The applicant was employed in the public sector as a Senior Registrar in Psychiatry with the respondent on a 0.2 FTE fixed-term contract from August 2024 to February 2025. By letter in September 2024, the employer confirmed with the applicant that he was not required to attend work until further notice, and in the meantime would be paid in accordance with his fixed-term contract of employment.

The applicant referred the matter to the Commission under the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) (IR Act)’s new provisions about matters relating to public sector employment. The applicant was, seeking reinstatement or an apology, claiming he was suspended from work without adequate explanation, arbitrarily, without reasons or procedural fairness.

The employer applied to have the matter dismissed, arguing that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, the remedies sought by the applicant were unavailable to him, and the application was out of time.

The respondent put forward several arguments including reference to s 23 of the IR Act which prevents the Commission from regulating suspensions if another Act provides an appeal mechanism. The respondent also referred to s 171 of the Health Services Act 2016 (WA) (HS Act), stating that appeals to the Commission are only allowed for suspensions on partial pay or without pay, not full pay. Since the applicant was suspended on full pay, the respondent argued that the matter did not qualify as an “industrial matter” under the HS Act and the IR Act. Additionally, it argued that the Commission could not order reinstatement or an apology in these circumstances.

Commissioner Emmanuel found that only suspensions on partial pay or without pay are industrial matters that may be referred to the Commission. Commissioner Emmanuel concluded that while the applicant was directed not to attend work, he continued to be paid as though working, which did not amount to a suspension under the HS Act. Further, there was no evidence of disciplinary action or a relevant decision under the HS Act, nor could the Commission order reinstatement or an apology, as there had been no dismissal. Accordingly, the application was dismissed.

The decision can be read here.  

In these proceedings, the applicant invoked the new provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) about referrals of public sector employment matters to challenge three decisions made by her employer: a permanent transfer to a new role, refusal of leave without pay (LWOP), and the blocking of her internal grievance process.  She argued that each decision involved a misinterpretation and misapplication of statutory provisions under the Public Sector Management Act 1994 (PSM Act), specifically those relating to fair treatment, suitability, procedural fairness, and grievance resolution.

The respondent maintained that the Commission’s jurisdiction under s 36AA(2)(b) is limited to disputes about the interpretation of a “conditions of service provision” under the PSM Act. It argued that the applicant’s grievances related to the application of statutory principles, not their interpretation, and that the LWOP decision was made under the Award, which does not invoke the Commission’s jurisdiction.

Commissioner Tsang noted that for jurisdiction to be established under s 36AA(2)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA), the dispute must relate to the interpretation of a “conditions of service provision” under the PSM Act, not merely dissatisfaction with how discretion was exercised. The Commissioner determined that the applicant’s grievances were about the application of statutory principles to her circumstances, rather than a genuine dispute over the meaning of those provisions.

As a result, the application was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

  The decision can be read here.  

The Commission of its own motion initiated two matters for variation of the Bakers’ (Metropolitan) Award No 13 of 1987 (Award) under ss 40B and 37D of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (IR Act). The proceedings, which were dealt with in tandem, were initiated to consolidate this award with the Bakers’ (Country) Award No. 18 of 1977 and the Pastrycooks’ Award No. 24 of 1981, as all three contained outdated provisions. The review of the Award was conducted to ensure the award does not contain wages less than the statutory minimum wage, to remove outdated and obsolete provisions, and to ensure compliance with current employment standards prescribed by the Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA).

The Commission provided notice of its intention to vary the Award to UnionsWA, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry WA, the Minister for Industrial Relations, and the United Workers Union, Western Australian branch as the union party to the Award. The Commission also provided notice of its intention to vary the Award to the Baking Industry Employers Association of Western Australia, and 15 employers. The Commission also sought further input from interested parties, including the Private Sector Labour Relations division of the Department of Local Government.

