Minister for Corrective Services -v- Western Australian Prison Officers' Union of Workers

Document Type: Decision

Matter Number: APPL 1/2024

Matter Description: Interpretation of the Department of Justice Prison Officers' Industrial Agreement 2022

Industry: Correction

Jurisdiction: Single Commissioner

Member/Magistrate name: Commissioner T B Walkington

Delivery Date: 14 Apr 2025

Result: Declaration issued

Citation: 2025 WAIRC 00244

WAIG Reference: 105 WAIG 895

DOCX | 42kB
2025 WAIRC 00244
INTERPRETATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PRISON OFFICERS' INDUSTRIAL AGREEMENT 2022
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION : 2025 WAIRC 00244

CORAM
: COMMISSIONER T B WALKINGTON

HEARD
:
WEDNESDAY, 25 SEPTEMBER 2024

DELIVERED : MONDAY, 14 APRIL 2025

FILE NO. : APPL 1 OF 2024

BETWEEN
:
MINISTER FOR CORRECTIVE SERVICES
Applicant

AND

WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PRISON OFFICERS' UNION OF WORKERS
Respondent

CatchWords : Agreement - Interpretation of - Relevant principles to be applied - Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) s 46
Legislation : Prisons Act 1981 (WA) ss 36 and 37; Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) s46.
Result : Declaration issued
REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
APPLICANT : MR M MCILWAINE
RESPONDENT : MR D STOJANOSKI


Case(s) referred to in reasons:
CITY OF WANNEROO V HOLMES [1989] FCA 369; (1989) 30 IR 36
DIRECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION V UNITED VOICE WA [2013] WASCA 287
FEDEC V THE MINISTER FOR CORRECTIVE SERVICES [2017] WAIRC 00828; 97 WAIG 1595
RE HARRISON; EX PARTE HAMES [2015] WASC 247
WORKPAC V SKENE [2018] FCAFC 131
Reasons for Decision

Background
1 The Minister for Corrective Services (Minister) applies to the Commission for a declaration of the true meaning of clause 28 of the Department of Justice Prison Officers’ Industrial Agreement 2022 (Agreement).
2 The question submitted by the Minister is:
Does Clause 28 of the Industrial Agreement, read in its entirety, require the Applicant to provide Officers a 12 hour break where they have worked overtime following a 12 hour shift? (the Interpretation Question).
3 The Western Australian Prison Officers’ Union of Worker (Union) submits the answer to this is in the affirmative, and the Minister argues the answer is ‘no’.
4 The Prison Officers employed by the Minister, engaged on a full-time basis, work in rostered patterns of either 8, 10 or 12 hours shifts.
5 Clause 31.7 states:
Rosters shall provide for at least eight hours between the ceasing of one shift and the commencement of the next shift except in the case of Officers working 12 hour shifts where the break shall be 12 hours.
6 There is a requirement for all Officers working full-time, except those undergoing Entry Level Training Program (ELTP), to work reasonable overtime in addition to their rostered ordinary hours (see clause 26.3).
7 The requirement to work overtime in addition to rostered ordinary hours is subject to clause 28 which sets out minimum time off duty when overtime is worked:

28. Minimum Time off Duty when Overtime is Worked

28.1 Subject to subclause 28.2, an Officer required to work a 12 hour shift shall be entitled to 12 hours off duty between successive shifts.

28.2 In an extreme emergency, an Officer who works a 12 hour shift may be required to perform 2 hours Overtime, requiring at least 10 hours off duty before returning to work.

28.3 All other Officers required to perform Overtime shall be entitled to have at least ten hours off duty between the hours of successive rostered shifts.

28.4 (a) An Officer who has not had at least 10 hours off duty before their next rostered shift is due to commence shall, without loss of pay for ordinary hours of work for which they are absent, not be required to commence the shift until the Officer has had 10 hours off duty.

(b) If the Officer resumes or continues work on the instruction of the Employer without 10 successive hours off duty, the Officer shall be granted time off in lieu for the hours worked until the Officer has had 10 consecutive hours off duty without loss of pay for ordinary hours of work for which they are absent.

28.5 Subclauses 28.2 and 28.4 are to be read in conjunction with the Department’s Fatigue Management Guidelines, as amended from time to time.

8 The Minister says that Officers rostered for successive twelve hour shifts who choose to work overtime between their shifts are required to have a ten hour break before returning to work. The Union asserts that the minimum break must be twelve hours.

The Minister’s Submissions
9 The Minister submits that clause 28.2 of the Agreement does not set out the only circumstance in which a break of less than 12 hours is permitted for an Officer rostered for successive 12 hours shifts and works overtime.
10 The Minster says that clause 28.2 properly understood provides for the only circumstance where the Minister can compel an Officer, working a 12-hour shift pattern, to work overtime if the working of the overtime will result in the Officer having less than a 12 hour break off duty between successive shifts.
11 The Minister says that clause 28.2 does not restrict the amount of overtime (subject to clause 29.4 of the Agreement) an Officer, working a 12-hour shift pattern, can voluntarily work if authorised to work overtime.
12 The Minister says that it would be an overly narrow interpretation of clause 28.2 of the Agreement to say that it provides that an Officer working consecutive 12 hour shifts can only work overtime in circumstances of an ‘extreme emergency’, and then, only a maximum of two hours.
13 The Minister submits that the absence of any express restriction on overtime following a 12 hour shift in clause 29 – Restrictions on Overtime indicates that the parties did not intend clause 28.2 as providing a strict limit on overtime that can be worked
14 The Minister contends that the parties intended that Officers working a 12 hour shift pattern would be required to have a 10 hour break before returning to work because 28.4(a) refers only to a requirement for a 10 hour break. That is, Officers who have completed a 12 hour shift, and choose to do overtime, are then only entitled to a 10 hour break without loss of pay, not a 12 hour break without loss of pay.
15 The applicant argues that due to clause 28.4 only referring to a 10 hour break, it points to there being no intention by the parties to provide a 12 hour break after an Officer chooses to do overtime.

