The Industrial Magistrate’s Court has ordered an employer to pay a severance payment to its previous Chief Executive Officer (CEO), finding that the termination of his employment constituted a redundancy. 

Background 

The claimant was employed as a CEO of the respondent’s steel product manufacturing business, Combined Metal Industries (CMI), from 1 June 2015. On 23 March 2020, the respondent terminated the claimant’s employment with CMI. 

On 23 March 2020, the respondent advised the claimant that the business could no longer afford the claimant’s remuneration, and if he would not accept a reduction in remuneration, his employment would be terminated. The claimant indicated that he did not wish to resign, but nor would he accept a reduction in pay. A letter terminating the claimant’s employment was sent the same day.

 The managing partner of the respondent took over the claimant’s duties, with some assistance from an outside consultancy, however no person held the title of CEO until August 2021. 

Contentions 

The claimant brought a claim in the Industrial Magistrate’s Court for the sum of $38,461.54 in severance pay, on the ground that the termination of the employment was a redundancy. 

The respondent submitted that, as part of the claimant’s role continued to be performed by another employee after his departure, that the respondent showed an intention to have the role of CEO continue, and that it was not liable to pay a redundancy payment. 

Findings 

Her Honour, Industrial Magistrate O’Donnell, held that the fact that the respondent offered to pay the claimant a lower salary did not mean that the termination of his employment, when he declined the lower remuneration, was not due to redundancy. Her Honour further held that the respondent’s ‘wish’ for the role to continue, did not prevent the termination of employment constituting a redundancy.

Her Honour found that demonstrating that parts of the claimant’s job were being performed by other employees within the employer’s business, was not sufficient to avoid an obligation to pay severance pay.  Rather, an issue was whether there were any duties left for the employee to perform.

Her Honour noted that the claimant, at the meeting on 23 March, had requested a salary proposal. Her Honour considered that the failure by the respondent to provide the claimant with a salary proposal, indicated that the respondent had decided that it no longer wished the role of CEO to be performed by anyone.

Her Honour noted that there was doubt as to whether the respondent properly complied with any consultation obligations before terminating the claimant’s employment.  However, noting that the claim had not been brought on this basis, her Honour made no finding on this issue.

Her Honour found that the termination of the claimant’s employment was a redundancy, and that the respondent was liable to pay severance pay to the claimant.

The decision can be read here.

The Police Compensation Tribunal (Tribunal) was established under the Police Act 1892 (Police Act) on 1 January 2022.  Applications can now be made to the Tribunal by eligible applicants. 

The Tribunal deals with certain disputes about determinations made by an approved medical specialist or assessor of a medically retired member’s entitlement to compensation resulting from a work-related injury or illness. 

The Police Act gives the Tribunal the authority to deal with disputes about the following determinations:

• the degree of permanent impairment;
• failure to qualify for compensation for permanent total incapacity; and
• the amount of compensation for permanent total incapacity. 

Further information on the Tribunal, including the application process, can be found here.

The Full Bench has upheld the decision of the Commission in an unfair dismissal application, finding that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to hear the unfair dismissal claim of a national system employee who was not eligible to bring a claim in the Fair Work Commission.

Background

The appellant worked for the respondent for around six weeks as a full‑time Guest Service Agent. The appellant resigned from her employment and commenced an unfair dismissal application in the Commission, alleging that her resignation was induced by bullying by colleagues. 

The parties agreed that the respondent was a national system employer. The appellant, however, was unable to pursue an unfair dismissal claim in the Fair Work Commission as she had not served the six month minimum employment period stipulated in the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act), and was not protected from unfair dismissal under the provisions of the FW Act. 

As there is no minimum employment period contemplated to make an unfair dismissal claim in the Commission, the appellant pursued the claim in this jurisdiction. The respondent objected to the application on the grounds of jurisdiction. The Commission upheld the respondent’s objection and dismissed the application. The appellant lodged an appeal to the Full Bench. 

Contentions 

The appellant submitted that the learned Commissioner, by posing the questions she did, took into consideration irrelevant considerations and failed to consider relevant considerations in determining the question of jurisdiction. 

The appellant further contented that that the learned Commissioner erred in law in her application of the test of inconsistency for the purpose of s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution. The appellant contented that as the FW Act does not provide employees who have not served the minimum employment period with a remedy for unfair dismissal, but the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (IR Act) does, that this means that the two statutes are not inconsistent. The appellant submitted that, if the statutes are not inconsistent, then the IR Act operates and applies, and the Commission has jurisdiction to determine the matter. 

Findings 

The Full Bench noted that inconsistency is not found where there are differences in the operation of the specific provisions, but rather is a result of the express exclusion contained in the FW Act of the operation of the IR Act, to the extent that it applies to national system employees and national system employers. 

The Full Bench upheld the decision at first instance, finding that within the terms of s 26 and subject to the exceptions in s 27 of the FW Act, the FW Act ousts the Commission’s jurisdiction in relation to national system employers and national system employees. 

The appeal was dismissed. 

The decision can be read here.

The Public Service Appeal Board (Appeal Board) has unanimously held that that it is not within the Appeal Board’s power to direct the Registrar to compel witnesses to attend and give evidence in proceedings before it. The Appeal Board found that there was a plain, legislative intention to exclude the power to issue summonses to compel witnesses to appear before it, and that there was no scope for the implication of this power.

