UNFAIR DISMISSAL APPLICATION

WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION : 2025 WAIRC 00704

DELIVERED : Friday, 15 August 2025

FILE NO. : U 9 OF 2024

Applicant

AND

LYNWOOD CHRISTIAN CHURCH INC

Respondent

CatchWords : Industrial Law (W.A) - Unfair dismissal application - Whether application ought to be dismissed under s 27(1)(a) - Breach of contract - Secondary employment - Doctrine of clean hands - Breach of contract found - Application upheld - Unfair dismissal application dismissed under s 27(1)(a)

Legislation : Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) 

Result : Application dismissed

Representation:

Applicant : Mr M Subrayan

Respondent : Mr C Fordham (of counsel)

Case(s) referred to in reasons:

Blyth Chemicals v Bushnell [1933] HCA 8; (1933) 49 CLR 66

Charles (Carmelo) Parrella v FBM Corporation Pty Ltd [2012] WAIRC 00903; (2012) 92 WAIG 1988

Civil Service Association of Western Australia Incorporated v Director General, Ministry of Justice [2003] WAIRC 08587; (2003) 94 WAIG 215

Francis James Slade v Graham Hart Holdings Pty Ltd [1987] WAIRC 10952; (1987) 67 WAIG 952

Meyers v Casey [1913] HCA 50; (1913) 17 CLR 90

Robb v Green [1895] 2 QB 315 

Verona Marie Wauchope v Director-General, Department of Education [2022] WAIRC 00739

Reasons for Decision

Background

1         Mr Myandran Subrayan (the Applicant) was employed as a pastor for Lynwood Christian Church Inc (the Respondent) from 2 July 2023 until 3 December 2023.

2         The Applicant asserts the Respondent’s decision to terminate his employment on 3 December 2023 with two months’ salary in lieu of notice was unfair. The Applicant filed an unfair dismissal application to the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission (the Commission) on 29 January 2024, 57 days after his termination date, and 29 days after the prescribed time limit under s 29(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) (the Act).

3         A hearing was programmed for two days on 12 November 2024 and 13 November 2024, to hear from the parties on the question of whether the application which was filed 57 days after the termination and therefore ‘out of time’, should be accepted.

4         In preparation for the ‘out of time’ hearing, the Respondent discovered documents that they say show the Applicant, had breached his contract as a pastor by engaging in secondary employment with another employer, the Department of Education, as a part-time mathematics teacher.

5         On 4 November 2024, the Respondent filed a Form 1A – Multipurpose Form - Objecting to an Application with the Commission, seeking an order under s 27(1)(a) of the Act that U 9 of 2024 be dismissed. The Respondent’s application requested that the hearing listed for 12 and 13 November be adjourned, pending the determination of the objection.

6         The Respondent contends that the Applicant had been engaged on a fixed-term contract and frequent casual engagements as a teacher with the Department of Education, whilst he was employed to work 38 hours per week with the Respondent. In doing so, the Respondent says the Applicant had breached terms of his contract.

7         The Respondent argued that reinstatement, which is the remedy the Applicant seeks, would be inappropriate. The Respondent submits that any further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.

8         In addition, the Respondent contends that the Applicant has sought to mislead the Commission by his conduct in proceedings and in these circumstances his application ought to be dismissed.

9         The hearing listed to decide the out of time issue was vacated, and the hearing re-listed on 12 November 2024, to determine the Respondent’s application to dismiss U 9 of 2024 pursuant to s 27(1)(a) of the Act.

Questions to decide

10      The Commission must decide whether the Applicant’s conduct breached the terms of his contract of employment such that the Commission ought to dismiss the application under s 27(1)(a) of the Act?

Respondent submissions – objecting to the application

11      The Respondent submits that when the Applicant entered into a contract of employment with the Respondent, he presented himself as a spiritual leader who exemplified the values of transparency and accountability. The Respondent asserts that the Applicant’s position as a pastor was one of ‘moral or spiritual authority within the church’ (ts 3).

