative bases on which the appellant’s claim could have been brought as a part of determining whether the Commission had jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim. In any event, a mere assertion by an appellant that the Commission has failed to have taken into account relevant considerations, without demonstrating how this is so, is insufficient to establish a ground of appeal.
20 As to ground 2, that being the complaint that the learned Commissioner failed to have regard to the practical consequences of the dismissal of the application, and that the appellant may be left without an effective remedy, this fails to have regard to the jurisdiction threshold necessary to be established for the Commission to deal with a claim. There is no necessity for the Commission to evaluate the consequences of such a matter, when it is clear it has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim in any event. All the learned Commissioner was doing at [97] of his reasons (see AB146) was identifying an alternative basis on which the appellant’s grievances may be referred to the Commission by an organisation. That does not constitute in any sense a material error.
21 Finally, as to ground 3, that being the appellant’s complaint that the appellant’s interlocutory application for production of documents was not addressed or determined by the Commission, that ground cannot succeed. Simply put, the Commission, unless it had jurisdiction to entertain the substantive claim, then no interlocutory applications, whether they be for production of documents or otherwise, could be determined. No error is established by the learned Commissioner’s failure to address or deal with the appellant’s interlocutory application for production of documents.
22 In all of the circumstances, the appellant has failed to establish that the grounds of appeal have merit. The appeal must be dismissed.

Quai-De Azam Edoo -v- South Metropolitan Health Service

APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION IN MATTER NUMBER P 18 OF 2025 GIVEN ON 23 APRIL 2026

WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

 

FULL BENCH

 

CITATION : 2026 WAIRC 00825

 

CORAM

: Chief Commissioner S J Kenner

 Commissioner T B Walkington

 Commissioner C Tsang

 

HEARD

:

FRIDAY, 21 AUGUST 2026

 

DELIVERED : WEDNESDAY, 26 AUGUST 2026

 

FILE NO. : FBA 15 OF 2026

 

BETWEEN

:

Quai-De Azam Edoo

Appellant

 

AND

 

South Metropolitan Health Service

Respondent

 

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction : WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

Coram : COMMISSIONER T KUCERA

Citation : [2026] WAIRC 00249

File No : P 18 of 2025

 

Catchwords : Industrial Law (WA) – Appeal against decision of the Commission – Dismissal of application under s 27(1)(a) for want of jurisdiction – Application by individual employee – Suspension on full pay – No jurisdiction – Appeal dismissed

Legislation :  Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) s 27(1), s 27(1)(a), s 29(1), s 29(1)(a)(ii), s 29(1)(i), s 29(1)(j), s 36AA(2)(c)

Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA) s 78

Health Services Act 2016 (WA) s 171

Result : Appeal dismissed

Representation:

Appellant : In person

Respondent : Mr M Aulfrey of counsel

 

Case(s) referred to in reasons:

Edoo v South Metropolitan Health Service [2026] WAIRC 00231; (2026) 106 WAIG 927

Edoo v South Metropolitan Health Service [2026] WAIRC 00461; (2026) 106 WAIG 1449

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Springdale Comfort Pty Ltd trading as Dalfield Homes v Building Trades Association of Unions of Western Australia (1987) 67 WAIG 325


Reasons for Decision

THE FULL BENCH:

Introduction

1         This is an appeal to the Full Bench from a decision of the Commission at first instance dismissing an application made by the appellant in relation to his suspension on full pay from 23 May 2025, arising from events said to have occurred inconsistent with the WA Health Code of Conduct.  In a stay application determined on 3 July 2026, the Chief Commissioner set out the background to the proceedings and the appeal filed:  Edoo v South Metropolitan Health Service [2026] WAIRC 00461; (2026) 106 WAIG 1449. The Chief Commissioner observed at [1]-[5]:

Background

[1] The applicant, Mr Edoo, is employed by the respondent, the South Metropolitan Health Service.  He is employed in the position of Program Manager.  In or about May 2025, the applicant was directed by the respondent to not attend for work on the basis that an investigation had been commenced concerning a potential disciplinary matter in relation to his employment in the Mental Health Services of Fiona Stanley Fremantle Hospitals Group.  The direction to the applicant to not attend work was on the basis that he would be paid his full entitlements in accordance with his contract of employment.

[2] In or about June 2025, the applicant commenced proceedings before the Commission, purportedly under s 78 of the Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA).  Such a matter may be referred to the Commission as an industrial matter under s 29(1)(i) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA).  By s 36A(2)(c) of the Act, the Commission is given jurisdiction to inquire into and deal with such a matter, under s 23 of the Act.