The Union’s submissions
16 The Union argues that the plain meaning embodied in the heading of the clause: ‘Minimum time off duty when overtime is worked’ is self-evident and in accordance with principles of construction, that it was the objectively ascertained intention of the parties, as expressed in the heading and a plain reading of clauses 28.1, 28.2 and 28.3, that a reasonable person would understand the provision to deal with how much time a worker gets off in between shifts when they did overtime.
17 The Union also submits that ‘all other Officers’ referred to in clause 28.3 means ‘not those Officers that worked a 12 hour shift’, and argues that any other meaning would be to strain for meaning that is not there.
18 The Union submits that the Minister seeks the Commission to declare an overly complicated construction to the clause, reading into it something that is not there. It argues that no reasonable person would read the clause in the way the applicant would seek the clause be read.
19 The Union also refers to the final provision of clause 28 which states that:
Subclauses 28.2 and 28.4 are to be read in conjunction with the Department’s Fatigue Management Guidelines, as amended from time to time.
20 The Union argues that it is apparent that the intention of the parties as embodied in the words used in the Agreement at this part is that the purpose of the clause is to ensure that an Officer’s fatigue is managed properly and that an Officer have the required amount of break to recuperate, otherwise it could, for example, be a safety issue, and would go against the ‘good government, good order, and security of the prison´ pursuant to the Prisons Act 1981 (WA) ss 36 and 37, and an Officer’s “responsibility to maintain the security of the prison where he is carrying out his duties’ pursuant to s12(b) of the same Act. This intention, the respondent argues, results in an interpretation of the clause providing that an Officer only be required to do no more than two hours overtime due to an ‘extreme emergency’.
21 At the hearing, the Union agreed with the Minister’s construction that clause 28.2 does not place a restriction on clause 28.1, and that Officers may voluntarily complete overtime beyond a 12-hour shift. They argued however that regardless of how much overtime has been done and whether the Officer voluntarily undertakes overtime, if the Officers have completed a 12 hour shift they must be given a 12 hour break, and, except in the case of an ‘extreme emergency’, the Officer must receive a 12 hour break.
22 The Union submits, by way of example, that Officers who work overtime for three hours between successive shifts and take a 12 hour break then commence their successive shift three hours late after the due time, will be paid for the full shift, despite only working nine hours of the rostered shift, because the payment arrangements provide for annualised salaries.

Principles to be applied when interpreting an Industrial Instrument
23 The parties agree that the relevant principles in interpreting industrial agreements are those set out in the principles were also set out in Re Harrison; Ex parte Hames [2015] WASC 247, where principles of contractual interpretation were held to apply to the interpretation of industrial agreements. In that case, Beech J outlined six principles to apply to the interpretation of industrial instruments, in a matter regarding a nurses’ industrial agreement. He said: [50]
(1)  the primary duty of the court in construing an instrument is to endeavour to discover the intention of the parties as embodied in the words they have used in the instrument;
(2)  it is the objectively ascertained intention of the parties, as it is expressed in the instrument, that matters; not the parties' subjective intentions. The meaning of the terms of an instrument is to be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood the terms to mean;
(3)  the objectively ascertained purpose and objective of the transaction that is the subject of a commercial instrument may be taken into account in construing that instrument. This may invite attention to the genesis of the transaction, its background and context;
(4)  the apparent purpose or object of the relevant transaction can be inferred from the express and implied terms of the instrument, and from any admissible evidence of surrounding circumstances;
(5)  an instrument should be construed so as to avoid it making commercial nonsense or giving rise to commercial inconvenience. However, it must be borne in mind that business common sense may be a topic on which minds may differ; and
(6)  an instrument should be construed as a whole. A construction that makes the various parts of an instrument harmonious is preferable. If possible, each part of an instrument should be construed so as to have some operation (Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 [35] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan & Kiefel JJ); Kidd v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASC 99 [122]; Red Hill Iron Ltd v API Management Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 323 [106] - [112]; Primewest (Mandurah) Pty Ltd v Ryom Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 28 [55] (Martin CJ, Pullin & Murphy JJA agreeing)).
24 The respondent submits that the principles in Fedec v The Minister for Corrective Services [2017] WAIRC 00828; 97 WAIG 1595, are also relevant, as stated by Scott CC and Smith AP said [21]:
(a) Industrial agreements are usually not drafted with careful attention to form by persons who are experienced in drafting documents that have legal effect.
(b) The task of construction of an industrial agreement is to be approached in a way that allows for a generous construction:  City of Wanneroo v Holmes [1989] FCA 369; (1989) 30 IR 362.
(c)  Industrial agreements are made for industries in light of the customs and working conditions of each industry and must not be interpreted in a vacuum divorced from industrial realities:  George A Bond & Co Ltd (in liq) v McKenzie [1929] AR (NSW) 498; City of Wanneroo v Holmes (378 - 379) (French J).
25 In City of Wanneroo v Holmes [1989] FCA 369; (1989) 30 IR 36, the respondent refers the Commission to [83]:
The words of a clause in a written agreement are to be given the most appropriate meaning which they can legitimately bear. A court must have regard to all of the provisions of the agreement with a view to achieving harmony among them. See Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd [1973] HCA 36; 129 CLR 99. 109-110 (Gibbs J). These propositions area applicable to instruments generally, subject to any particular rules of construction which have been developed in relation to a particular kind of provision or instrument.
26 The respondent also points to the observations of Buss JA in Director General, Department of Education v United Voice WA [2013] WASCA 287, applying the court’s observations in Kucks v CSR Ltd [1996] IRCA 166; (1996) 66 IR 182, about interpreting industrial instruments, citing Madgwick J in that case:
It is trite that narrow or pedantic approaches to the interpretation of an award are misplaced. The search is for the meaning intended by the framer(s) of the document, bearing in mind that such framer(s) were likely of a practical bent of mind: they may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in ways likely to have been understood in the context of the relevant industry and industrial relations environment than with legal niceties or jargon. Thus, for example, it is justifiable to read the award to give effect to its evidence purposes, having regard to such context, despite mere inconsistencies or infelicities of expression which might tend to some other reading. [82]