Key amendments include:

• The Award's scope was expanded to cover all baking industry employers and employees in Western Australia without geographical limits, reflecting the repeal of the Bread Act 1982 and removing anomalous boundaries between metropolitan and country areas.
•  The Award's title being changed to the Baking Industry Award.
•  Provisions for wages and allowances were simplified, removing obsolete safety net references and classifications from the Pastrycooks’ Award No. 24 of 1981 were included.
• The provisions for leave entitlements – including family and domestic violence leave and parental leave, have been updated to align with current standards and legislation.
• Hours of work clauses were simplified following repeal of the Bread Act 1982, with overtime provisions updated to reference the Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA). Penalty rates were restructured for clarity, and provisions from consolidated awards were incorporated to preserve conditions.
• Provisions related to records and right of entry, posting of the Award, and dispute resolution were revised for modern compliance and clarity, including removal of obsolete references and enabling electronic provision of the Award.

The changes took effect from 1 October 2025.

The decision can be read here.  

The applicant applied to the Work Health and Safety Tribunal (Tribunal) for an external review of the respondent’s decision to cancel a provisional improvement notice (PIN). The applicant’s employer sought leave to intervene in the proceedings, arguing that it had a direct interest in the outcome as it would bear the consequences if the Tribunal set aside the decision.  The respondent supported the employer’s application, stating that the employer was best placed to provide additional information of the circumstances to assist the Tribunal.

The Tribunal sought submissions from the parties regarding the matter of granting leave to intervene. The employer argued that while the respondent is the proper contradictor, its submissions are limited under Work Health and Safety legislation and therefore may not address all necessary matters at hand. The respondent supported this view, citing the employer’s direct interest in the matter, their compliance with the issued PIN, and the assistance they would provide to the Tribunal. The applicant did not oppose the employer’s intervention but insisted that the respondent should fully participate in the proceedings. The applicant further argued that since the employer had already complied with the PIN, the risk in the workplace had been removed, and therefore there was no compliance risk to the employer if the PIN were to be reinstated.

In reviewing submissions by the parties, the Tribunal referred to the principles set out in the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) (IR Act) and relevant case law, which emphasise that a person whose rights will be directly affected by an order must be given a full and fair opportunity to be heard.

The Tribunal concluded that the employer’s interest in the matter was sufficient to justify intervention. The Tribunal was persuaded that the intervening party would be directly affected by the order sought by the applicant and was best placed to provide additional evidence about the current circumstances. Accordingly, the Tribunal issued an order under s 27(1)(k) of the IR Act, to allow the employer to intervene in the application.

The decision can be read here.  

The applicant made an application for an interpretation of the term "full pay" as used in s 82 of the Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA) (PSM Act) and the Department of Justice (Youth Custodial Officers) CSA Agreement 2022. This issue arose when a Juvenile Custodial Officer, who was receiving a Higher Duties Allowance (HDA), was suspended due to a breach of discipline. The officer was initially paid the HDA during the suspension, but it was later discontinued.

The applicant argued that "full pay" should include the HDA during the suspension period, supported by the officer’s rostered acting position, and sought a declaration interpreting “full pay” under s 46 of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) (IR Act), because the term was not explicitly defined in the Agreement.

The respondent contended that the Public Service Arbitrator lacked the jurisdiction to make the declaration sought by the applicant, and that interpreting "full pay" in the PSM Act would require statutory interpretation principles, which differ from those applied to an Award or Agreement.  The respondent also argued that a declaration under s 46 of the IR Act would not solve the dispute, and urged the Arbitrator to exercise discretion against doing so.

Commissioner Walkington considered whether the Arbitrator had jurisdiction to interpret the term "full pay" and, if so, whether to exercise discretion to issue a declaration. The Commissioner noted that s 46 of the IR Act empowers the Commission to interpret awards and agreements it has made but limits statutory provisions like the PSM Act. The Commissioner also noted that the Agreement did not contain provisions regulating the suspension of employees, and a declaration under s 46 would not assist in determining the meaning of "full pay" in the context of suspension and HDA application.

The Commissioner declined to make the declaration and concluded that the Public Service Arbitrator did not have the necessary jurisdiction to declare the meaning of a statutory term under s 46 of the IR Act, and that a declaration would not resolve the dispute regarding the meaning of "full pay" in the context of the suspension. Accordingly, the application was dismissed.

The decision can be read here.