12      The Respondent refers the Commission to Clause 4.3 of the contract of employment between the Applicant and Respondent:

The Pastor agrees with the church that the Pastor must:

unless absent on leave, as provided in this document, or through illness or involuntary injury, devote the whole of the Pastor’s time and attention during normal working hours, and such other times as may be reasonably necessary, to the business of the church and to the performing the Pastor’s obligation under this document;

not have any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in any business, partnership, corporation, club, organisation or group that would in any way compromise the performance of the Pastor's obligations under this document, unless a disclosure of that interest has been made to the Church and the Pastor has complied with any directions of the Church in respect of that interest; and

not hold any position for monetary or other reward which may in any way be seen to conflict with the Pastor 's obligations under this document.

13      The Respondent says the Applicant knowingly breached this term of his contract of employment because when he commenced employment, he was already employed at Pinjarra Senior High School three days per week and failed to advise the Respondent of this arrangement. Subsequently throughout his employment with the Respondent, the Applicant worked a number of days or half days for the Department of Education on a casual basis. The frequency of these engagements with the Department of Education increased throughout the year.

14      The Respondent submits that the Applicant would not have been offered a contract of employment had he disclosed that he had another job, he would not be providing all of his time and effort to his duties as a pastor and would not have held the position for as long as he did, had he not maintained that deceit.

15      The Respondent’s evidence of the Applicant’s engagements with the Department of Education, including the work performed every business day throughout November 2023, was not contested.

16      The Respondent further argues by the Applicant’s response on page 12 of his submissions in reply: ‘This claim that APPLICANT worked three days a week is hearsay. Where did they get this information from?’ that the Applicant intentionally sought to mislead the Commission: (ts 4).

17      The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s conduct in engaging in secondary employment and failing to advise the Respondent, breached the terms of his contract in a way that struck at the heart of the employment relationship. Consequentially, the Applicant’s conduct means reinstatement is not possible and the Commission ought to dismiss the application.

Applicant submissions – Response to objections

18      The Applicant claims he did not intentionally conceal his employment with the Department of Education or engage in any intentional wrongdoing.

19      The Applicant gave evidence that the terms of his contract of employment did not require him to disclose his employment with the Department of Education that was usually undertaken on Mondays and Tuesdays, being days he was not required to work at the Church.

20      The Applicant argued that his contract with Pinjarra Senior High School as a part-time teacher with an end date of 16 July 2023, ‘practically’ ended earlier on 30 June 2023 due to school holidays at that time. Therefore, the Applicant submits he was not ‘practically’ employed by Pinjarra Senior High School when he commenced his employment with the Respondent.

21      The Applicant agrees that he was engaged as a casual teacher by the Department of Education to teach at several different schools during his employment with the Respondent. The Applicant’s evidence is that his pastoral duties for the Respondent involved flexible hours, evening duties, and his employment with the Department of Education as a teacher was able to be accommodated without conflict. He gave evidence that he fulfilled the 38 hours required weekly of him by the Respondent.

22      The Applicant argued that his 38 hours were completed after hours such as writing sermons, visiting parishioners and that his teaching work finished at lunch time each day, allowing him to still complete eight hours of work for the Respondent.

23      Under cross-examination, he said that he would have finished work as a teacher every day ‘around 1 o’clock’ and did not work eight hours a day for the Department of Education (ts 10). He argued that his time working for the Department of Education was ‘his time’ and not time ‘on the clock’ of the Respondent (ts 11, 14).

24      When asked by the Respondent’s counsel if he thought ‘it was relevant to inform the elders at the Church that he had another job’, he said he: ‘can’t answer that with a ‘Yes or No’’ (ts 12), and that he ‘did not agree that he was not being transparent’ (ts 13). The Applicant answered the Respondent’s counsel in the affirmative when asked: ‘so you say that you were open and honest in your communication with the Church and that you disclosed everything that was relevant to your employment or that might have an impact’ (ts 13).

25      When the Applicant was referred to Clause 4.3 of his contract of employment ([13] above), he said he understood this to mean: ‘normally, in that sense is a broad category for a pastor. So it’s not normal as in 9 to 5, but it’s ‘normal’ as per a pastor, and a pastor’s normality for work hours is 24/7’ (ts 19).

26      The Applicant contends that only when he complained about governance issues in the Church, the complaints about his performance surfaced.

27      In reference to whether he sought to mislead the Commission, the Applicant says that his bundle of documents submitted prior to the hearing was not misleading or intended to mislead. He also argued that contrary to the Respondent’s assertions, his submissions were not solely focussed on the legitimacy of the discovery of his secondary employment as a teacher.

