The applicant referred a matter to the Commission in March 2024 under the Public Sector Management Act 1994. The respondent filed a response to the application, citing that the applicant’s guilty plea to criminal charges met the conditions required for his subsequent dismissal.

After communication with the applicant and the respondent, the Commission scheduled a conciliation conference on 21 June 2024. After a request for an adjournment by the applicant’s representative, a further conference was scheduled for 18 July 2024, at which the applicant’s representative also did not appear, and later discontinued their representation due to illness and resource constraints.

Over a period of several months in early 2025, the Commission sought clarification from the applicant’s representative regarding the applicant’s intention to proceed with or withdraw the matter.  The representative was warned that a lack of future communication would result in a show cause hearing being listed, at which the applicant would be required to show cause as to why the matter should not be dismissed pursuant to s 27(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979. Subsequently a hearing was scheduled for 4 August 2025, at which the applicant and respondent did not appear.

Commissioner Walkington found the applicant had failed to prosecute his case without adequate reason and had failed to respond to several communications from the Commission. For these reasons, and along with the applicant’s failure to appear at the August 2025 hearing, the Commissioner concluded that the applicant did not have sufficient interest for the application to be sustained. Accordingly, an order was issued dismissing the application for want of prosecution.

The decision can be read here.

In this matter, a dispute arose following the appellant’s decision to restructure its Community Safety Business Unit, resulting in the abolition of the Parking and Information Officer role held by the respondent. This restructure engaged the redundancy and redeployment provisions of the City of Stirling Inside Workforce Agreement 2019. Pursuant to the restructure, the appellant offered the respondent several alternative positions, including that of Community Patrol Officer. The respondent union contended that the positions offered did not constitute “suitable alternative employment” within the meaning of clause 10.4 of the Agreement and asserted that the respondent was entitled to redundancy pay under clause 10.7. 

The matter was referred to the Commission, in which the Commissioner determined that the position offered to the respondent was not suitable, having regard to differences in classification, salary, and required qualifications, as well as the circumstances pertaining to retraining. The Commissioner further found that the respondent was entitled to redundancy pay but concluded that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to make a binding declaration regarding redundancy entitlement.

The appellant appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the Full Bench, advancing several grounds:

1. The Commissioner erroneously applied a subjective test by considering the respondent’s personal circumstances, rather than the objective standard required for determining “suitable alternative employment” under the Agreement.
2. The Commissioner exceeded the Commission’s jurisdiction by interpreting the Agreement beyond the intentions of the parties and by considering factors not specified in clause 10.4.2.
3. The findings on redundancy amounted to the exercise of judicial power, which fall outside the Commission’s jurisdiction.
4. The Commissioner erred in concluding that a declaration of redundancy constituted a repudiation of the employment contract.

The Full Bench reviewed the construction of clause 10.4 of the Agreement, emphasising that its primary focus is on preserving employment, with redundancy intended only as a last resort. The meaning of “suitable alternative employment” under clause 10.4.2 requires an objective assessment, specifically comparing classification, salary, and status as defined in the Agreement. The Full Bench found that the Commissioner erred by considering extraneous factors such as work value, duties, and personal circumstances, which are not specified in clause 10.4.2. The Full Bench confirmed that, while the Commission may interpret industrial agreements as part of its arbitral function, it cannot make binding declarations of existing rights, as this would constitute the exercise of judicial power.

The Full Bench upheld the appeal, determining that the Commissioner erred by considering extraneous factors not specified in the Agreement and by applying a subjective rather than objective test to the assessment of “suitable alternative employment”. The Full Bench also agreed that the Commissioner was correct in finding that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to make a binding declaration regarding entitlement to redundancy pay.

Accordingly, the orders sought were not granted; instead, the decision was suspended and remitted for reconsideration in accordance with the Full Bench’s reasoning.

The decision can be read here.  

The appellant was employed by the respondent as Director – Corporate Services. He commenced as Manager of Human Resources in June 2012 and was promoted in April 2013. In May 2023, the appellant was summarily dismissed for misconduct, specifically for initiating an undocumented pay arrangement in April 2019. This arrangement postponed salary increases to be received as backpay in the future and was not disclosed to the CEO nor properly documented.

Upon discovery in March 2023, an investigation was conducted by the respondent, which lead to the appellant’s dismissal. The appellant brought two claims before the Commission: (1) unfair dismissal, arguing the process and outcome were unjust, and (2) denied contractual benefits, seeking payment for the balance of his fixed-term contract.

At first instance, the Commission dismissed both claims, finding that the pay arrangement breached contractual and statutory obligations, was secretive, and justified summary dismissal. The Commission held that the respondent did not need to prove actual breaches of law, but that a “real and substantial risk” of a breach sufficed. The investigation was found to be procedurally fair, and the appellant’s conduct was deemed serious misconduct.

The appellant raised sixteen grounds of appeal to the Full Bench, arguing that the Commissioner wrongly found a “real and substantial risk” of a breach sufficient for summary dismissal without proof of actual misconduct. Claims of procedural unfairness were made regarding the Council’s process under the Local Government Act 1995. The appellant also disputed any contractual breach and argued that any pay arrangement was a self-initiated variation, negating liability. Statutory breaches under various employment and tax laws were denied, as was any breach of the respondent’s Code of Conduct, which was said to rely on incorrect statutory findings. Additional grounds included failure to consider key evidence (such as testimony from the former CEO), reliance on irrelevant matters, flawed credibility assessments, and arguments regarding disparity of treatment, noting that a colleague was terminated with notice, which was relevant to the fairness of the appellant’s dismissal.