27 In Workpac v Skene [2018] FCAFC 131 the Federal court summarised the principles of interpretation also [197]:
The starting point for interpretation of an enterprise agreement is the ordinary meaning of the words, read as a whole and in context: City of Wanneroo v Holmes (1989) 30 IR 362 at 378 (French J). The interpretation “… turns on the language of the particular agreement, understood in the light of its industrial context and purpose …”: Amcor Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2005) 222 CLR 241 at [2] (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J). The words are not to be interpreted in a vacuum divorced from industrial realities (Holmes at 378); rather, industrial agreements are made for various industries in the light of the customs and working conditions of each, and they are frequently couched in terms intelligible to the parties but without the careful attention to form and draftsmanship that one expects to find in an Act of Parliament (Holmes at 378–9, citing Geo A Bond & Co Ltd (in liq) v McKenzie [1929] AR(NSW) 498 at 503 (Street J)). To similar effect, it has been said that the framers of such documents were likely of a “practical bent of mind” and may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in a way likely to be understood in the relevant industry rather than with legal niceties and jargon, so that a purposive approach to interpretation is appropriate and a narrow or pedantic approach is misplaced: see Kucks v CSR Ltd (1996) 66 IR 182 at 184 (Madgwick J); Shop Distributive and Allied Employees’ Association v Woolworths SA Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 67 at [16] (Marshall, Tracey and Flick JJ); Amcor at [96] (Kirby J).
28 I adopt these principles in this matter.
Consideration
The Text of the Agreement
29 Clause 26 of the Agreement requires Officers to work overtime:
26. Requirement to Perform Overtime
26.1 Subject to clause 28 – Minimum Time off Duty when Overtime is Worked, all Officers, other than those employed on a part time basis or undertaking ELTP, are required to work reasonable Overtime in addition to their ordinary hours of work.
26.2 Officers employed on a part time basis or undertaking ELTP shall not be required to perform Overtime but may volunteer to perform Overtime.
26.3 Officers required to perform Overtime may be given advance or immediate notice to report for, return to, or remain on duty to perform Overtime.
26.4 If an Officer of the same Classification as the role to be filled in Overtime is not available, then any available Officer may be required to perform the Overtime.
26.5 An Officer required to return to duty to perform Overtime shall be paid for a minimum period of three hours Overtime.
26.6 Where an Officer is required to return to duty to perform Overtime more than once, each duty period will stand alone in respect to the application of the minimum payment of three hours; except where the second or subsequent return to duty occurs within three hours of commencement of the most recent return to duty.
26.7 Neither the Union nor an Officer shall in any way whether directly or indirectly be a party to, or be concerned with, any ban, limitation, or restriction on the working of Overtime in accordance with this Agreement.
30 Clearly the requirement to work overtime is subject to Clause 28 – Minimum Time Off Duty when Overtime is Worked:
28. Minimum Time off Duty when Overtime is Worked
28.1 Subject to subclause 28.2, an Officer required to work a 12 hour shift shall be entitled to 12 hours off duty between successive shifts.
28.2 In an extreme emergency, an Officer who works a 12 hour shift may be required to perform 2 hours Overtime, requiring at least 10 hours off duty before returning to work.
28.3 All other Officers required to perform Overtime shall be entitled to have at least ten hours off duty between the hours of successive rostered shifts.
28.4 (a) An Officer who has not had at least 10 hours off duty before their next rostered shift is due to commence shall, without loss of pay for ordinary hours of work for which they are absent, not be required to commence the shift until the Officer has had 10 hours off duty.
(b) If the Officer resumes or continues work on the instruction of the Employer without 10 successive hours off duty, the Officer shall be granted time off in lieu for the hours worked until the Officer has had 10 consecutive hours off duty without loss of pay for ordinary hours of work for which they are absent.
28.5 Subclauses 28.2 and 28.4 are to be read in conjunction with the Department’s Fatigue Management Guidelines, as amended from time to time.
31 There are restrictions on overtime and these are set out in in clause 29, and sub-clause 29.4 provides that :
No Officer, other than an Officer employed in a Work Camp Classification, shall work more than a total of 16 hours continuous hours except in a Declared Major Emergency or Natural Disaster.
32 The Minister submits that it is an overly narrow interpretation of clause 28.2 to say that the only circumstances in which an Officer rostered for 12 hour shifts can work overtime between successive shifts is in circumstances of an “extreme emergency”. The Minister submits that Officers on 12 hours shift rosters can undertake overtime.
33 The Union agrees that clause 28.2 does not place a restriction on overtime worked. The Union asserts that clause 28 read as a whole means that Officers working a 12 hour shift roster who work overtime between successive shifts must have a break of 12 hours, except where there is an extreme emergency, and then the required break is 10 hours.
34 The Minister and the Union disagree on the effect that working of overtime subsequently has on the requirement for a break and the payment of Officers during subsequent successive shifts. The Minister submits that clause 28.4 preserves the payment of Officers from the commencement of the successive rostered shift where the Officer has a 10 hour break.
35 The Minister contends that it would be an industrial absurdity to construe clause 28.1 as providing an Officer recalled for overtime between successive 12 hour shifts with a 12 hour break where there are no provisions similar to clause 28.4(a) to protect the Officer’s ordinary pay, even when the Officer does not work the full hours of their next shift.
36 The Minister says that without a similar sub-clause for Officer working 12 hours shifts and requiring a break of twelve hours following overtime worked, they should be required to use leave or not be paid for their absence during the successive shift.
37 In contrast, the Union says Officers are entitled to have their ordinary pay protected from the commencement of their rostered successive shift where the Officer has a 12 hour break. The union contends that the Agreement’s annualised salary arrangements effectively protect the Officers’ pay in these circumstances.
38 The Union says that the omission of a clause like 28.4 specifically referencing 12 hour shifts is not important, relevant nor informative because the terms of the Agreement prescribe annualised salaries, and therefore the Officer would be paid for their successive rostered shift regardless of when the Officer commenced that shift. That is, they would not have their pay withheld for their absence for part of their rostered shift.
39 It is not evident how the annualised salary arrangements preserve an Officer’s entitlement to pay in circumstances where the Officer has a 12 hour break, and therefore commences their successive rostered shift sometime into that shift. The Union’s submissions do not account for an Officer who is absent for part of their rostered shift without paid leave, and consequently works less hours than their rostered hours, but still receive their full pay.
40 The Agreement does not specifically provide for the preservation of pay where an Officer is absent for a period of their successive rostered shifts because they have worked overtime and have had a twelve hour break before returning to duty.
41 The inclusion of clause 28.4 which provides for the preservation of pay for Officers who have not had ten hours off duty before their next rostered shift indicates that the parties considered it necessary to make this provision to ensure that Officers who undertake overtime are not penalised for being absent for part of their subsequent shift.
42 The parties have not made a similar provision for Officers who have not had 12 hours off duty before their next rostered shift.
43 The Union’s contention that Officers who return to duty following a break of 12 hours are entitled to have their pay preserved for the period of their absence is not sustainable.
44 Given this, there are, then, two possible interpretations:
a) The parties considered it was not necessary to make such a provision because they did not intend that Officers engaged in 12 hour shift patterns would work any additional hours of overtime between successive shifts, except in an extreme emergency.
b) Alternatively, the parties intended to require only a 10 hour break regardless of rostered shift length, specifically addressing the preservation of pay to accommodate the required break.