[3] The respondent disputed the applicant’s claim and contended that the Commission at first instance had no jurisdiction to inquire into and determine the matter, on the basis that the respondent is not an employer for the purposes of the PSM Act, rather, the employer is one subject to the Health Services Act 2016 (WA).  Furthermore, and in any event, the respondent contended that even if the application was made under the HS Act, specifically s 171 of that legislation, the Commission still had no jurisdiction to inquire into and deal with the applicant’s claim.  This was on the basis that s 171 of the HS Act does not enable an employee suspended on full pay, to refer an industrial matter to the Commission, and the Commission has no jurisdiction to inquire into and deal with such an industrial matter.  The HS Act does not apply in circumstances where an employee is suspended on full pay.

An appeal is filed

[4] The learned Commissioner in first instance upheld the respondent’s application to dismiss the proceedings under s 27(1)(a) of the Act.The applicant has appealed against the decision of the Commission at first instance to dismiss his application.  The grounds of appeal are in the following terms:

• This is an appeal from the order delivered on 23 April 2026 in P 18 of 2025 (2026 WAIRC 00231) dismissing the Applicant’s application under the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA).

• The appeal concerns legality only. The Applicant does not seek merits review of the allegations or investigation.

• The central issue is whether the Commissioner lawfully exercised the discretionary power to dismiss. The Applicant’s case is that the dismissal resulted from a failure to perform the discretionary task required by s 27(1)(a).

Ground 1 — Failure to consider the Applicant’s discretionary submissions (paras 24–25)

• The Applicant filed written submissions dated 19 March 2026. At paragraphs 24–25, the Applicant addressed the nature and exercise of the s 27(1)(a) discretion, including that the discretion is broad, “swings both ways”, and should not default to dismissal, but should be applied case-by-case.

• Those submissions went directly to the statutory task of whether dismissal should be ordered.

• A discretionary decision is affected by appealable error where the decision-maker fails to take into account a material consideration or otherwise fails properly to exercise the discretion (House v The King).

Ground 2 — Paragraph 97: identified statutory pathway not considered in the discretionary outcome

• At paragraph 97, of the Commissioner’s order of the 23 April 2026, the Commissioner stated in substance that the suspension/investigation may give rise to an “industrial matter” that could be referred to the Commission, but only by way of a fresh application by an organisation under s 29(1)(a)(ii).

• That observation identifies a relevant alternative pathway by which the matter could potentially proceed.

Ground 3 — Form 1A interlocutory application not considered/determined before dismissal

• On 19 December 2025, the Applicant filed a Form 1A Multipurpose Form seeking procedural and interlocutory relief including discovery/production/inspection of documents, examination of a witness, and an urgent interlocutory injunction under s 96.

• The decision does not address or determine that interlocutory application. The proceeding was dismissed without dealing with those procedural requests.

[5] It is of some note that none of the grounds of appeal advanced by the applicant seek to challenge the findings and conclusions of the Commission at first instance, that no jurisdiction existed to entertain the applicant’s claim. 

Decision at first instance

2         The respondent made application under s 27(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) to dismiss the appellant’s substantive claim on the grounds that the Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain it. On 20 April 2026 the Commission delivered its decision on that application: Edoo v South Metropolitan Health Service [2026] WAIRC 00231; (2026) 106 WAIG 927.  In that decision, the learned Commissioner upheld the respondent’s objection to the Commission’s jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim on a number of bases.  The learned Commissioner:

(a) set out the appellant’s claim in his Form 5 purportedly referring the matter to the Commission under s 78 of the Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA);

(b) referred to the appellant’s grievances contained in his claim including the seeking of a variation to the employer’s direction allowing him to return to work or work from home;

(c) noted the employer’s objection and that the appellant’s claim could not be brought under s 78 of the PSM Act as the employer is covered by the Health Services Act 2016 (WA);

(d) noted that in the alternative, even if the appellant had brought his claim under the HS Act it would be beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction, as a dispute regarding the appellant’s suspension on full pay was not a matter that may be referred to the Commission by an individual employee;

(e) noted that the employer contended that s 171 of the HS Act did not provide a basis for the appellant’s claim;

(f) determined that the scope of an individual to refer an industrial matter to the Commission under s 29(1) is limited, whereas general disputes in relation to industrial matters, including disputes where an employee has been suspended on full pay, and the circumstances of that suspension, may be referred under s 29(1)(a)(ii) of the Act but only by an organisation (and not an individual employee);

(g) held that the appellant was not an employee whose employment is covered by the PSM Act and that Act confers no jurisdiction on the Commission;

(h) held that given that the appellant was suspended on full pay, the Commission had no jurisdiction to deal with the appellant’s claim under s 171 of the HS Act when read with s 36AA(2)(c) of the Act;

(i) held that as the appellant had not then been, at the time of the proceedings below, the subject of any disciplinary action taken by the respondent, there was also no ground for the appellant to make a claim under s 171 of the HS Act on that basis;

(j) held that for the foregoing reasons, the appellant’s application must be dismissed on the ground of want of jurisdiction.