Legal Principles

28      The question to be answered in this matter is whether the matter should be dismissed under s 27(1)(a) of the Act:

(a) at any stage of the proceedings dismiss the matter or any part of it or refrain from hearing or determining the matter or part if it is satisfied –

(i) that the matter or part is trivial; or

(ii) that further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest;

 …

(iv) that for any other reason the matter or part should be dismissed or the hearing of it discontinued, as the case may be;

29      When considering this question, the Commission must exercise its powers consistently with s 26(1)(a) of the Act, the Commission –

(a) must act according to equity, good conscience, and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities or legal forms.

Consideration

30      The contract of employment between the parties expressly sets out the employee’s obligations in relation to his working hours:

4.2 Hours of Work

The normal hours of work for the Pastor shall be 38 hours per week. The Pastor shall work a minimum of 38 hours per week unless agreed otherwise with the Church. Any hours worked less than 38 hours per week shall be made up as leave unless otherwise agreed by the Church.

The Pastor will be required to adopt a flexible approach to the hours required for the Position, including working on weekends and evenings on occasion, and reasonable additional hours above the normal hours of work from time-to-time.

Sundays shall be classed as a normal working day and the Pastor shall be entitled to a day off during the week in place of Sunday where the normal hours of work per week are still met by the Pastor.

4.3 Pastor’s Agreement with the Church: General

 The Pastor agrees with the Church that the Pastor must:

Unless absent on leave as provided in this document or through illness or involuntary injury, devote the whole of the Pastor’s time and attention during normal working hours, and at such other times as may be reasonably necessary, to the business of the Church and to performing the Pastor’s obligations under this document;

Not have any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in any business, partnership, corporation, club, organization or group that would in any way compromise the performance of the Pastor’s obligations under this document, unless a disclosure of that interest has been made to the Church and the Pastor has complied with any directions of the Church in respect of that interest; and

Not hold any position for monetary or other reward which may be in any way be seen to conflict with the Pastor/s obligations under this document.

31      The undisputed evidence is that the Applicant was employed by the Department of Education and engaged in duties at public schools during his employment with the Respondent. The Applicant was employed by the Department of Education to work at Pinjarra Senior High School during July 2023; Gilmore College during August 2023, September 2023, October 2023, November 2023 and December 2023; Coodanup College during September 2023 and November 2023; Safety Bay High School in October 2023; Halls Head College in August 2023 and October 2023; and Ridge View High School in October 2023:

Table submitted by the Respondent, Form 1A Objection to an Application [4]

32      It is also not in dispute that the Applicant did not inform the Respondent that he was undertaking secondary employment with the Department of Education during his employment with the Respondent and at any time following his dismissal. Neither did the Applicant seek to enter into an agreement with the Respondent about his working hours. Instead, the Applicant decided that his ‘normal working hours’ would start after he completed his teaching engagements.

33      The Applicant’s evidence is that he did not believe he needed to advise the Respondent of secondary employment at the commencement of his engagement with the Respondent, because the school term had already ended and he was not ‘practically employed’ (ts 6, 9). The Applicant’s evidence is inconsistent on this point. There is no explanation for the Applicant not advising the Respondent of his subsequent engagements with the Department of Education when he was ‘practically employed’ and undertaking casual teaching engagements.

34      When asked about the time taken to travel to the schools the Applicant was engaged to teach, the Applicant’s answers were evasive. The Applicant’s evidence that he would travel for 15 minutes on the train to Mandurah Train Station and then up to 10 minutes on the bus between Secret Harbour and Coodanup College, is not credible. The Applicant’s evidence is that he travelled to Lynwood Christian Church from Coodanup College after he completed his teaching duties. I am of the view that the travel between the College and Church would require significantly more time than suggested by the Applicant. Given the locations of the different worksites and travelling by public transport, the travel time would be at least one and a half hours.

35      The Applicant concedes he did not secure the agreement of the Respondent to his hours of work, nor did he raise with the Respondent his work for the Department of Education at any time. The Applicant states it was not necessary to raise his secondary employment with the Respondent because the terms of his contract of employment did not expressly require him to do so, his work performance was not adversely impacted, and he was able to accommodate his work for the Respondent in the hours of the day available after he finished his teaching duties for the Department of Education.