Industrial Absurdity of Overtime Limitation
45 The Minister says that an interpretation that results in Officers working 12 hours shift patterns only undertaking overtime in extreme emergencies is an overly narrow interpretation and results in an industrial absurdity.
46 The Union submits that the reference in clause 28.5 to fatigue management policies and guidelines is an important indication of the purpose of the clause prescribing minimum breaks between shifts. Acknowledging the Union submits that Officers on 12 hours shift rosters are able to work overtime between successive shifts, there is no evidence before me on the question of the adequacy, or otherwise, of breaks of 10 hours nor 12 hours. It is not possible to draw an inference that the reference to fatigue management policies and guidelines favours the interpretation advanced by the Union.
47 The Agreement restricts overtime in certain circumstances:
29.1 Overtime will not be available in the following circumstances:
(a) after a period of Personal Leave where the prescribed application form and required evidence has not been provided to the nominated authority at the Officer’s Headquarters;
(b) where an Officer has taken a single day’s Annual Leave as a Repay Day under a Repay Agreement but is yet to commit to an alternative work date;
(c) when an Officer is undergoing a period of rehabilitation or is subject to a return to work program; or
(d) when an Officer as a result of secondment becomes bound by a different award or industrial agreement.
29.2 An Officer working a training roster will not be permitted to work Overtime on a day that interrupts their attendance at or active participation on the course.
48 Further, Officers in a job share arrangement have limits on the overtime they may undertake.
49 If the parties intended that Officers rostered on 12 hour shift patterns were to be denied access to overtime or have limits on the overtime they may access, it would have been consistent with this intention to specify such restrictions in this clause.
50 Given there are no restrictions set out in this clause, I find the parties did not intend to preclude Officers on 12 hours shifts from undertaking overtime between successive shifts.
51 Applying Workpac v Skene [2018] FCAFC 131, and avoiding a narrow and pedantic approach and taking the Agreement as a whole, I find that the Agreement cannot be read to say that the only time overtime can be undertaken by an Officer rostered on 12 hours shifts is in an extreme emergency, and that the limitation is two hours.

Entitlements and Voluntary Overtime
52 Clause 28.1 provides those Officers required to work a 12 hour shift shall be entitlement to 12 hours off duty between successive shifts. Whereas clause 28.3 says “all other Officers’ required to perform overtime shall be entitled to have at least 10 hours off duty between successive shift rosters. Both parties agree that “all other Officers” means Officers rostered on 8 hour or 10 hour shift patterns.
53 The Union contends that Officers on 12 hours shift pattern must have a break of 12 hours off duty because clause 28.2 is the only circumstance in which the break may be reduced to 10 hours off duty.
54 The Minister contends that when an Officer elects to work available overtime, then clause 28.4 of the Agreement applies. That is, an Officer may waive their entitlement set out in clause 28.1 for twelve hours off duty if they elect or choose to work overtime. Where this occurs, an Officer is required to have a 10 hour break before returning to duty and their pay is preserved if this means the Officer returns to duty after the commencement of their subsequent shift.
55 The Minister submits that clause 28.2 provides for a limited circumstance in which an Officer on a 12 hour shift pattern may be compelled to work overtime.
56 The Minister contends that the omission of a similar clause concerning entitlements to pay for offices working successive 12 hours shifts who undertake overtime that is not compelled by the Minister in an extreme emergency means that clause 28.4 should be taken to apply to Officers who work 12 hour shifts. That is, a 10 hour break is required, and if a break of 10 hours is not taken, then the Officer has an entitlement to time in lieu.
57 Essentially, I understand the Minister’s contentions to be that clause 28.1, prescribing an entitlement of a 12 break between shifts for Officers on 12 hours shifts, cannot operate to prevent Officers on 12 hours shifts from undertaking overtime between successive shifts, because that would be an overly narrow interpretation. It is, then, accepted that Officers working 12 hours shifts will voluntarily undertake available overtime between successive shifts, and when this occurs, clause 28.4 applies — and requires a ten hour break between successive shifts.
58 The Minister’s interpretation is that the words of clause 28 can be construed to mean that the minimum break for Officers rostered on a 12 hour shift pattern is 10 hours where they volunteer to work overtime.
59 The use of the term “entitlement” in clauses 28.1 and 28.3 favour the Minister’s contentions. An “entitlement” may be waived by the beneficiary, however an employer may not compel the waiver.
60 The parties agree that Officers rostered on 12 hours shift patterns can and do undertake overtime in addition to their ordinary rostered hours. The overtime worked may take place in between successive shifts.
61 The parties consequently identified the Agreement needed to address the mandatory minimum breaks before returning to duty and the preservation of pay. The Agreement provides that by clauses 28.4(a) and (b), which provide for the entitlement to rostered hours off duty between successive shifts. The prescribed entitlement may be waived in circumstances where an Officer chooses to undertake overtime, provided there is a mandatory 10 hours off duty before returning to duty with preservation of pay for any absence, and where an Officer is instructed to continue or return to duty without a 10 hour break, the Officer is granted time off in lieu.
62 Clause 28.1 refers to an ‘entitlement’ to take a 12 hour break between successive shifts. The Minister says this entitlement can be set aside in circumstances where an Officer is compelled to work overtime because there is an extreme emergency in accordance with clause 28.2 and when an Officer volunteers to undertake overtime between successive shifts.
63 The Minister says clause 28.1 prescribes an entitlement which an Officer may voluntarily forsake.
64 Applying the principles in Fedec v The Minister for Corrective Services [2017] WAIRC 00828; 97 WAIG 1595 I find that the construction recognises the Agreement may not have been drafted with careful attention to its form and legal effect, and that I ought to adopt a generous construction in light of the customs and working conditions of prisons as that advanced by the Minister.
65 A rigid adherence to clause 28.1, without consideration of other parts of the clause and Agreement, effectively results in an Officer rostered on a 12 hour shift and volunteering to undertake overtime having part of their pay protected or preserved. That is, clause 28.4 preserves their full pay for the successive shift when they return after a 10 hour break, but not at all on return from a 12 hour shift. This is an absurd result.
66 I find that the parties did not intend for clause 28.1 and 28.2 to preclude an Officer rostered on 12 hour shift patterns from working overtime on a voluntary basis. Further, in circumstances where Officers on 12 hour shift rosters voluntarily worked overtime, then clause 28.4 applies to require an Officer to have 10 hours off duty without loss of pay.
67 The answer to the question posed by the Minister is “no”.
Minister for Corrective Services -v- Western Australian Prison Officers' Union of Workers

INTERPRETATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PRISON OFFICERS' INDUSTRIAL AGREEMENT 2022

WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

 

CITATION : 2025 WAIRC 00244

 

CORAM

: Commissioner T B Walkington

 

HEARD

:

Wednesday, 25 September 2024

 

DELIVERED : Monday, 14 April 2025

 

FILE NO. : APPL 1 OF 2024

 

BETWEEN

:

Minister for Corrective Services

Applicant

 

AND

 

Western Australian Prison Officers' Union of Workers

Respondent

 

CatchWords : Agreement - Interpretation of - Relevant principles to be applied -  Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) s 46

Legislation : Prisons Act 1981 (WA) ss 36 and 37;                                                                     Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) s46.

Result : Declaration issued

Representation:

 


Counsel:

Applicant : Mr M McIlwaine

Respondent : Mr D Stojanoski

 

 

Case(s) referred to in reasons:

City of Wanneroo v Holmes [1989] FCA 369; (1989) 30 IR 36

Director General, Department of Education v United Voice WA [2013] WASCA 287

Fedec v The Minister for Corrective Services [2017] WAIRC 00828; 97 WAIG 1595

Re Harrison; Ex parte Hames [2015] WASC 247

Workpac v Skene [2018] FCAFC 131

Reasons for Decision

 

Background

1         The Minister for Corrective Services (Minister) applies to the Commission for a declaration of the true meaning of clause 28 of the Department of Justice Prison Officers’ Industrial Agreement 2022 (Agreement).

2         The question submitted by the Minister is:

Does Clause 28 of the Industrial Agreement, read in its entirety, require the Applicant to provide Officers a 12 hour break where they have worked overtime following a 12 hour shift? (the Interpretation Question).

3         The Western Australian Prison Officers’ Union of Worker (Union) submits the answer to this is in the affirmative, and the Minister argues the answer is ‘no’.

4         The Prison Officers employed by the Minister, engaged on a full-time basis, work in rostered patterns of either 8, 10 or 12 hours shifts.

5         Clause 31.7 states:

Rosters shall provide for at least eight hours between the ceasing of one shift and the commencement of the next shift except in the case of Officers working 12 hour shifts where the break shall be 12 hours.

6         There is a requirement for all Officers working full-time, except those undergoing Entry Level Training Program (ELTP), to work reasonable overtime in addition to their rostered ordinary hours (see clause 26.3).

7         The requirement to work overtime in addition to rostered ordinary hours is subject to clause 28 which sets out minimum time off duty when overtime is worked:

 

28. Minimum Time off Duty when Overtime is Worked

 

28.1  Subject to subclause 28.2, an Officer required to work a 12 hour shift shall be entitled to 12 hours off duty between successive shifts.

 

28.2  In an extreme emergency, an Officer who works a 12 hour shift may be required to perform 2 hours Overtime, requiring at least 10 hours off duty before returning to work.

 

28.3  All other Officers required to perform Overtime shall be entitled to have at least ten hours off duty between the hours of successive rostered shifts.

 

28.4   (a)  An Officer who has not had at least 10 hours off duty before their next rostered shift is due to commence shall, without loss of pay for ordinary hours of work for which they are absent, not be required to commence the shift until the Officer has had 10 hours off duty.

 

(b)  If the Officer resumes or continues work on the instruction of the Employer without 10 successive hours off duty, the Officer shall be granted time off in lieu for the hours worked until the Officer has had 10 consecutive hours off duty without loss of pay for ordinary hours of work for which they are absent.

 

28.5  Subclauses 28.2 and 28.4 are to be read in conjunction with the Department’s Fatigue Management Guidelines, as amended from time to time.

 

8         The Minister says that Officers rostered for successive twelve hour shifts who choose to work overtime between their shifts are required to have a ten hour break before returning to work.  The Union asserts that the minimum break must be twelve hours.

 

The Minister’s Submissions

9         The Minister submits that clause 28.2 of the Agreement does not set out the only circumstance in which a break of less than 12 hours is permitted for an Officer rostered for successive 12 hours shifts and works overtime.

10      The Minster says that clause 28.2 properly understood provides for the only circumstance where the Minister can compel an Officer, working a 12-hour shift pattern, to work overtime if the working of the overtime will result in the Officer having less than a 12 hour break off duty between successive shifts.

11      The Minister says that clause 28.2 does not restrict the amount of overtime (subject to clause 29.4 of the Agreement) an Officer, working a 12-hour shift pattern, can voluntarily work if authorised to work overtime.

12      The Minister says that it would be an overly narrow interpretation of clause 28.2 of the Agreement to say that it provides that an Officer working consecutive 12 hour shifts can only work overtime in circumstances of an ‘extreme emergency’, and then, only a maximum of two hours.

13      The Minister submits that the absence of any express restriction on overtime following a 12 hour shift in clause 29 – Restrictions on Overtime indicates that the parties did not intend clause 28.2 as providing a strict limit on overtime that can be worked

14      The Minister contends that the parties intended that Officers working a 12 hour shift pattern would be required to have a 10 hour break before returning to work because 28.4(a) refers only to a requirement for a 10 hour break.  That is, Officers who have completed a 12 hour shift, and choose to do overtime, are then only entitled to a 10 hour break without loss of pay, not a 12 hour break without loss of pay. 

15      The applicant argues that due to clause 28.4 only referring to a 10 hour break, it points to there being no intention by the parties to provide a 12 hour break after an Officer chooses to do overtime.

 

The Union’s submissions

16      The Union argues that the plain meaning embodied in the heading of the clause: ‘Minimum time off duty when overtime is worked’ is self-evident and in accordance with principles of construction, that it was the objectively ascertained intention of the parties, as expressed in the heading and a plain reading of clauses 28.1, 28.2 and 28.3, that a reasonable person would understand the provision to deal with how much time a worker gets off in between shifts when they did overtime.

17      The Union also submits that ‘all other Officers’ referred to in clause 28.3 means ‘not those Officers that worked a 12 hour shift’, and argues that any other meaning would be to strain for meaning that is not there.

18      The Union submits that the Minister seeks the Commission to declare an overly complicated construction to the clause, reading into it something that is not there.  It argues that no reasonable person would read the clause in the way the applicant would seek the clause be read.

