The Commission, of its own motion, initiated a review of the Manufacturing, Maintenance and Metal Trades Award, formerly known as the Metal Trades (General) Award, pursuant to s 40B of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA).  The proceedings were initiated to ensure the award is consistent with the efficient organisation and performance of work in the relevant industry while maintaining fairness for employees.  Specifics of the review were to ensure the award does not contain wages less than the statutory minimum award wage, to remove outdated and obsolete provisions, to ensure compliance with current employment standards prescribed in the Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA), and to ensure it does not contain discriminatory provisions contrary to the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA).

The Commission provided notice of its intention to vary the Award to UnionsWA, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry WA, the Minister for Industrial Relations, and the Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing & Kindred Industries Union of Workers – Western Australian Branch (AFMEPKIU), and Electrical Trades Union WA (ETU) both being union parties to the award.

The Commission also provided notice to the Australian Industry Group and the Motor Trades Association of Western Australia. The Commission also sought further input from interested parties, including the Private Sector Labour Relations division of the Department of Local Government.

Key amendments to the award focus on modernisation and coherence by updating definitions to reflect contemporary statutory terminology, removing provisions that are obsolete or redundant, aligning employment conditions with current statutory minimum standards, and replacing gendered language with gender neutral terminology to ensure consistency with current standards and legislation.

Significant changes include revised hours of work and rest break provisions, updated redundancy and leave clauses, simplified wage tables expressed as total weekly rates, and the removal of outdated structural efficiency and supplementary payment provisions. Numerous allowances were updated or linked to equivalent provisions in a modern award to ensure ongoing adjustment, and administrative provisions were amended to reflect contemporary payment, record‑keeping and electronic access practices.

Senior Commissioner Cosentino determined it was appropriate to vary the award in accordance with the proposed changes.  Accordingly, the Award was varied in the manner set out in the Schedule to the decision. The variations are to take effect from a date calculated by reference to publication of the Commission’s order in the Industrial Gazette.

 The decision can be read here.   

The applicant applied to the Commission to register the City of Canning Industrial Agreement 2025 under the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA). The proposed agreement was intended to replace an existing enterprise agreement following the transition of local government employees from the national to the State industrial relations system.

Two employee organisations supported the application and were named as parties to the proposed agreement. A third employee organisation, which had participated in bargaining, applied to intervene and opposed registration unless it was included as a party. The respondent contended that the agreement should not be registered or alternatively should be varied to include it as a party.

The respondent’s submissions raised issues concerning statutory construction, representation rights, and alleged misrepresentation during bargaining.

Commissioner Kucera considered whether the proposed agreement satisfied the statutory requirements for registration, including whether it was validly made and whether the Commission was satisfied that it should be registered. Central to the dispute was the proper construction of provisions governing multi‑union industrial agreements and employee eligibility for union membership.

The Commissioner examined whether the legislation requires all employees bound by an agreement to be eligible for membership of each union party, or whether eligibility for membership of at least one union party is sufficient. The Commissioner also considered submissions relating to good faith bargaining, the role of negotiating parties, alleged misrepresentations during bargaining, and the scope of the Commission’s power to vary an agreement prior to registration.

The Commissioner concluded that the legislation permits the registration of a multi union industrial agreement where employees bound by the agreement are eligible for membership of at least one of the union parties. There is no requirement for employees to be eligible for membership of every union party. The proposed agreement was found to have been genuinely agreed to by the applicant and the named union parties, and to otherwise meet the statutory criteria for registration.  There is no requirement for employees to be eligible for membership of every union party. The proposed agreement was found to have been genuinely agreed to by the applicant and the named union parties, and to otherwise meet the statutory criteria for registration.

It was further determined that participation in bargaining does not, of itself, confer an entitlement to be named as a party to an agreement. In this case, the absence of agreement between the applicant and the respondent as to party status was determinative.

The Commissioner also held that the Commission does not have power to vary a proposed agreement to add an additional party without the consent of the existing parties. Allegations raised by the respondent concerning misrepresentation and bargaining conduct were not accepted as a basis to refuse registration and were considered matters capable of being addressed, if necessary, in separate proceedings.

Accordingly, the Commissioner was satisfied that the proposed agreement should be registered and ordered accordingly.

The decision can be read here.   

The Industrial Appeal Court has upheld an appeal concerning public holiday pay for a prison officer employed as a Principal Officer. The appeal arose from a decision of the Full Bench of the Commission about whether a full‑time officer working Monday to Friday was entitled to overtime for work performed on a public holiday.

The dispute followed the appellant’s attendance at work on the King’s Birthday public holiday in September 2022. She was paid her ordinary rate under an annualised salary. The appellant contended that, under the applicable industrial agreement, officers in her classification were not required to work public holidays as part of their ordinary hours. She argued that any work performed on such a day therefore constituted overtime.

At first instance, the Industrial Magistrates Court found in favour of the appellant. It held that the industrial agreement did not require Monday to Friday officers to work public holidays as part of their ordinary hours and that their annualised salary did not include payment for such work. In reaching that conclusion, the Court relied on the structure of the agreement and the history of earlier instruments, which distinguished between officers who were required to work public holidays and those who were not. The Court concluded that the appellant’s work on the public holiday was overtime and ordered payment of the shortfall, together with the imposition of a pecuniary penalty.

