The applicant Union’s member was a police officer who travelled to the UK in March 2021 as part of a recruitment drive, promoting living and working as a police officer in Western Australia.

The Union and the Police Commissioner were in dispute about whether the member was entitled to overtime pay for the hours outside his rostered ordinary hours, while he was on the long-haul flights to and from London, and while he was waiting at the respective airports.

The issue was what the relevant overtime clause in the applicable industrial agreement meant when it referred to “all time worked.”

The Union invoked s 46 of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) to resolve the question of the meaning of ‘all time worked’ in the Western Australian Police Force Industrial Agreement 2022. Section 46 empowers the Industrial Relations Commission to declare the true interpretation of an award or industrial agreement that is in force.

The Union argued that any time that an officer is doing an activity because they are instructed, directed or required by the Police Commissioner to do it, they are working. The Union said that if an officer travels on an 18-hour flight paid for, organised by and required by the Police Commissioner, time spent on the flight is time spent working.

The Police Commissioner argued that while time spent on a flight may in some circumstances be time spent working, it would only be time spent working if during that time the officer was on duty in the sense of either being rostered on duty or being directed outside of rostered hours to engage in policing activities.

Senior Commissioner Cosentino analysed the text of the industrial agreement to ascertain what was the objective intention of the parties when referring to “all time worked” in the overtime clause. The Senior Commissioner noted that other provisions of the Agreement contained themes that indicated rosters are the primary means of determining when an officer is on-duty, that being on-duty and working are interchangeable, that there is intended to be a clear line between when an officer is on duty and when an officer is off duty, and time spent travelling to and from work is not itself time worked.

The Senior Commissioner then considered what being on duty involved. In this regard, the Police Force Regulations provide strong indications of what is and is not consistent with being on duty. An officer must be able to devote themselves “exclusively and zealously” to the discharge of their duties when on duty, which indicates that being on duty that is generally inconsistent with the officer, at the same time, being able to engage in private activities, such as sleeping, enjoying entertainment or engaging in private correspondence.

The Decision can be read here.

In proceedings commenced by two unions to vary the Municipal Employees (Western Australia) Award 2021, the Western Australian Local Government Association is acting as agent for several employer parties.  The WALGA acts for those employers because it is registered as an industrial agent under the IR Act. The WALGA then additionally applied to be permitted to intervene in its own right, as the representative of the local government sector more broadly. It did so because the proceedings have potential ramifications for the local government sector, and because its local government employer members will be directly affected by the outcome in the proceedings.

The application to intervene was opposed by all of the represented parties, other than those the WALGA acts for.

The Senior Commissioner regarded the WALGA as having an indirect, but not a direct, interest in the proceedings. As a representative body, it did not have the direct interest that its members have, as it is not a registered employer organisation under the IR Act. However, having an indirect interest, meant that the Commission had a discretion to permit the WALGA to intervene, In exercising the discretion, the requirements of natural justice are the primary consideration.

The Senior Commissioner found that natural justice did not require that the WALGA be permitted to intervene, because the indirect interest it has could be advanced in other ways, namely by local governments themselves applying to intervene should they wish to do so.  The Senior Commissioner recognised that while efficiencies might be achieved by the WALGA intervening, this was not a significant factor in favour of permitting intervention. It would not, for instance, prevent individual local governments from also seeking to be separately represented.

On the other hand, the potential difficulties associated with permitting the WALGA to intervene were significant. The WALGA has a potential conflict between its interest, and those of the individual local governments it currently acts as agent for. If it ceases to act for those local governments, those local governments may then be disadvantaged by having to incur costs of alternative representation, or being unrepresented. The WALGA’s intervention would potentially also mean it is acting contrary to the Code of Conduct for industrial agents. These factors weighed against permission being given.

The Senior Commissioner dismissed the intervention application.

The Decision can be read here.

The Commission, of its own motion, initiated proceedings to vary the Aboriginal Communities and Organisations Western Australia Interim Award 2011 under s40B of the Industrial Relations Act. Section 40B allows the Commission to vary an award for any of the following relevant purposes:

• to ensure that the award does not contain wages that are less than the minimum award wage as ordered by the Commission under s 50A;
• to ensure that the award does not contain provisions that discriminate against an employee on any ground on which discrimination in work is unlawful under the Equal Opportunity Act 1984(WA);
• to ensure that the award does not contain provisions that are obsolete or need updating; and
• to ensure that the award is consistent with the facilitation of the efficient organisation and performance of work according to the needs of an industry and enterprises within it, balanced with fairness to the employees in the industry and enterprises.