19      The Union also refers to the final provision of clause 28 which states that:

Subclauses 28.2 and 28.4 are to be read in conjunction with the Department’s Fatigue Management Guidelines, as amended from time to time.

20      The Union argues that it is apparent that the intention of the parties as embodied in the words used in the Agreement at this part is that the purpose of the clause is to ensure that an Officer’s fatigue is managed properly and that an Officer have the required amount of break to recuperate, otherwise it could, for example, be a safety issue, and would go against the ‘good government, good order, and security of the prison´ pursuant to the Prisons Act 1981 (WA) ss 36 and 37, and an Officer’s “responsibility to maintain the security of the prison where he is carrying out his duties’ pursuant to s12(b) of the same Act. This intention, the respondent argues, results in an interpretation of the clause providing that an Officer only be required to do no more than two hours overtime due to an ‘extreme emergency’. 

21      At the hearing, the Union agreed with the Minister’s construction that clause 28.2 does not place a restriction on clause 28.1, and that Officers may voluntarily complete overtime beyond a 12-hour shift. They argued however that regardless of how much overtime has been done and whether the Officer voluntarily undertakes overtime, if the Officers have completed a 12 hour shift they must be given a 12 hour break, and, except in the case of an ‘extreme emergency’, the Officer must receive a 12 hour break. 

22      The Union submits, by way of example, that Officers who work overtime for three hours between successive shifts and take a 12 hour break then commence their successive shift three hours late after the due time, will be paid for the full shift, despite only working nine hours of the rostered shift, because the payment arrangements provide for annualised salaries.

 

Principles to be applied when interpreting an Industrial Instrument

23      The parties agree that the relevant principles in interpreting industrial agreements are those set out in the principles were also set out in Re Harrison; Ex parte Hames [2015] WASC 247, where principles of contractual interpretation were held to apply to the interpretation of industrial agreements. In that case, Beech J outlined six principles to apply to the interpretation of industrial instruments, in a matter regarding a nurses’ industrial agreement. He said: [50]

(1)  the primary duty of the court in construing an instrument is to endeavour to discover the intention of the parties as embodied in the words they have used in the instrument;

(2)  it is the objectively ascertained intention of the parties, as it is expressed in the instrument, that matters; not the parties' subjective intentions. The meaning of the terms of an instrument is to be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood the terms to mean;

(3)  the objectively ascertained purpose and objective of the transaction that is the subject of a commercial instrument may be taken into account in construing that instrument. This may invite attention to the genesis of the transaction, its background and context;

(4)  the apparent purpose or object of the relevant transaction can be inferred from the express and implied terms of the instrument, and from any admissible evidence of surrounding circumstances;

(5)  an instrument should be construed so as to avoid it making commercial nonsense or giving rise to commercial inconvenience. However, it must be borne in mind that business common sense may be a topic on which minds may differ; and

(6)  an instrument should be construed as a whole. A construction that makes the various parts of an instrument harmonious is preferable. If possible, each part of an instrument should be construed so as to have some operation (Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 [35] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan & Kiefel JJ); Kidd v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASC 99 [122]; Red Hill Iron Ltd v API Management Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 323 [106] - [112]; Primewest (Mandurah) Pty Ltd v Ryom Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 28 [55] (Martin CJ, Pullin & Murphy JJA agreeing)).

24      The respondent submits that the principles in Fedec v The Minister for Corrective Services [2017] WAIRC 00828; 97 WAIG 1595, are also relevant, as stated by Scott CC and Smith AP said [21]:

(a)  Industrial agreements are usually not drafted with careful attention to form by persons who are experienced in drafting documents that have legal effect.

(b) The task of construction of an industrial agreement is to be approached in a way that allows for a generous construction:  City of Wanneroo v Holmes [1989] FCA 369; (1989) 30 IR 362.

(c)  Industrial agreements are made for industries in light of the customs and working conditions of each industry and must not be interpreted in a vacuum divorced from industrial realities:  George A Bond & Co Ltd (in liq) v McKenzie [1929] AR (NSW) 498; City of Wanneroo v Holmes (378 - 379) (French J).

25      In City of Wanneroo v Holmes [1989] FCA 369; (1989) 30 IR 36, the respondent refers the Commission to [83]:

The words of a clause in a written agreement are to be given the most appropriate meaning which they can legitimately bear. A court must have regard to all of the provisions of the agreement with a view to achieving harmony among them.  See Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd [1973] HCA 36; 129 CLR 99. 109-110 (Gibbs J).  These propositions area applicable to instruments generally, subject to any particular rules of construction which have been developed in relation to a particular kind of provision or instrument.

26      The respondent also points to the observations of Buss JA in Director General, Department of Education v United Voice WA [2013] WASCA 287, applying the court’s observations in Kucks v CSR Ltd [1996] IRCA 166; (1996) 66 IR 182, about interpreting industrial instruments, citing Madgwick J in that case:

It is trite that narrow or pedantic approaches to the interpretation of an award are misplaced. The search is for the meaning intended by the framer(s) of the document, bearing in mind that such framer(s) were likely of a practical bent of mind: they may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in ways likely to have been understood in the context of the relevant industry and industrial relations environment than with legal niceties or jargon. Thus, for example, it is justifiable to read the award to give effect to its evidence purposes, having regard to such context, despite mere inconsistencies or infelicities of expression which might tend to some other reading. [82]

 

27      In Workpac v Skene [2018] FCAFC 131 the Federal court summarised the principles of interpretation also [197]:

The starting point for interpretation of an enterprise agreement is the ordinary meaning of the words, read as a whole and in context: City of Wanneroo v Holmes (1989) 30 IR 362 at 378 (French J). The interpretation “… turns on the language of the particular agreement, understood in the light of its industrial context and purpose …”: Amcor Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2005) 222 CLR 241 at [2] (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J). The words are not to be interpreted in a vacuum divorced from industrial realities (Holmes at 378); rather, industrial agreements are made for various industries in the light of the customs and working conditions of each, and they are frequently couched in terms intelligible to the parties but without the careful attention to form and draftsmanship that one expects to find in an Act of Parliament (Holmes at 378–9, citing Geo A Bond & Co Ltd (in liq) v McKenzie [1929] AR(NSW) 498 at 503 (Street J)). To similar effect, it has been said that the framers of such documents were likely of a “practical bent of mind” and may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in a way likely to be understood in the relevant industry rather than with legal niceties and jargon, so that a purposive approach to interpretation is appropriate and a narrow or pedantic approach is misplaced: see Kucks v CSR Ltd (1996) 66 IR 182 at 184 (Madgwick J); Shop Distributive and Allied Employees’ Association v Woolworths SA Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 67 at [16] (Marshall, Tracey and Flick JJ); Amcor at [96] (Kirby J).