On appeal, a majority of the Full Bench of the Commission overturned the Magistrate’s decision. The majority considered that, under the agreement, payment for work performed on public holidays was included in an officer’s annualised salary unless expressly excluded. It concluded that the appellant had worked her ordinary and rostered hours on the relevant day and was therefore not entitled to overtime. The Full Bench considered the relevant provisions to be unambiguous and set aside the Magistrate’s findings and orders.

The matter was referred to the Industrial Appeal Court in November 2025. The Court held that the Full Bench had erred by construing the relevant provisions narrowly and in isolation, rather than reading the agreement as a whole and in its industrial and historical context. When the clauses dealing with ordinary hours, annualised salary, public holidays, and overtime were read together, the Court found that ambiguity arose.

The Court drew a critical distinction between an officer being directed to work on a public holiday and being required to work public holidays as part of their ordinary hours. It concluded that Monday to Friday officers were not required to work public holidays as part of their ordinary hours. Significant weight was placed on the history of predecessor agreements, which showed that public holiday work had previously attracted higher remuneration and that the annualised salary for such officers did not include compensation for public holiday work, other than Easter Sunday.

On its proper construction, public holidays falling on weekdays were days on which Monday to Friday officers were ordinarily entitled to be absent on paid leave. Where such officers were directed to attend work on a public holiday, the work performed constituted overtime.

The Court set aside the Full Bench’s decision and remitted the matter to the Commission to determine outstanding issues relating to penalty.

The decision can be read here.   

The appellant was dismissed from his position as a conservation employee in July 2024, following the completion of a disciplinary process by the respondent. The appellant lodged an application alleging unfair dismissal with the Commission in August 2024. Two conciliation conferences occurred in November 2024 and February 2025, but the matter did not resolve. At the later conference, discussion took place about steps required for the matter to proceed, and the Commission subsequently directed the appellant to file an application for leave to amend the original claim by February 2025. The appellant then represented by legal practitioners, sought to substantially recast the original claim, and filed an application containing proposed amendments that constituted a submission of the original claim. The respondent opposed the amendment.

The Commission determined the amendment application on the papers in accordance with its earlier directions. It found that the proposed amendments were extensive and unexplained, that reliance on discussions from the conciliation conference was impermissible due to confidentiality, and that the amendments would prejudice the respondent by requiring significant additional work. The Commission also considered that the appellant had not provided evidence supporting the need for the amendment, nor explaining the delay or the departure from aspects of the original claim. Accordingly, leave to amend was refused.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the Commission erred by determining the matter on the papers without permitting further submissions or evidence, failed to properly consider whether an oral hearing was required, wrongly treated conciliation discussions as confidential, and placed undue weight on the alleged prejudice to the respondent, rendering the decision unreasonable. The respondent opposed the appeal, submitting that the procedural directions had been agreed, no procedural unfairness arose, and the appellant —who was legally represented—made a choice not to provide evidence or request a hearing. The Full Bench noted that the amendment application was interlocutory in nature, and that no evidence had been presented to support the appellant’s assertions about the conference discussions.

The Full Bench held that the appeal concerned an interlocutory finding and could only proceed if the public interest requirement under the legislative test was met. It concluded that the issues raised were routine procedural matters and did not amount to questions of principle warranting appellate intervention. The Full Bench found no procedural unfairness or injustice, noting that the appellant had opportunity to present material, was legally represented, and did not seek to be further heard. It further held that the Commission was entitled to determine the matter on the material before it, particularly in circumstances where the proposed amendment was substantial, unsupported by evidence, and unexplained as to delay or necessity. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

The decision can be read here.   

The applicant sought an order from the Commission under s 73 of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) (IR Act) cancelling the registration of the respondent as a registered organisation. The applicant contended that the respondent was defunct for the purposes of s 73(12)(b) of the IR Act. Although the matter was initially listed for hearing in December 2025, the respondent informed the Commission that it did not oppose the application, and the Commission determined the matter on the papers.

The Commission examined extensive evidence provided by the applicant, including two statutory declarations, which established that the respondent had failed to comply with its statutory obligations for many years. These obligations included filing annual office holder and membership returns, notifying changes in office holders, and submitting audited financial statements, as required under ss 63 and 65 of the IR Act and associated regulations. The respondent had not filed office holder or membership returns since 2018, had not notified any changes in office holders since July 2008, and had not submitted audited financial statements for financial years ending June 2018 through June 2024.

The Commission noted that these failures were systemic rather than isolated and emphasised that compliance with statutory reporting obligations serves important functions of transparency, accountability, and democratic control within registered organisations. The prolonged and widespread non‑compliance demonstrated that the respondent was not operating as an organisation bound by the IR Act. The Commission also observed that a previous attempt by the respondent to request cancellation of its own registration had been invalid, as it did not meet the evidentiary requirements prescribed by regulation 75.

The Commission found that the respondent was no longer operative and therefore defunct within the meaning of s 73(12)(b). As the Act provides no discretion once this threshold is met, the Commission concluded that cancellation of the respondent’s registration was mandatory. Accordingly, the Commission issued an order cancelling the respondent’s registration as a registered organisation.

The decision can be read here.