The appeal contentions

Appellant

3         It is unnecessary to repeat the appeal grounds as set out at [1] above, and they are adopted and applied for present purposes.

4         As to ground 1, the appellant contended that the learned Commissioner failed to engage with his submissions in relation to the nature of the discretionary power of the Commission under s 27(1)(a) of the Act. The appellant therefore contended that the Commission failed to take into account a relevant consideration for the purposes of appeal principles as set out in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499.

5         As to ground 2, the appellant contended that in concluding that the appellant could only address the issues that he was aggrieved about through an application by an organisation under s 29(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, the effect of such a finding was to leave the appellant without a remedy and the Commission failed to consider this.

6         As to ground 3, the appellant contended that the application made by him for production of documents by way of an interlocutory application, was not addressed or determined, prior to the dismissal of the substantive application.  On this basis, the appellant contended that the Commission failed to exercise the discretionary powers imposed upon it in a fulsome way.

7         As an overarching submission made on the hearing of the appeal, the appellant contended that the learned Commissioner failed to appreciate that the circumstances of his application went further than a dispute about his suspension on full pay.  It included other matters concerning the circumstances of his suspension, the fact that the restrictions imposed upon him by the suspension were deleterious to him, and that the respondent failed to consider alternative options as to how the suspension on full pay may have been implemented. 

8         At once, it is necessary to deal with and reject this contention.  As we have indicated above, the learned Commissioner set out the terms of the appellant’s claim at [9] to [13] of his reasons for decision (at AB135-136).  At [2(b)] above, we have referred to this issue as identified by the learned Commissioner.  Also, the learned Commissioner’s reference to the capacity for an organisation to bring a dispute about the fuller circumstances of a suspension, including the arrangements in place giving effect to it, at [64] to [66], and [97] to [100] of his reasons for decision (at AB142-143 and AB146), discloses that he was well aware of the breadth of the application brought by the appellant.

Respondent

9         On behalf of the respondent, in short, it was submitted that the grounds of appeal disclose that the appellant has not appreciated the distinction between jurisdiction and the exercise of a discretion.  It was submitted that a necessary first step in dealing with a matter, is that the Commission must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction to do so.  It is only if the Commission has jurisdiction to enquire into and deal with an industrial matter, that it may exercise any powers, including a discretionary power, in relation to that matter.

10      In summary, the respondent contended that none of the grounds of appeal challenge the basis on which the Commission concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim at first instance.  Rather, the grounds of appeal cavil with the issue of how the discretion may be exercised under s 27(1)(a) of the Act.  On this basis, as the appeal grounds do not challenge the basis on which the learned Commissioner dismissed the appellant’s application, then the appeal must be dismissed.

Consideration

11      It is trite that before enquiring into and dealing with an industrial matter, the Commission must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction to do so.  If a challenge as to jurisdiction is made by a party to a proceeding, then the Commission is duty bound to deal with that issue first, before proceeding further to enquire into and deal with the industrial matter:  Springdale Comfort Pty Ltd trading as Dalfield Homes v Building Trades Association of Unions of Western Australia (1987) 67 WAIG 325. 

12      In this case, the employer challenged the Commission’s jurisdiction to deal with the appellant’s claim at first instance, and made application under s 27(1)(a) of the Act that the application be dismissed.  Given that the appellant brought his application as an individual, there are significant limitations as to the types of claims that may be the subject of a referral to the Commission under s 27(1) of the Act.  Whilst an organisation may refer an industrial matter to the Commission on behalf of an employee who is a member or is eligible to be a member of that organisation, and the Commission has, by such a referral, jurisdiction to enquire into and deal with such an industrial matter under s 29(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, the referral of an industrial matter by an individual employee is far more restricted.  Relevantly, s 29(1) of the Act provides as follows:

(1) An industrial matter may be referred to the Commission —

(a) in any case, by —

(i) an employer with a sufficient interest in the industrial matter; or

(ii) an organisation in which persons to whom the industrial matter relates are eligible to be enrolled as members or an association that represents such an organisation; or

(iii) the Minister;

and

...