28      I adopt these principles in this matter.

Consideration

The Text of the Agreement

29      Clause 26 of the Agreement requires Officers to work overtime:

26.  Requirement to Perform Overtime

26.1  Subject to clause 28 – Minimum Time off Duty when Overtime is Worked, all Officers, other than those employed on a part time basis or undertaking ELTP, are required to work reasonable Overtime in addition to their ordinary hours of work.

26.2  Officers employed on a part time basis or undertaking ELTP shall not be required to perform Overtime but may volunteer to perform Overtime.

26.3  Officers required to perform Overtime may be given advance or immediate notice to report for, return to, or remain on duty to perform Overtime.

26.4  If an Officer of the same Classification as the role to be filled in Overtime is not available, then any available Officer may be required to perform the Overtime.

26.5  An Officer required to return to duty to perform Overtime shall be paid for a minimum period of three hours Overtime.

26.6  Where an Officer is required to return to duty to perform Overtime more than once, each duty period will stand alone in respect to the application of the minimum payment of three hours; except where the second or subsequent return to duty occurs within three hours of commencement of the most recent return to duty.

26.7  Neither the Union nor an Officer shall in any way whether directly or indirectly be a party to, or be concerned with, any ban, limitation, or restriction on the working of Overtime in accordance with this Agreement.

30      Clearly the requirement to work overtime is subject to Clause 28 – Minimum Time Off Duty when Overtime is Worked:

28.  Minimum Time off Duty when Overtime is Worked

28.1 Subject to subclause 28.2, an Officer required to work a 12 hour shift shall be entitled to 12 hours off duty between successive shifts.

28.2  In an extreme emergency, an Officer who works a 12 hour shift may be required to perform 2 hours Overtime, requiring at least 10 hours off duty before returning to work.

28.3  All other Officers required to perform Overtime shall be entitled to have at least ten hours off duty between the hours of successive rostered shifts.

28.4 (a) An Officer who has not had at least 10 hours off duty before their next rostered shift is due to commence shall, without loss of pay for ordinary hours of work for which they are absent, not be required to commence the shift until the Officer has had 10 hours off duty.

(b)  If the Officer resumes or continues work on the instruction of the Employer without 10 successive hours off duty, the Officer shall be granted time off in lieu for the hours worked until the Officer has had 10 consecutive hours off duty without loss of pay for ordinary hours of work for which they are absent.

28.5  Subclauses 28.2 and 28.4 are to be read in conjunction with the Department’s Fatigue Management Guidelines, as amended from time to time.

31      There are restrictions on overtime and these are set out in in clause 29, and sub-clause 29.4 provides that :

No Officer, other than an Officer employed in a Work Camp Classification,  shall work more than a total of 16 hours continuous hours except in a Declared Major Emergency or Natural Disaster.

32      The Minister submits that it is an overly narrow interpretation of clause 28.2 to say that the only circumstances in which an Officer rostered for 12 hour shifts can work overtime between successive shifts is in circumstances of an “extreme emergency”. The Minister submits that Officers on 12 hours shift rosters can undertake overtime.

33      The Union agrees that clause 28.2 does not place a restriction on overtime worked. The Union asserts that clause 28 read as a whole means that Officers working a 12 hour shift roster who work overtime between successive shifts must have a break of 12 hours, except where there is an extreme emergency, and then the required break is 10 hours.

34      The Minister and the Union disagree on the effect that working of overtime subsequently has on the requirement for a break and the payment of Officers during subsequent successive shifts.  The Minister submits that clause 28.4 preserves the payment of Officers from the commencement of the successive rostered shift where the Officer has a 10 hour break. 

35      The Minister contends that it would be an industrial absurdity to construe clause 28.1 as providing an Officer recalled for overtime between successive 12 hour shifts with a 12 hour break where there are no provisions similar to clause 28.4(a) to protect the Officer’s ordinary pay, even when the Officer does not work the full hours of their next shift.

36      The Minister says that without a similar sub-clause for Officer working 12 hours shifts and requiring a break of twelve hours following overtime worked, they should be required to use leave or not be paid for their absence during the successive shift.

37      In contrast, the Union says Officers are entitled to have their ordinary pay protected from the commencement of their rostered successive shift where the Officer has a 12 hour break.  The union contends that the Agreement’s annualised salary arrangements effectively protect the Officers’ pay in these circumstances.

38      The Union says that the omission of a clause like 28.4 specifically referencing 12 hour shifts is not important, relevant nor informative because the terms of the Agreement prescribe annualised salaries, and therefore the Officer would be paid for their successive rostered shift regardless of when the Officer commenced that shift.  That is, they would not have their pay withheld for their absence for part of their rostered shift.

39      It is not evident how the annualised salary arrangements preserve an Officer’s entitlement to pay in circumstances where the Officer has a 12 hour break, and therefore commences their successive rostered shift sometime into that shift.  The Union’s submissions do not account for an Officer who is absent for part of their rostered shift without paid leave, and consequently works less hours than their rostered hours, but still receive their full pay.

40      The Agreement does not specifically provide for the preservation of pay where an Officer is absent for a period of their successive rostered shifts because they have worked overtime and have had a twelve hour break before returning to duty.

41      The inclusion of clause 28.4 which provides for the preservation of pay for Officers who have not had ten hours off duty before their next rostered shift indicates that the parties considered it necessary to make this provision to ensure that Officers who undertake overtime are not penalised for being absent for part of their subsequent shift.

42      The parties have not made a similar provision for Officers who have not had 12 hours off duty before their next rostered shift. 

43      The Union’s contention that Officers who return to duty following a break of 12 hours are entitled to have their pay preserved for the period of their absence is not sustainable.

44      Given this, there are, then, two possible interpretations:

a) The parties considered it was not necessary to make such a provision because they did not intend that Officers engaged in 12 hour shift patterns would work any additional hours of overtime between successive shifts, except in an extreme emergency.

b) Alternatively, the parties intended to require only a 10 hour break regardless of rostered shift length, specifically addressing the preservation of pay to accommodate the required break.