36      The Commission has previously considered a matter in which an employee was engaged in secondary employment and found that the contract of employment was a critical consideration. In Francis James Slade v Graham Hart Holdings Pty Ltd [1987] WAIRC 10952; (1987) 67 WAIG 952 7, 9, the Commissioner said:

Having regard for all before me I have concluded that the question of whether the Applicant's actions in securing part-time external employment constituted misconduct is a proper one in these proceedings. At this point it should be made clear that the question is not whether the Applicant had a right to undertake another contract of employment whilst engaged by the Respondent. The question is whether, in all the circumstances, the Applicant's action in undertaking another contract of employment whilst engaged by the Respondent was such that it struck at the heart of his contract with the Respondent (7). (emphasis added).

…

The position of farm manager was always a full-time one. It is clear from the evidence that neither the Applicant nor the Respondent defined this as a set number of hours per week. Indeed, given the industry and the type of work entailed, it would have been surprising if they had. Equally clearly the type of work involved entailed an "on-call" component, particularly in relation to calving. In my view, any diminution of the Applicant's ability to respond to on-call situations, whether actual or potential, was a serious matter which the Respondent was entitled to have knowledge of and to give consideration to in the light of its contract with the Applicant.

I consider it unlikely that Mr Richard Hart would have agreed to the external employment situation as described by the Applicant for the period February 10, 1986 to May 2, 1986 had he known the details. And I consider it likely Mr Slade knew this. (9).

37      The Applicant's contract of employment does not prohibit him from engaging in secondary employment. However, an employee owes a duty of fidelity and good faith to an employer. This duty is an implied term of the contract: Robb v Green [1895] 2 QB 315 [317].

38      This obligation is set out in Blyth Chemicals v Bushnell [1933] HCA 8; (1933) 49 CLR 66 [81]:

Conduct which in respect of important matters is incompatible with the fulfilment of an employee's duty, or involves an opposition, or conflict between his interest and his duty to his employer, or impedes the faithful performance of his obligations, or is destructive of the necessary confidence between employer and employee, is a ground of dismissal (Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co v. Ansell (1); English and Australian Copper Co v. Johnson (1); Shepherd v. Felt and Textiles of Australia Ltd. (2)). But the conduct of the employee must itself involve the incompatibility, conflict, or impediment, or be destructive of confidence. An actual repugnance between his acts and his relationship must be found. It is not enough that ground for uneasiness as to its future conduct arises [81].

39      Clause 4.2 Hours of Work of the Applicant’s contract of employment required the Applicant to work a minimum of 38 hours per week. This clause also required the Applicant to adopt a flexible approach to the hours required including working on weekends, evenings on occasion, and reasonable additional hours above the normal hours of work from time to time.

40      I find the Applicant’s assertion that he was entitled to consider his normal working hours commencing between 1:00 pm to 3:00 pm and concluding in the evenings so that he worked 38 hours per week, is not one validly made under his contract of employment.

41      The Applicant’s contract of employment refers to the possibility of working on weekends and evenings on occasion, meaning not regularly. The words of the contract of employment are that normal working hours are not hours worked on weekends or in the evenings. The Applicant was obliged under the terms of his contract of employment to work ‘normal working hours’.

42      Given this, the Applicant breached Clause 4.3 of the contract of employment with the Respondent because he did not disclose a direct pecuniary interest in an organisation that would in any way compromise the performance of his obligations under his contract of employment. That is, the Applicant’s teaching engagements with the Department of Education would have compromised the Applicant’s performance of his obligations during normal working hours because he was unavailable at those times he was teaching.

43      The Applicant’s evidence about his working arrangements and the time necessary to travel between the Respondent’s workplace and the workplaces attended for the Department of Education is not convincing. The Applicant’s oral evidence was evasive and vague.

44      During November, the Applicant worked each working day for the Department of Education. The Applicant’s evidence is that during this period, he worked 38 hours per week for the Respondent in addition to the teaching engagements with the Department of Education. This would mean that the Applicant would be working until at least 10:00 pm on most days from Mondays through to Fridays during this period. The Respondent says it is unlikely that had they been aware of the secondary employment, it would have agreed to such an arrangement.