In considering the appeal, the Full Bench determined that:

• The Council, not the CEO, was the statutory decision-maker for the dismissal of senior employees under the Local Government Act 1995.
• Procedural fairness was compromised by the failure to provide the Council with complete and accurate information, including the appellant’s full response and mitigating circumstances.
• Summary dismissal requires proof of actual misconduct (wilful or grave), not merely a “real and substantial risk” of breach.
• The contractual right to summarily dismiss was conditional on the appellant being found “guilty” of misconduct.
• Errors were identified in the application of the Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 and the Local Government Officers’ Award, which did not apply during the relevant period, and findings of risk of breach of tax and superannuation laws were unsupported.
• The investigation was found to be procedurally unfair, particularly in the process before the Council, which was misled as to key facts and not provided with all relevant material.
• Some adverse credibility findings were affected by error, especially those relating to the Award and matters irrelevant to the dismissal.

The Full Bench distinguished the circumstances of the appellant’s colleague but emphasised the need to consider mitigating circumstances and the impact of dismissal.

The Full Bench found that the summary dismissal was unfair as the conduct did not meet the contractual threshold for summary termination—specifically, there was no wilful or grave misconduct—and that the dismissal was procedurally unfair due to errors in the process before the Council and a failure to provide accurate, complete information. In addition, reinstatement was deemed impracticable owing to the breakdown in trust and confidence.  Accordingly, the appeal was upheld.

The decision can be read here.  

The appellant commenced employment as a Probationary Youth Custodial Officer with the respondent in February 2023. His employment was purportedly terminated in March 2024, and he subsequently sought to challenge this decision.

The appellant made several unsuccessful attempts to bring his case before the appropriate authority, including applications under the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (IR Act) and the Young Offenders Act 1994. In August 2024, the matter was referred to the Public Service Appeal Board (the Appeal Board), at which time it was more than four months outside the prescribed 21-day timeframe as stipulated in the Industrial Relations Commission Regulations 2005.

Initially, the appellant, represented by legal counsel, filed an unfair dismissal application under s 29(1)(c) of the IR Act within the prescribed timeframe. The respondent objected to the Commission’s jurisdiction, asserting that the appellant was a “Government Officer” and that the Appeal Board was the appropriate jurisdiction. The appellant’s legal representation changed several times, and he pursued multiple avenues, all of which were ultimately found to be without jurisdiction.

On the merits, the appellant raised several arguments regarding the validity of his dismissal, including:

• The status of his probation at the time of discharge;
• The service and content of the discharge letter; and
• Issues of procedural fairness.

The Appeal Board found that the appellant had an arguable case and considered the prejudice to the respondent to be neutral, noting that the main prejudice cited was the expenditure of resources on other proceedings. The appellant argued that the assessment of delay should consider his earlier, unsuccessful attempts to pursue the matter in other jurisdictions. The respondent contended that the appellant was on notice of the correct jurisdiction in April 2024 and, therefore, the delay should be considered as three and a half months.

The Appeal Board found that the appellant made genuine attempts to seek an independent review and acknowledged the complexity of the regulatory framework for public sector employment in Western Australia. The Appeal Board noted that the original application was made within time, albeit to the wrong authority. Despite the significant delay and the reasons for it, the existence of an arguable case favoured granting an extension of time for the appeal to be heard.

Accordingly, an extension of time was granted.

The decision can be read here.  

The appellant was employed by the respondent as a Level G8 Senior Supply Specialist and, at times, acted in higher-level positions. In 2024, the respondent imposed disciplinary action on the appellant, including a reduction in remuneration and a reprimand, after finding that the appellant had committed three breaches of discipline relating to the unauthorised disclosure of confidential information. The appellant appealed this decision to the Public Service Appeal Board (the Appeal Board), arguing that the disciplinary process was procedurally unfair, the sanction was disproportionate, and not based on all available facts.

An external investigator reviewed the matter, and the respondent confirmed the disciplinary action in October 2024, which was later superseded by a further letter in November 2024.

The Appeal Board considered whether the appellant had engaged in the alleged conduct, whether that conduct constituted a breach of discipline, and whether the disciplinary action was fair. The allegations were as follows:

• The appellant breached confidentiality by sending sensitive documents to an external party;

• The appellant failed to raise concerns when a subordinate sent confidential recruitment information to the same external party; and
• The appellant again breached confidentiality by sending internal information to the external party, who was not employed or engaged by the respondent.

The Appeal Board determined that the appellant did not seriously contest the conduct alleged in the three allegations, finding that the appellant had indeed sent the relevant emails and failed to raise concerns as required. The information disclosed was confidential and sensitive, specifically, commercial-in-confidence pricing, stock levels, and recruitment data. Sharing this information with an external party not bound by confidentiality obligations was deemed a breach of discipline.

The Appeal Board rejected arguments that the context of the COVID-19 pandemic or the external party’s previous employment with the respondent excused the conduct. The Appeal Board also found that the appellant’s failure to raise concerns about his subordinate’s conduct was itself a breach of discipline, reflecting a lack of insight into confidentiality obligations. Mitigating factors, such as the pandemic and the appellant’s previously unblemished record, were acknowledged but did not excuse the breaches.

The Appeal Board concluded that the appellant engaged in the conduct alleged in all three allegations with the first allegation being particularly serious due to the nature and volume of information disclosed and the appellant’s seniority within the organisation. The disciplinary action imposed by the respondent, a reprimand for each breach, reduction in remuneration, and a final warning, was found to be fair and proportionate in all the circumstances. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

The decision can be read here.