 

Industrial Absurdity of Overtime Limitation

45      The Minister says that an interpretation that results in Officers working 12 hours shift patterns only undertaking overtime in extreme emergencies is an overly narrow interpretation and results in an industrial absurdity.

46      The Union submits that the reference in clause 28.5 to fatigue management policies and guidelines is an important indication of the purpose of the clause prescribing minimum breaks between shifts.  Acknowledging the Union submits that Officers on 12 hours shift rosters are able to work overtime between successive shifts, there is no evidence before me on the question of the adequacy, or otherwise, of breaks of 10 hours nor 12 hours.  It is not possible to draw an inference that the reference to fatigue management policies and guidelines favours the interpretation advanced by the Union.

47      The Agreement restricts overtime in certain circumstances:

29.1 Overtime will not be available in the following circumstances:

(a)  after a period of Personal Leave where the prescribed application form and required evidence has not been provided to the nominated authority at the Officer’s Headquarters;

(b)  where an Officer has taken a single day’s Annual Leave as a Repay Day under a Repay Agreement but is yet to commit to an alternative work date;

(c)  when an Officer is undergoing a period of rehabilitation or is subject to a return to work program; or

(d)  when an Officer as a result of secondment becomes bound by a different award or industrial agreement.

29.2  An Officer working a training roster will not be permitted to work Overtime on a day that interrupts their attendance at or active participation on the course.

48      Further, Officers in a job share arrangement have limits on the overtime they may undertake.

49      If the parties intended that Officers rostered on 12 hour shift patterns were to be denied access to overtime or have limits on the overtime they may access, it would have been consistent with this intention to specify such restrictions in this clause.

50      Given there are no restrictions set out in this clause, I find the parties did not intend to preclude Officers on 12 hours shifts from undertaking overtime between successive shifts.

51      Applying Workpac v Skene [2018] FCAFC 131, and avoiding a narrow and pedantic approach and taking the Agreement as a whole, I find that the Agreement cannot be read to say that the only time overtime can be undertaken by an Officer rostered on 12 hours shifts is in an extreme emergency, and that the limitation is two hours.

 

Entitlements and Voluntary Overtime

52      Clause 28.1 provides those Officers required to work a 12 hour shift shall be entitlement to 12 hours off duty between successive shifts. Whereas clause 28.3 says “all other Officers’ required to perform overtime shall be entitled to have at least 10 hours off duty between successive shift rosters.  Both parties agree that “all other Officers” means Officers rostered on 8 hour or 10 hour shift patterns.

53      The Union contends that Officers on 12 hours shift pattern must have a break of 12 hours off duty because clause 28.2 is the only circumstance in which the break may be reduced to 10 hours off duty.

54      The Minister contends that when an Officer elects to work available overtime, then clause 28.4 of the Agreement applies.  That is, an Officer may waive their entitlement set out in clause 28.1 for twelve hours off duty if they elect or choose to work overtime. Where this occurs, an Officer is required to have a 10 hour break before returning to duty and their pay is preserved if this means the Officer returns to duty after the commencement of their subsequent shift.

55      The Minister submits that clause 28.2 provides for a limited circumstance in which an Officer on a 12 hour shift pattern may be compelled to work overtime.

56      The Minister contends that the omission of a similar clause concerning entitlements to pay for offices working successive 12 hours shifts who undertake overtime that is not compelled by the Minister in an extreme emergency means that clause 28.4 should be taken to apply to Officers who work 12 hour shifts.  That is, a 10 hour break is required, and if a break of 10 hours is not taken, then the Officer has an entitlement to time in lieu.

57      Essentially, I understand the Minister’s contentions to be that clause 28.1, prescribing an entitlement of a 12 break between shifts for Officers on 12 hours shifts, cannot operate to prevent Officers on 12 hours shifts from undertaking overtime between successive shifts, because that would be an overly narrow interpretation. It is, then, accepted that Officers working 12 hours shifts will voluntarily undertake available overtime between successive shifts, and when this occurs, clause 28.4 applies — and requires a ten hour break between successive shifts.

58      The Minister’s interpretation is that the words of clause 28 can be construed to mean that the minimum break for Officers rostered on a 12 hour shift pattern is 10 hours where they volunteer to work overtime.

59      The use of the term “entitlement” in clauses 28.1 and 28.3 favour the Minister’s contentions.  An “entitlement” may be waived by the beneficiary, however an employer may not compel the waiver.

60      The parties agree that Officers rostered on 12 hours shift patterns can and do undertake overtime in addition to their ordinary rostered hours. The overtime worked may take place in between successive shifts.

61      The parties consequently identified the Agreement needed to address the mandatory minimum breaks before returning to duty and the preservation of pay. The Agreement provides that by clauses 28.4(a) and (b), which provide for the entitlement to rostered hours off duty between successive shifts. The prescribed entitlement may be waived in circumstances where an Officer chooses to undertake overtime, provided there is a mandatory 10 hours off duty before returning to duty with preservation of pay for any absence, and where an Officer is instructed to continue or return to duty without a 10 hour break, the Officer is granted time off in lieu.

62      Clause 28.1 refers to an ‘entitlement’ to take a 12 hour break between successive shifts.  The Minister says this entitlement can be set aside in circumstances where an Officer is compelled to work overtime because there is an extreme emergency in accordance with clause 28.2 and when an Officer volunteers to undertake overtime between successive shifts.

63      The Minister says clause 28.1 prescribes an entitlement which an Officer may voluntarily forsake.

64      Applying the principles in Fedec v The Minister for Corrective Services [2017] WAIRC 00828; 97 WAIG 1595 I find that the construction recognises the Agreement may not have been drafted with careful attention to its form and legal effect, and that I ought to adopt a generous construction in light of the customs and working conditions of prisons as that advanced by the Minister.

65      A rigid adherence to clause 28.1, without consideration of other parts of the clause and Agreement, effectively results in an Officer rostered on a 12 hour shift and volunteering to undertake overtime having part of their pay protected or preserved. That is, clause 28.4 preserves their full pay for the successive shift when they return after a 10 hour break, but not at all on return from a 12 hour  shift.  This is an absurd result.

66      I find that the parties did not intend for clause 28.1 and 28.2 to preclude an Officer rostered on 12 hour shift patterns from working overtime on a voluntary basis.  Further, in circumstances where Officers on 12 hour shift rosters voluntarily worked overtime, then clause 28.4 applies to require an Officer to have 10 hours off duty without loss of pay.

67      The answer to the question posed by the Minister is “no”.