45      Applying Robb v Green, Blyth Chemicals v Bushnell and adopting similar reasoning as set out in Francis James Slade v Graham Hart Holdings Pty Ltd, I conclude the Applicant had an obligation to disclose to the Respondent his secondary employment with the Department of Education. The Applicant’s failure to disclose the fact of his regular employment engagements with the Department of Education, destroyed the necessary trust in the employment relationship.

46      Throughout the proceedings the Applicant maintained his position that he had always acted transparently and that his casual employment engagements with the Department of Education was a private matter.

47      The remedy sought by the Applicant is to be reinstated to the role of pastor. Given the Applicant’s insistence that the secondary employment with the Department of Education is a private matter that he would not disclose to the respondent, the remedy of reinstatement is not available to the Applicant.

Clean Hands

48      The Applicant says the Respondent’s conduct in terminating his employment was unfair because the Respondent breached the terms of his contract of employment. The Applicant refers the Commission to section 10.5 of the Lynwood Christian Church Inc Constitution 2019 (the Constitution) which is to be applied in conjunction with his contract of employment:

10.5  Removal from Office of a Church Leader, Office Bearer or Key Leader.

Termination of a Pastor(s) and Elder(s), Deacon(s), Deaconess(s) an Office Bearer or a Key Leader from their respective position(s) shall take place:

(a) Upon the resignation of that person given in writing to the Chairman of the Elders.

(b)  Subject to (Rule 8.6) at the decision of the Elders that the person:

i.  Has ceased to hold to the Statement of Faith.

ii.  Has displayed unworthy conduct or erroneous belief contrary to the Scriptures.

iii.  Continually absents themselves from Church attendance as per (Rule 8.4).

(c)  In the event of the apparent need to terminate a person from their respective position, the Elders shall in all cases give that person the opportunity for explanation, prior to arriving at a final decision, but the decision of the Elders shall be made at their absolute discretion.

The Elders at any time shall call a Special Church Members Meeting as per (Rule 12.3) which will have the power to terminate the Pastor’s contract by passing a resolution to that effect. A Secret Ballot shall be conducted and the resolution shall be passed if at least three quarters (75%) of active members present vote in favour of terminating the Pastor’s contract.

The Elders shall have the power to remove an Elder from his position by passing a vote by at least three quarters (75%) of the Eldership subject to (Rule 10.5 (c)).

In the event that the matter cannot be resolved, the Elders shall call a Special Church Members Meetings which shall have the power to remove the Elder from his position by passing a resolution to that effect. A Secret Ballot shall be conducted and the resolution shall be passed if at least three quarters (75%) of active members present vote in favour of removing the Elder from Office.

The Elders at their discretion have the power to remove a Deacon a Deaconess an Office Bearer or a Key Leader from their position subject to (Rule 10.5).

49      The Applicant says that the Respondent failed to comply with the processes required by the Constitution. In particular, the requirement to hold a Special Church Members Meeting and there being a lack of quorum to make the decision to terminate his employment. Consequentially, the Respondent breached a term of his contract of employment rendering the decision to terminate his employment unlawful and unfair.

50      In addition, the Applicant says the Respondent breached Clause 9.5 of his contract of employment:

9.5  Termination by Church: Any Reason

The Church, for any reason, may terminate the Pastor's employment in terms of this document, but only after due observance of the provisions of the Church constitution in this regard, by giving to the Pastor three months notice in writing, but if the Church does so for any reason other than a reason specified in clause 9.1 or 9.2, the Church must pay to the Pastor the payment calculated as set out in Item 9.1 of the Schedule (as adjusted from time to time).

A 6 month probationary period applies from the commencement date with the Church able to terminate at the end of this period for any reason by giving two months' notice.

51      Furthermore, the Applicant contends the Respondent failed to comply with the terms of his contract of employment and consequentially his dismissal was unfair:

(a) Clause 5 Performance Criteria and Review of Pastor’s Performance

(b) Clause 11 Alternative Dispute Resolution

52      The Respondent says that the Applicant cannot rely on the terms of the contract of employment to sustain a claim that the Respondent breached a term of the contract of employment by his dismissal, in circumstances where the Applicant’s conduct was in breach of the terms of the same contract. The Respondent seeks an order from the Commission that the unfair dismissal application be dismissed.

