In the original claim, the respondent union filed an application on behalf of its member regarding an ongoing working from home request made under clause 51 of the Public Sector CSA Agreement 2022.  The union member was employed as an Investigator Advocate for the appellant and had been working from home for approximately 12 months when an extension to the arrangement was requested due to health concerns.  The appellant’s refusal coincided with a blanket direction for all employees to cease COVID-19 WFH arrangements.  The matter was not resolved by conciliation and was referred for arbitration. 

An application was made by the appellant that the application be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, contending the matter involved enforcement of the Agreement.  It was also contended that the proceedings contravened the no extra claims clause of the Agreement in cl 7.2.  The Arbitrator dismissed the appellant’s application, concluding that clause 51 of the Agreement imposes substantive obligations on the employer to consider working from home requests, unless there are reasonable business grounds to refuse them. Further, the Arbitrator concluded the dispute was amenable to the dispute resolution provision in the Agreement and that the proceedings did not involve the enforcement or contravene clause 51 or clause 7.2 of the Agreement.

The Full Bench considered the principles of procedural fairness, the interpretation of clause 51 of the Agreement, and the distinction between judicial and arbitral power. The Full Bench found that clause 51 creates an enforceable entitlement for employees to request working from home arrangements, which can only be refused on reasonable business grounds.  It was concluded that the dispute was about enforcing the terms of clause 51 and that the orders sought were problematic because they aimed to seek an entitlement of WFH under the Agreement, which is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Magistrates Court.  The Full Bench also held that the claim was covered by the no extra claims clause and was precluded on that basis.  There was no denial of procedural fairness. 

Accordingly, the Full Bench upheld the appeal, quashing the decision at first instance and dismissing the substantive application on the basis of want of jurisdiction. 

The decision can be read here. 

The appellant, who was employed as a safety operations business partner with the respondent, was dismissed following investigations into allegations against him and his work-related grievances. The appellant applied to the Work, Health and Safety Tribunal alleging discriminatory conduct, and claimed that the respondent took discriminatory action against him when it placed him on a performance plan and dismissed him for raising work health and safety concerns. The Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s application finding that the respondent had proved that a prohibited reason was not a substantial reason for the conduct the appellant was aggrieved by.

The appellant lodged his notice of appeal three days out of time, and argued that the Tribunal erred by excluding a recording he sought to rely on, applied the wrong case law, denied him a fair process by failing to make reasonable adjustments, and did not properly understand or apply the objects of the Work Health and Safety Act 2020. 

The Full Bench considered the extension of time for the appeal based on several factors, including the length and reasons for the delay, the prospects of success of the appeal, and the extent of any prejudice to the respondent. In its determination, the Full Bench found that the recordings the appellant sought to admit were not relevant, the case law applied by the Tribunal was appropriate, and the Tribunal had afforded him procedural fairness. The Full Bench also noted that the appellant’s notice of appeal did not identify proper grounds of appeal by alleging an error of law or error of fact in the Tribunal’s decision.

The Full Bench concluded the grounds for the late notice of appeal did not weigh in favour of granting an extension.  Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

The decision can be read here. 

The Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission is required to set the minimum wage to apply to employers and employees covered by the WA industrial relations system. It must do this before 1 July each year. The current minimum wage for an adult employee is $918.60 per week.

Call for submissions

The Commission invites interested persons and organisations to make a submission to the Commission on what minimum wage should be set in 2025. The Commission will hear oral submissions on Wednesday, 21 May 2025 and if necessary, a half day on Thursday, 22 May 2025. The proceedings are open to the public and will be webcast.

Any person who wishes to make an oral submission at that time should notify the Registrar of the Commission stating the basis of their interest. This must be done by Wednesday, 14 May 2025.

Written submissions are also welcome. Any person or organisation who wishes to make a written submission should do so by Wednesday, 14 May 2025. Copies of written submissions will be made public. Anonymous submissions will not be considered.

Submissions can be made by email, by post or over the counter (Level 17, 111 St Georges Terrace, Perth WA 6000). Please quote ‘CICS 1 of 2025’ in all correspondence. Please feel free to contact the Commission's Registry about making a submission.

The Notice can be read here.

For more information about the 2025 State Wage Case, click here.

The appellant commenced a claim in the Industrial Magistrates Court (IMC) against the respondent employer alleging damaging action in contravention of section 97A of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (The Act). The IMC struck out parts of her statement of claim as they did not disclose a cause of action under s. 97A and were not salvageable by further amendments; however, three distinct claims under s. 97A were preserved.

The appellant appealed the IMC's orders striking out parts of her statement of claim on the ground that Industrial Magistrate Scaddan made an error of fact by concluding that she was transferred to another position after her payroll contract ended. She contended that the Industrial Magistrate’s decision did not align with the facts, as she had successfully applied for another position.

The Full Bench considered that the Industrial Magistrate had not made any such a finding, and that her reasons for striking out parts of the pleadings was because the facts did not disclose a cause of action, not because she found the facts themselves unfounded.  The Full Bench further considered whether an appeal lies from any decision of the IMC to the Full Bench under section 84 of the Act, concluding that the reference to "decision" in section 84 means a final determination of the substantive application.

The Full Bench found that the Industrial Magistrate’s orders striking out parts of the appellant's statement of claim and particulars were not a final determination of her claims on their merits. The orders did not prevent the subject matter of a claim from being revived by a fresh and valid claim, subject to it being made within time. The Full Bench therefore dismissed the appeal.

The decision can be read here. 

The applicant, formerly employed as a Caretaker by the respondent, sought reinstatement and claimed unfair dismissal before both the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission (WAIRC) and the Fair Work Commission (FWC). The respondent, a national system employer, argued that the applicant's employment was covered by a federal award.

The WAIRC contacted both parties regarding the jurisdictional objection raised by the respondent and sought the views of the parties as to how they would like to proceed. The respondent reasserted their belief that the FWC was the appropriate body for the matter, while the applicant replied referencing his grievances with the respondent but not addressing the question of how to progress the claim. 

The WAIRC scheduled a hearing to determine the matter of the jurisdiction of the claim, at which the applicant submitted that he rejected the findings of the FWC in those proceedings, while the respondent maintained that the WAIRC lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, and that the matter had been heard by the FWC with no jurisdictional issues raised. Considering the proceedings before the FWC and legal precedent precluding the WAIRC from dealing with applications heard already by the FWC, Commissioner Walkington determined that the Commission was unable to hear and determine the application and dismissed it accordingly.

The decision can be read here.