The time limit for filing claims of unfair dismissal in the Commission is 28 days from the date of dismissal. The applicant, a hairdresser, filed her claim 79 days outside the 28-day time limit in the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA).

After filing her late application, the applicant was then unable to attend several scheduled conciliation conferences. Her claim stalled.

The Commission listed the application for hearing to determine whether it should grant the applicant an extension of time to commence the claim. Commissioner Walkington applied the established principles for extending time, considering the relevant factors being:

• the length of the delay
• the applicant’s explanation or reasons for the delay
• any prejudice to the respondent
• the apparent merits of the claim, and
• broader considerations of fairness.

Part of the delay was explained by the fact that the applicant had erroneously lodged an unfair dismissal claim in the wrong jurisdiction, namely, the Fair Work Commission. However, that claim had been dismissed by July 2024. While the applicant relied on medical evidence that injury and mental health issues were affecting her at the relevant time,  Commissioner Walkington was not satisfied that this evidence demonstrated she was unable to lodge an unfair dismissal claim (given she did file a claim in the Fair Work Commission), and it did not adequately explain the delay after the Fair Work Commission proceedings ended, particularly as she was able to correspond and take other steps during that period.

The Commissioner considered the applicant’s lack of urgency once she knew the Commission was the correct forum weighed against granting an extension. Accordingly, the application was dismissed.

The decision can be read here.

The substantive proceedings in this matter concern a union’s application for an enterprise order under s 42I of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA). The proceedings had earlier been stayed on the employer’s application, pending proceedings for registration of an industrial agreement to which the employer, but not the union applicant, was party.

The agreement registration proceedings were resolved in January 2026, bringing an end to the previous stay. In March 2026, the employer applied for a further adjournment or stay, relying on separate Commission in Court Session proceedings under s 72A of the IR Act, which relate to the applicant union’s right to represent employees in local government, including the respondent’s employees.

It was argued that the Commission in Court Session decision could affect whether the Commission had power to grant the enterprise order sought, and that it was preferable to await that decision to avoid inconsistent findings, wasted costs, and further proceedings to unwind any order made.

Senior Commissioner Cosentino declined to stay the proceedings for a second time. The Senior Commissioner considered where the interests of justice lay and the union’s entitlement to have its case heard. She considered that it was premature to determine that there was any overlap between the issues before the Commission in Court Session and the enterprise order proceedings, and that because the employer was not party to the proceedings before the Commission in Court Session, it was not being ‘vexed’ by two sets of litigation over the same issues.  Ultimately, the prejudice that would be occasioned to the union applicant was determinative. Delaying the proceedings would risk rendering the applicant union’s claim practically futile.

Senior Commissioner Cosentino refused the respondent’s application to adjourn or stay the proceedings.

The decision can be read here.

The appellant was employed by the respondent as Director of Product Development and Customer Experience from December 2021 until April 2023, when the respondent terminated her employment due to redundancy. The appellant then commenced proceedings in the Commission alleging that, upon termination, the respondent had denied various contractual benefits said to be payable under her employment contract. Most of her claims were based on an alleged contractual entitlement to full-time hours and commensurate pay.

At first instance, the Commission upheld the appellant’s claim for payment in lieu of notice. It found that the contract provided for four weeks’ notice, but only two weeks had been paid, and it ordered payment of the balance. The Commission dismissed the remaining denied contractual benefit claims.

The Commission found that in November 2022, the appellant and the respondent orally agreed that the appellant would temporarily reduce ordinary hours from full-time to four days per week, with a commensurate reduction in salary. Although the contract contained a clause stating that variations were to be by written agreement, the Commission concluded that the parties could nevertheless bind themselves by an oral variation where they agreed to the change and objectively intended it to be contractual. On that basis, the Commission held that the appellant was not entitled to recover the alleged shortfalls.

On appeal, the appellant advanced nine grounds. The majority concerned whether there had been a valid reduction in the contracted hours of work and salary. The Full Bench considered whether an oral agreement could validly vary the contract notwithstanding a clause requiring variations to be in writing, and whether the purported variation was supported by consideration and was sufficiently certain and complete.

Applying established principles, the Full Bench held that a writing requirement cannot preclude the parties from later agreeing to an oral variation, though the clause remains a relevant evidentiary consideration when determining objective intention. The Full Bench found a sound basis for the conclusion that the parties intended to be bound by the November 2022 agreement, including subsequent conduct consistent with a four-day arrangement.

The Full Bench affirmed the Commission’s finding that the employment contract was validly varied in November 2022 to reduce ordinary hours and salary, and that the writing requirement did not, on the evidence, prevent the oral variation from becoming binding. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

The decision can be read on the Commission’s website here.

The appellant commenced an appeal in the Commission against a 2024 decision of the Public Service Appeal Board. The notice of appeal was filed in January 2026 and was therefore substantially out of time.

The applicant sought to challenge the Public Service Appeal Board’s decision on grounds said to involve jurisdictional error, denial of procedural fairness and matters of public importance.

The Full Bench held that s 49 of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) permits appeals only from decisions of the Commission constituted by a Commissioner, and does not confer a right of appeal from decisions of the Public Service Appeal Board. The Full Bench noted that the abolition of the Public Service Appeal Board did not alter the limits of s 49. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

The decision can be read here.    

These proceedings concern a long-running matter about whether the respondent was validly appointed to fill a casual vacancy in the office of union secretary after the incumbent secretary resigned in August 2024. The union’s Council made the appointment under the rules.

The applicant argued the appointment was invalid because the respondent did not meet the rules for holding the office of secretary. The applicant sought orders removing the respondent and confirming the applicant’s later appointment. The Registrar supported the applicant’s position.

The main issue for the Commission to decide was whether a person appointed to a casual vacancy must meet the same eligibility rules as someone elected to the role, including having been a financial member for the two years immediately before the appointment.

The evidence was that the respondent’s employment as the union’s chief executive ended in September 2023. There was evidence of later periods in which the respondent was not employed by the union, as well as an intervening period of casual work. The applicant contended that these matters meant the respondent could not show continuous eligible and financial membership for the required two‑year period.

The Chief Commissioner held that the respondent’s membership ceased when the respondent’s employment as chief executive ended in September 2023 and also ceased during later periods when the respondent was not employed by the union and no other basis of eligibility was established. In the absence of contrary evidence from the respondent, the Commission was satisfied that the respondent was not eligible for membership throughout the required two‑year period and therefore did not meet the qualification requirement for appointment to the casual vacancy.

The Commission declared the August 2024 appointment invalid and made consequential orders, but declined to order an early election, noting the proximity of the ordinary election timetable and the importance of stability in the union’s administration.

The decision can be read here.