53      In Civil Service Association of Western Australia Incorporated v Director General, Ministry of Justice [2003] WAIRC 08587; (2003) 94 WAIG 215 [55], [56], a matter concerning disciplinary proceedings with respect to a government employee, the Commission considered the issue of whether the Commission’s jurisdiction has general equitable jurisdiction. Kenner C said:

In relation to the nature of the Commission's jurisdiction, in response to submissions by the Applicant, counsel for the Respondent also submitted that the Commission's jurisdiction is statutory and there is no general equitable jurisdiction conferred upon the Commission or the Commission constituted as an Arbitrator under the Act. Whilst it is trite to observe that the Commission is not a court of equitable jurisdiction, in my view, given that the touchstone of the Commission's jurisdiction is to enquire into and deal with industrial matters “in accordance with equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case” under s 26(1)(a) of the Act, it is appropriate for the Commission to have regard to relevant equitable principles, as part of “inquiring into and dealing with” an industrial matter [55].

The injunction in s 26(1)(a), governs the manner of the exercise of the Commission's jurisdiction, and somewhat tritely, is not a source of power in itself. However, what it does permit is the departure from strict legal entitlement, in circumstances where the equity and good conscience compels such a conclusion. For example, in a contractual benefits claim, in circumstances where the Applicant may be strictly entitled to a benefit under his or her contract of employment, but the circumstances of the case reveal that the Applicant engaged in some form of misconduct or deceit in relation to the matter the subject of the claim, the Commission is empowered in my opinion, pursuant to s 26(1)(a), to deny an Applicant relief. This approach would appear to accord with the two important maxims of equity, they being that “he who seeks equity must do equity and that “he must also come with clean hands”. In my opinion, there is nothing inconsistent with the Commission's jurisdiction, for the application of these broad principles, having regard to s 26(1)(a) of the Act [56].

54      In Charles (Carmelo) Parrella v FBM Corporation Pty Ltd [2012] WAIRC 00903; (2012) 92 WAIG 1988 [9], which is a claim under s 29(1)(d) of the Act for a denied contractual benefit, the Commission considered the question of an employees’ conduct that caused loss and damage to an employer. Beech C said:

Whether Mr Parrella acted in breach of his contract of employment will be an important consideration in both this Commission and in the Supreme Court proceedings. It is directly raised in FBM’s Notice of Answer in this matter and it is central to the action taken by FBM in the Supreme Court. Although this Commission will decide whether Mr Parrella has not been allowed by FBM benefits to which he is entitled under his contract of employment, his claim for an order that FBM pay him any benefits will be decided according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case (Sargant v Lowndes Lambert Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 81 WAIG 311; and the appeal which was dismissed: [2001] WAIRC 02603; (2001) 81 WAIG 1149). This means that if Mr Parrella did act in breach of his contract of employment and caused loss and damage to FBM, he does not come here with clean hands. The Commission would be slow to order FBM to pay him a benefit due under the very contract of employment of which he himself was in breach which caused loss and damage to his former employer [9].

55      The Commission has applied these principles in a claim for unfair dismissal in Verona Marie Wauchope v Director-General, Department of Education [2022] WAIRC 00739.

56      In Meyers v Casey [1913] HCA 50; (1913) 17 CLR 90 123, the High Court of Australia citing Dering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 29 ER 1184 [319] - [320] observed that the connection between the Applicant’s conduct and the equity claimed must be immediate and necessary.

57      I have found that the Applicant’s conduct was in breach of Clause 4.3 of his contract of employment. The Applicant’s conduct is wanting in good faith in that he conducted himself without regard to the impact his conduct would have on his duties to the Respondent and without regard to the terms of his contract of employment. The Applicant has not demonstrated he would do anything different if reinstated. The connection between the Applicant’s conduct and the equity claimed, being in the Applicant’s case, reinstatement, is ‘immediate and necessary’ to the employment relationship.

58      The Applicant cannot rely on the terms of his contract of employment to sustain a claim that the Respondent breached a term of the contract of employment by and when he was dismissed, in circumstances where his conduct was in breach of the terms of the same contract.

Conclusion

59      For the reasons set out above, I will dismiss application U 9 of 2024 pursuant to s 27(1)(a) of the Act.