(c) in the case of a claim by an employee that the employee has been harshly, oppressively or unfairly dismissed from the employee’s employment — by the employee; and

(d) in the case of a claim by an employee that the employer has not allowed the employee a benefit, other than a benefit under an award or order, to which the employee is entitled under the contract of employment — by the employee; and

(e) in the case of a matter relating to the bullying of a worker at work — by the worker; and

(f) in the case of a matter relating to the sexual harassment of a person in connection with work — by the person; and

(g) in the case of a decision mentioned in section 36AA(2)(b) — by a public service officer; and

(h) in the case of a claim relating to the reclassification of an office held by a government officer — by the government officer; and

(i) in the case of an industrial matter under the Public Sector Management Act 1994 section 78 that is a decision or finding made in relation to an employee or former employee to which Part 5 of that Act applies — by the employee or former employee; and

(j) in the case of an industrial matter under the Health Services Act 2016 section 171 that is a decision or finding made in relation to an employee or former employee to which Part 11 of that Act applies — by the employee or former employee; and

(k) in the case of an industrial matter relating to a flexible working arrangement dispute between an employer and an employee — by the employee; and

(l) in the case of a breach of public sector standards claim — by the person who made the claim to a public sector body.

13      The appellant purported to bring his claim at first instance under s 29(1)(i) of the Act as an industrial matter under the PSM Act.  As the appellant’s employment was not covered by the PSM Act, as found by the learned Commissioner, it was not open for the appellant to bring such a claim, and the Commission had no jurisdiction to enquire into or deal with it.

14      In the alternative, the learned Commissioner considered whether, had the appellant brought a claim as an individual under s 29(1)(j) of the Act, under s 171 of the HS Act, the Commission could entertain the appellant’s claim.  The learned Commissioner concluded that no such claim could be brought, because the appellant was neither suspended on partial pay or without pay, and nor was he the subject of disciplinary action taken by the employer.

15      In other words, the learned Commissioner concluded that the appellant, as an individual, had no capacity to refer an industrial matter to the Commission under s 29(1)(i) or (j) of the Act, and accordingly, the Commission had no jurisdiction to enquire into and deal with the matter that he had referred.

16      In the further alternative, the learned Commissioner pointed out, with a full understanding that the scope of the appellant’s claim at first instance went beyond just his suspension on full pay, that an organisation may refer such a dispute to the Commission under s 29(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, acting on behalf of the appellant.  However, no such application was before the Commission and, in the absence of such an application, the Commission had no jurisdiction to enquire into and deal with the matter before it.

17      Given these are the fundamental and threshold issues that the learned Commissioner had to determine, and the appeal grounds filed by the appellant do not seek to challenge the basis upon which the Commission determined that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim, then this appeal cannot succeed.  It is therefore not strictly necessary for us to deal with the individual grounds of appeal, because none of them engage with the reasons for the Commission’s rejection of the appellant’s application on jurisdictional grounds.

18      Irrespective of this we will comment on the grounds of appeal in any event.

19      Ground 1 of the grounds appears to assert that the appellant’s submissions at first instance, referring to the broad discretionary power of the Commission to dismiss an application under s 27(1)(a) of the Act, and that the discretion should be determined ‘on a case by case basis’, were not considered by the learned Commissioner.  This is not correct.  First, at [29] to [32] of the reasons for decision (see AB138-139) the learned Commissioner set out the relevant principles as to the application of s 27(1)(a) of the Act and the exercise of the discretionary power to dismiss an application.  Second, at [34] to [37] (see AB139), and [45] to [51] (see AB140) of his reasons for decision, the learned Commissioner set out the appellant’s contentions as to the circumstances of his claim and his grievances.  Third, the learned Commissioner set out alternative bases on which the appellant’s claim could have been brought as a part of determining whether the Commission had jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim.  In any event, a mere assertion by an appellant that the Commission has failed to have taken into account relevant considerations, without demonstrating how this is so, is insufficient to establish a ground of appeal.

20      As to ground 2, that being the complaint that the learned Commissioner failed to have regard to the practical consequences of the dismissal of the application, and that the appellant may be left without an effective remedy, this fails to have regard to the jurisdiction threshold necessary to be established for the Commission to deal with a claim.  There is no necessity for the Commission to evaluate the consequences of such a matter, when it is clear it has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim in any event.  All the learned Commissioner was doing at [97] of his reasons (see AB146) was identifying an alternative basis on which the appellant’s grievances may be referred to the Commission by an organisation.  That does not constitute in any sense a material error.

21      Finally, as to ground 3, that being the appellant’s complaint that the appellant’s interlocutory application for production of documents was not addressed or determined by the Commission, that ground cannot succeed.  Simply put, the Commission, unless it had jurisdiction to entertain the substantive claim, then no interlocutory applications, whether they be for production of documents or otherwise, could be determined. No error is established by the learned Commissioner’s failure to address or deal with the appellant’s interlocutory application for production of documents.

22      In all of the circumstances, the appellant has failed to establish that the grounds of appeal have merit.  The appeal must be dismissed.