Background

The appellant was formerly employed by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly (respondent). The appellant has appealed the termination of her employment to the Appeal Board, with the appeal yet to be heard or determined.

The appellant applied to the Appeal Board for orders to direct the Registrar to issue summonses to witnesses to appear and give evidence at the appeal. The Registrar declined, on the basis that s 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, which empowers the Registrar to issue summonses, does not apply to the Appeal Board as a Constituent Authority of the Commission.

The Attorney‑General filed an application seeking to intervene and/or be heard on behalf of the State of Western Australia in order to make submissions on the matter. The appellant did not object, and leave was granted to the Attorney‑General to intervene in relation to the issues arising relevant to summonses to witnesses in proceedings before the Appeal Board.

Contentions

It was accepted by all parties to the matter that no express power existed in the IR Act for the compelling of witnesses before the Appeal Board. The appellant claimed that the Appeal Board held an implied power. The appellant’s case for an implication of the power was based on the principle outlined by Dawson J in Grassby v The Queen [1989] HCA 45; (1989) 168 CLR 1 that, where an inferior court lacks express powers to perform a function prescribed by statute, that court may have an implied power, where that power is necessary for the performance of that function.

The appellant submitted that the characterisation of such proceedings as an appeal was a mischaracterisation, and that elements of the proceedings mirrored a merits hearing. The appellant contended that that the implied power could be found within other sections of the IR Act, and that the issues of summonses to witnesses in proceedings before the Appeal Board was “uncontroversial”.

The respondent submitted that no implied power could be found, on the basis that the Appeal Board’s jurisdiction exists in the determination of appeals, rather than a trial hearing. The respondent, citing Currie v Chief Constable of Surrey [1982] 1 All ER 89, contended that the power to compel witnesses is an intrusive power, and was not necessary for the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Appeal Board. The Attorney General argued similarly.

The respondent further contended that as the Commission’s powers under the IR Act, conferred on the Appeal Board were expressly stated within s 80L of the IR Act, it would be repugnant to find an implied power to do what s 80L does not cover.

Findings

The Appeal Board noted that the characterisation of the Appeal Board as a jurisdiction determining “appeals” did not, on its own, indicate a Parliamentary intention to exclude the power to compel witnesses to appear before the Appeal Board. The Appeal Board also contemplated that the importance of summonses in the administration of justice may indicate that such a power is necessary.

Notwithstanding this, the Appeal Board highlighted the need to look to the statute creating the tribunal to determine whether such a power existed and looked to the language and structure of the IR Act. The Appeal Board held that, as s 80L expressly lists the powers of the Commission that are granted to the Appeal Board, and the omission of s 33 and the power to issue summonses, was indicative of the Parliament’s intention to exclude this power. The Appeal Board highlighted that the absence of mechanisms to enforce a summons further indicate the Parliamentary intent to exclude such a power.

The Appeal Board further considered the statutory predecessors and legislative history of the power. The Appeal Board noted that, as a statutory express power contemplating the issuing of summonses had previously existed, and had been repealed and omitted in subsequent legislation, that this supported a construction that denies an implied power.

The Appeal Board found that there was a plain, legislative intention to exclude the power to issue summonses to compel witnesses to appear before the Appeal Board, and the interlocutory application was dismissed.

The decision can be read here.

The Industrial Magistrate has imposed penalties on a restaurant owner (respondent), after he notified the Department of Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety (claimant) that an underpayment of an employee’s entitlements had been settled, before proceeding to ask the employee to return the payment.

Background

The claimant carried out an investigation to ascertain whether the respondent had observed the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) (the Act) and the Restaurant, Tearoom and Catering Workers’ Award 1979 (WA) (the Award). The investigation indicated that payments to a salaried employee were not sufficient to cover his minimum award entitlements.

The respondent notified the claimant advising that an agreement had been reached with the employee and that half of the identified underpayment would be paid to him. In March 2021, the respondent notified the claimant when payment was made. In April 2021, however, the employee contacted the claimant to indicate that the respondent had requested the settled sum be repaid.

Contentions

The claimant alleged that the respondent wilfully misled the claimant. The claimant alleged that this conduct amounted to an obstruction pursuant to s 102(2)(a) of the Act and sought penalties.

The respondent acknowledged the seriousness of the contravention. The respondent indicated that the employee owed the partnership more than the amount of his entitlements due to a separate board and lodging agreement.

Findings

Her Honour, Industrial Magistrate Hawkins, considered the non-exhaustive range of factors to determine whether the conduct calls for the imposition of the penalty and if so, the amount, these being: 

• The nature and extent of the conduct which led to the breaches;
• Circumstances in which the conduct took place;
• The nature and extent of any loss or damage sustained because of the breaches;
• Whether there has been any similar previous conduct by the respondent;
• Whether the breaches are properly distinct or arose out of one course of conduct;
• The size of the business involved;
• Whether or not the breaches were deliberate;
• Whether senior management was involved in the breaches;
• Whether the party committing the breach had exhibited contrition;
• Whether the party committing the breach has taken corrective action;
• Whether the party committing the breach had cooperated with enforcement authorities; and
• The need for specific and general deterrence. 

Her Honour noted that the maximum penalty pursuant to s 83E(1)(a) of the Act for a contravention under s 102 is $5,000. Considering the above factors, her Honour found that a penalty of $2,800 should be applied. Her Honour also found that costs sought by the claimant of $187 by way of disbursements, should be awarded.

The decision can be read here.