The interested parties broadly agreed that the Award ought to be varied under s 40B:

• That clause 7 - Enterprise Flexibility should be removed as being contrary to the principles summarised in City of Cockburn v Western Australia Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union of Employees (WASU) & Ors [2023] WAIRC 00787 and applied in Commission’s Own Motion v (Not Applicable) [2023] WAIRC 00836;
• That Schedule B should be varied to remove salary rates which are below the minimum rates set under s 50A;
• That Schedule F should be updated to remove parties that no longer exist and to correct party names; and
• That discriminatory definitions of ‘spouse’ or ‘de facto’ should be removed.

The only contentious issue was what variations should be made to the rates of pay in Schedule B to achieve the purposes of s 40B. The WASU argued that the Commission should not only increase the Level 1 salaries below the statutory minimum, but also increase all rates in the Award to establish increases in pay for the steps within each classification level.

Senior Commissioner Cosentino declined to do this. The Senior Commissioner noted that the power in s 40B was limited to effecting variations for the purposes stated in the section, and that any variation to wage rates must be in accordance with the Statement of Principles contained in the State Wage Case General Order. As WASU had not addressed or satisfied any such principle, the Senior Commissioner ordered that only those wage rates that were below the statutory minimum be increased, and then that they be increased only to align with the statutory minimum.

The Senior Commissioner also rejected WASU’s argument that the pay increments within each level were an unintended distortion, noting that predecessor instruments appeared to intend to deliberately phase out pay increments within levels.

The Award was varied accordingly.

The Decision can be read here.

The Transport Workers Union applied to the Commission to vary the Transport Workers (General) Award to consolidate it with the Breadcarters (Metropolitan) Award and the Breadcarters (Country) Award. The Breadcarters Awards which cover employees working in bread and bakery product distribution, have historical origins linked to regulation contained in the now repealed Bread Act 1903. The applicant sought the consolidation in anticipation of the Commission’s Own Motion review of the scope of the General Award in CICS 20 of 2022, and so that the Breadcarters Awards could then be cancelled.

The Baking Industry Employers Association of Western Australia Inc did not oppose the variations the applicant sought. No one else opposed the variations.

Senior Commissioner Cosentino granted the application amending the General Award, on the basis that the Senior Commissioner considered it was appropriate that the terms and conditions of employment of transport worked engaged in the distribution of bread have conditions aligned with transport workers generally. The variations include savings provisions to ensure any more favourable entitlements under the Breadcarters Awards are preserved.

The Decision can be read here.

In an appeal from the Industrial Magistrates Court, the Full Bench was required to consider the meaning of the Public Service Award 1992’s provisions about representational rights.

The appellant is an employee association. It was the nominated representative of two of the respondent’s employees for the purpose of dealing with disciplinary processes involving the employees.

The appellant commenced proceedings against the respondent in the Industrial Magistrates Court, alleging that it had breached the Award’s representational rights provisions when the respondent emailed an invitation to the employees to attend a meeting about the disciplinary matters, without communicating directly with the Civil Service Association as the employee’s nominated representative. Clause 36A(3) of the Award says that an employer “will recognise the choice of representative made by an officer, which may include a union representative, a union official or an employee of the union.” However, the appellant alleged the respondent’s conduct was in breach of clause 36A(4) of the Award, not clause 36A(3). Clause 36A(4) says that when an employer has been notified in writing that a representative acts for an officer, and certain information is contained in the notice, then “the employer must recognise that person’s representational capacity in all future dealings on that matter.”

At first instance, the Industrial Magistrate accepted the appellant’s argument that clause 36A(4) imposed a mandatory obligation on the respondent to recognise the appellant’s representational capacity. But her Honour dismissed the appellant’s claim because her Honour was satisfied that the appellant’s representational capacity was recognised when the respondent informed the employees, in writing, that they were entitled to have a union representative attend the meeting with them.

In appealing from the dismissal of the claim, the appellant alleged that the Industrial Magistrate had incorrectly interpreted clause 36A(4).

The Full Bench embarked on its own consideration of the meaning of clause 36A(4). It formed a different view to the Industrial Magistrate, finding that clause 36A(3) contained the substantive obligation in relation to representation, whereas clause 36A(4) did not impose any proactive or additional obligation. Rather, clause 36A(4) provided the process for triggering and enabling observance of the obligation in clause 36A(3). As this construction is not one which would have resulted in the appellant’s success at first instance, the appeal was dismissed.

The Decision can be read here.